State v. Leathers

• Decision Date: 24 October 1979
• Citation: 407 A.2d 15
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Leon LEATHERS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 15

407 A.2d 15

STATE of Maine v. Leon LEATHERS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 24, 1979.

David W. Crook (orally), Dist. Atty., Skowhegan, for plaintiff.

Butler & Bilodeau by William Thomas Hyde (orally), Skowhegan, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, GODFREY, NICHOLS and GLASSMAN, JJ.

WERNICK, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction entered March 7, 1979 in the Superior Court (Somerset County) on the verdict of a jury finding him guilty of having committed, on August 31, 1977, the crime of "arson" by causing his house to be set on fire "with the intent to enable . . . collect(ion of) insurance proceeds for the loss caused by the fire", in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 802(1)(B)(1). ¹

On the evidence the jury had ample warrant to find beyond a reasonable doubt the following facts. In September, 1976, defendant listed his house in Skowhegan, Maine, for sale. The house did not sell, and there was still no prospect of a sale one year later when the house was destroyed by fire. During the summer of 1977 defendant talked with one of his friends, Albert Poulin, about having his house "taken care of." Poulin then arranged a telephone call from his house to a Maxwell Dragon in Peru, New York, where Dragon lived. Defendant participated in that telephone call by speaking with Dragon, who was then a total stranger to defendant. A few weeks later defendant left Skowhegan to take a vacation trip of several days to Ontario, Canada and Niagara Falls. Before departing, defendant removed many valuable items over four thousand dollars worth of guns, afghans, clothing and bedding from his house. The guns he left in his father's house. He took the afghans, clothing and bedding to a camper belonging to Poulin. While defendant was away on vacation, Maxwell Dragon, at the end of August, came to Skowhegan. He was accompanied by his brother, Thomas. On August 30th, Poulin showed the Dragon brothers the general location of defendant's house and pointed out the house to them. The next day the Dragon brothers filled several milk containers with gasoline, and Poulin, who had access to the key to defendant's house, drove the Dragons to the vicinity of the house. Within half an hour defendant's house was on fire. Two or three weeks after the fire defendant removed the afghans and bedding from Poulin's camper and placed them in an automobile, displaying New York license plates, that Maxwell Dragon had driven to Poulin's house.

This recounting of the facts the jury had warrant to find beyond a reasonable doubt makes plain that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of the crime charged against him. We therefore quickly pass, and reject, defendant's first point on appeal contesting the adequacy of the evidence to support the conviction.

We turn for more extended discussion to the one other point on appeal raised by defendant, that reversible error was committed at trial when, over defendant's objection claiming lack of relevance and improper prejudice to defendant, the presiding Justice permitted an insurance adjuster, called as a witness by the prosecution, to testify as to his opinion that defendant had inflated the values of a few particular items of property listed in the proof of loss filed with the insurance company.

The alleged error occurred when the prosecutor in his direct examination of the insurance adjuster began to question him about certain items of property listed in the proof of loss. When defense counsel objected, asserting that the proffered testimony lacked relevance and had potential to subject defendant to improper prejudice, the prosecutor argued to the presiding Justice (outside the hearing of the jury) that his purpose was to show that defendant had listed as lost in the fire various items which other evidence had shown, or would show, defendant had removed from his house before the fire. The prosecutor contended that defendant's making claim for a loss of property that had not in fact occurred was relevant to show a comprehensive plan by defendant to burn his house with intent to collect insurance proceeds to which he was not legally entitled.

We have no occasion to decide whether the prosecutor's theory of relevance was correct because subsequent developments rendered the prosecutor's theory inapplicable to this case. After the colloquy with the Court when the prosecutor resumed his questioning of the insurance adjuster, instead of asking his about those specific items that independent evidence had shown, or would show, defendant had removed from his house before the fire occurred, the prosecutor asked only about a few other items as to which the evidence indicated no doubt of their having been lost in the fire. In regard Only to these latter items, despite defense counsel's continuing objection of lack of relevance and potential for unfair prejudice to defendant, the insurance adjuster was permitted to state his opinion that defendant had claimed inflated valuations.

Even if it were the fact, and not merely the insurance adjuster's opinion, that defendant exaggerated the values of a few items lost in the fire, that fact would lack relevance to the crime of arson charged against defendant. If, after the fire, defendant may have sought to take advantage of the insurance company by seeking to be paid more for some items lost in the fire than they were really worth, that has no rational tendency, in accordance with the definition of "relevant evidence" set forth in Rule 401 M.R.Evid., to make "more probable or less probable" any "fact . . . of consequence to the determination of . . . " the prosecution of defendant for arson.

Patently lacking is such a probative relation to those facts constituting the essential element of the crime of arson, as charged here, that defendant be responsible for the incendiary...