State v. Lead Industries Assn., Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 April 2001
• Docket Number: C.A. 99-5226
• Parties: STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, by and through SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Attorney General v. LEAD INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, INC.; AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY; ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY; E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; THE O'BRIEN COMPANY; CONAGRA GROCERY PRODUCTS COMPANY; THE GLIDDEN COMPANY; NL INDUSTRIES, INC.; SCM CHEMICALS; THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY; and JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, by and through SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Attorney General v. LEAD INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, INC.; AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY; ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY; E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; THE O'BRIEN COMPANY; CONAGRA GROCERY PRODUCTS COMPANY; THE GLIDDEN COMPANY; NL INDUSTRIES, INC.; SCM CHEMICALS; THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY; and JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS

C.A. No. 99-5226

Superior Court of Rhode Island

April 2, 2001

DECISION

SILVERSTEIN J.

Before the Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, are defendants' motions to dismiss and the plaintiff's objection thereto.

Facts/Travel

On October 12, 1999, the Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island (the Attorney General or the State) filed a complaint against several lead pigment manufacturers and their trade association, specifically nine named defendants^[1] and John Doe Corporations collectively identified herein as the lead^[2] industry. In its complaint, the State alleges an extensive history of defendants' conduct consisting of misrepresentations and concealment of evidence regarding the hazards of lead. The State claims that it has been damaged because it has incurred, and continues to incur, substantial costs related to discovering and abating lead, detecting lead poisoning, and providing (i) medical and/or other care for lead-poisoned residents of this state, (ii) education programs for children suffering injuries as a result of lead exposure and (iii) education programs for state residents.^[3] In seeking compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and other equitable relief, the State pled ten causes of action: (i) public nuisance, (ii) violation of the Rhode Island Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act, G.L. 1956 § 6-13.1-1 et seq. (UTPA), (iii) strict liability, (iv) negligence (v) negligent misrepresentations and omissions, (vi) fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, (vii) civil conspiracy, (viii) unjust enrichment, (ix) indemnity and (x) equitable relief to protect children.

Certain defendants filed their motion to dismiss on January 31, 2000. On the same date, defendant The Sherwin-Williams Company (Sherwin-Williams) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on constitutional grounds. On May 31, 2000, defendant Lead Industries Association (LIA) filed a motion to dismiss wherein it joined Sherwin-Williams' argument to dismiss based on constitutional grounds. In early June, the State filed briefs in opposition to the defendants' motions filed on January 31, 2000, to which Sherwin-Williams, the LIA and certain defendants filed reply briefs on August 15, 2000. On July 21, 2000, the State filed its first amended complaint wherein it merely added ConAgra as a defendant.^[4] Defendant ConAgra filed its motion to dismiss on September 15, 2000. On October 12, 2000, the Court heard extensive oral argument on the motions to dismiss and the State's objection thereto. Subsequent to the availability of a transcript of the hearing, the parties simultaneously filed post-hearing briefs on or about December 14, 2000.

Relying on various theories and over the State's objection, the defendants move this Court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss for failure to state any cause of action cognizable under Rhode Island law.

Motion to Dismiss

It is well-settled that the sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I. 1989). "When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the trial justice must look no further than the complaint, assume that all allegations in the complaint are true, and resolve any doubts in a plaintiff's favor." Estate of Sherman v Almeida, 747 A.2d 470, 473 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties Union Inc., 557 A.2d at 1232). "When it appears clear beyond a reasonable doubt that plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts, a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted." Solomon v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 685 A.2d 1073, 1074 (R.I. 1996) (order) (citing Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I. 1991)).

Attorney General's Capacity to Bring this Suit

At the outset, the defendants challenge the Attorney General's authority in bringing this suit on behalf of the State. The Attorney General counters that his authority derives from the following three distinct capacities: (1) proprietary, as the State's corporate attorney; (2) statutory, as provided for in the Rhode Island General Laws; and (3) sovereign, as founded in the common law and established in the Rhode Island Constitution. The State contends that this suit differs in kind from other suits commenced by private individual plaintiffs. Regarding the Attorney General's authority to bring this action, the defendants primarily challenge the extent of his sovereign capacity to pursue certain claims on behalf of the Rhode Island citizenry.

In this state it is well-settled that "[s]uits for the public should be placed in public and responsible hands." McCarthy v. McAloon, 79 R.I. 55, 62, 83 A.2d 75, 78 (1951) (quoting O'Brien v. Board of Aldermen, 18 R.I. 113, 116, 25 A. 914, 915 (1892)). The public officer vested with that authority is the Attorney General of the state. Id.; see also Stearns v. Newport Hospital, 27 R.I. 309, 316, 62 A. 132, 135 (1905) (Recognizing that the Attorney General is the proper person to represent the public in any judicial inquiry regarding the conduct of the trustee in administering a public trust, our Supreme Court quoted Burbank v. Burbank, 152 Mass. 254, 25 N.E. 427 (1890), "'This duty of maintaining the rights of the public is vested in the Commonwealth, and it is exercised here, as in England, by the attorney-general.'") Although exclusive, the Attorney General's authority to redress a purely public wrong excepts "those instances where one of the public who is injured has a distinct personal legal interest different from that of the public at large." McCarthy, 79 R.I. at 62, 83 A.2d at 78.

The significant powers of the office of Attorney General derive from common and statutory law. "'The office of Attorney General is an ancient one. It came into being as a necessary adjunct in the administration of the common law of England and was transported to America in the early days of the establishment of government in the colonies as part of their English derived common law.'" Suitor v. Nugent, 98 R.I. 56, 58, 199 A.2d 722 (R.I. 1964) (quoting Commonwealth ex re. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 21, 188 A. 524 (1936)). Our Supreme Court recognized, as the Pennsylvania court had noted, that with the office of Attorney General "came the common-law powers and duties thereof to the extent that they were not abridged by constitutional provision." Id. Our constitution "did not purport to create such an office but recognized it as existing and provided for continuance of the powers and duties exercised by its occupant prior to the adoption of the constitution." Id. Specifically, Article IX, section 12 of our constitution provides, "The duties and powers of the . . . attorney-general . . . shall be the same under this constitution as are now established, or as from time to time may be prescribed by law." Accordingly, the common law powers of the Attorney General are not abridged by the Rhode Island Constitution. Further, the Legislature may not "infringe[] upon the fundamental powers of the Attorney General." In Re House of Representatives, 575 A.2d 176, 180 (R.I. 1990) (construing Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 492, 494, 348 A.2d 837, 846-47 (1975)) ("the General Assembly may not abrogate the common law powers of the Attorney General . . . having been stated as those 'prescribed by law'. . . . If an Office is created by the Constitution . . . the position can neither be abolished by statute nor reduced to impotence by the transfer of duties characteristic of the office to another office created by the legislature"). Additionally, the powers of the Attorney General derive from certain statutory authority, including G.L. 1956 §§ 42-9-2, 42-9-5, and 6-13.1-5 (infra). Specifically, in relevant part, G.L. 1956 § 42-9-2 provides that, "The attorney general . . . shall exercise the powers and duties prescribed in and shall enforce the provisions of this chapter and of §§ 12-1-4 --12-1-12 [Title 12 Criminal Procedure], and in all other provisions of the general laws and public laws insofar as they relate to the powers and duties of the attorney general." Further, G.L. 1956 § 42-9-5 provides, "The attorney general shall commence and prosecute to final judgment and execution those other legal or equitable processes, and shall perform those other duties which are or may be required of him or her by law." Accordingly, the Attorney General's authority in bringing this action is comprised of that which existed at common law, as well as that allowed by statute.

The Doctrine of Parens Patriae

A state's authority to vindicate certain interests of the state and its citizens is often referred to as a parens patriae action. "Parens patriae means literally 'parent of the country.'" Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 335 (1^st Cir. Me 2000) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)). The doctrine "creates an exception to normal rules of standing applied to private citizens in recognition of the special role that a State plays in pursuing its quasi-sovereign interests in 'the well-being of its populace.'" Id. (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602); see also Georgia v Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S....