State v. Lee

• Decision Date: 07 June 1974
• Docket Number: Nos. 5493,5494,s. 5493
• Citation: 523 P.2d 315,55 Haw. 505
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary K. LEE, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Glenn W. MILES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 315

523 P.2d 315

55 Haw. 505

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary K. LEE, Defendant-Appellant.

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Glenn W. MILES, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 5493, 5494.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

June 7, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the phraseology of a statute, HRS § 291-1, relating to careless or heedless operation of vehicles or riding of animals, does not make reference therein to the place where it can be violated, such as on a public street or highway, and the indicated legislative intent appears to be that it would be applicable throughout the state, including private ways and premises, such a statute would apply not only on public property but also on private property.

2. Where the phraseology of a statute, HRS § 291-12, relating to inattention to driving, does not make reference therein to the place where it can be violated, such as on a public street or highway, and the indicated legislative intent appears to be that it would be applicable throughout the state, including private ways and premises, such a statute would apply not only on public property but also on private property.

3. Where the meaning of a penal statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the application of the statutory principle of strict contruction.

4. The legislature has authority under the police power of the state to regulate the operation and control of automobiles wherever they may be within the boundaries of the state, and HRS §§ 291-1 and 291-12, regulating the driving of automobiles otherwise than upon its public streets or highways, are a valid exercise of such police power.

Robert T. Ito, First Deputy Pros. Atty., County of Hawaii, Hilo, for plaintiff-appellant.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and LEVINSON, KOBAYASHI, OGATA and MENOR, JJ.

OGATA, Justice.

On May 11, 1973, defendant-appellee Lee was arraigned in the District Court of the Third Circuit, South Hilo Division, for alleged violation of HRS § 291-12. ¹ The information in this case charged defendant-appellee Lee as follows:

INFORMATION

On or about the 7th day of April, 1973, in Hilo, County and State of Hawaii, MARY K. LEE did operate a motor vehicle on the roadway leading to the Naniloa Hotel, a private property open to the general public, without exercising due care, to wit: by failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to maintain proper control of her vehicle, thereby colliding into an on-coming vehicle, in violation of Section 291-12, Hawaii Revised Statutes, as amended.

Defendant-appellee Lee entered a plea of no contest and the court, sua sponte, took the matter under advisement.

Thereafter, on May 17, 1973, defendant-appellee Miles was arraigned in the District Court of the Third Circuit, Puna Division, for alleged violation of HRS § 291-1. ² The information in the second case charged defendant-appellee Miles as follows:

INFORMATION

On or about the 8th day of April, 1973, in Kapoho, County and State of Hawaii, on Railroad Avenue, a privately-owned road, GLENN W. MILES did operate a vehicle in a careless manner so as to endanger persons and property by traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour, on a ten-foot wide unpaved road that had no shoulders, thereby being unable to avoid colliding with a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, in violation of Section 291-1, Hawaii Revised Statutes.

Defendant-Appellee Miles also pleaded no contest to this charge and the court, sua sponte, took the matter under advisement.

Subsequently, on May 23, 1973, the district court judge filed written opinions in both cases. The charges against both defendants were dismissed, and both defendants were discharged. Except for the description of some factual differences between the cases, and that the first case involved the alleged violation of HRS § 291-12, and the second involved the alleged violation of HRS § 291-1, the written decisions in both cases were indentical, and certainly the key legal question involved in both cases was substantively similar. The state has appealed to this court from both orders dismissing these charges, under the provisions of HRS § 641-13(2) and Rule 43, District Court Rules of Penal Procedure, solely on a question of law. The Miles and the Lee cases have therefore been consolidated for purpose of disposition of these appeals.

The single and only issue presented to us by these appeals involves the proper interpretation of HRS §§ 291-1 and 291-12 as to whether these sections of the statutes should be deemed to apply to public property only. In each of these informations, neither defendant was charged with a chapter 291 offense on public property, e. g., on the public streets or highways, and, hence, the decisions below held that neither incurred criminal liability under the pertinent provisions of HRS chapter 291 for the reason that these provisions do not extend to any conduct of any kind on private property. On the other hand, the state argues on these appeals that the statute should be deemed to cover all land, including paths, roadways, diriveways, and trails, and all other real property within the state of Hawaii, regardless of whether such property may be public, quasi-public, or utterly private in nature.

Since the appellees in these cases did not file any brief or memorandum and neither has appeared during the oral argument in defense of their positions, we have not had the benefit of any views expressed in opposition to the contentions made by the state. We have, however, taken time to research this problem and to resolve this issue. We hold that HRS §§ 291-1 and 291-12 should be deemed to apply not only to purely public property, such as public streets and highways and other public places, but also to all private property. On the basis of this holding, we reverse the orders dismissing the charges in both of these cases.

In 1971, the legislature, in conjunction with its consideration and passage of HRS ch. 291C, ³ the Statewide Traffic Code, also enacted HRS § 291-12, and a new section was added to our statute pertaining to inattention to driving. No such statutory traffic regulation had been in effect in this state prior to the enactment of HRS § 291-12, although there was in force, immediately prior to that time, in each of the counties a provision in their traffic ordinances requiring that the operator of a motor vehicle shall exercise due care in the operation of such vehicle upon any street or highway in order to avoid collision with any person or property on or off such street or highway. ⁴

HRS § 291-1, however, is not of recent origin. It has a long history and this section of our statutes can be traced as far back as 1850. ⁵ But even in 1850, during our horse and buggy era when vehicles were not power driven, ⁶ the language of this old statute did not spell out any particular place where a person could violate its terms. But interestingly, in another section of the same chapter of the Penal Code of 1850, relating to driving or leading any wild bull or other ferocious or dangerous animal, it was expressly required that before a person could violate this section that such driving or leading of any wild bull or other ferocious or dangerous animal must be within a street of any village or in a place of public resort. ⁷

No change in the Penal Code of 1850, ch. 27, occurred until 1907, when the legislature amended sections 1 and 2 of the chapter to broaden the coverage of these sections to include specific kinds of vehicles consistent with the then available means of transportation, as carriages, wagons, buggies, omnibuses, carts, bicycles, automobiles, motorcycles and locomobiles. ⁸ In 1941, thirty-four years later, the legislature further amended this statute to read in its present form. ⁹ Throughout the years, since its original enactment in 1850, there has been no change in phraseology as to where a person must be when he operates a vehicle carelessly or heedlessly of the rights or safety of others or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property and thereby violate the terms of HRS § 291-1, and the legislature has not responded even after the question was raised in 1920 in Territory v. Puana, 25 Haw. 584 (1920).

Both HRS §§ 291-1 and 291-12 are included under Part I of HRS chapter 291, under the subject 'Traffic Violations,' and Part I is specifically designated under the sub-heading 'Operation.' Generally speaking, Part I of HRS chapter 291 is concerned with careless or heedless operation of vehicles or riding of animals; driving of vehicles while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs; loading of freight on any motor car or truck, used for the transportation of passengers, in a manner so that any part of the freight projects beyond the extreme width of the motor car or truck; loading of any freight on the running board of a motor car or truck, used for the tranportation of passengers, in a manner so that such freight projects beyond the running board, or blocks the doors of the vehicle; carrying of passengers under seven years of age on motorcycles and motor scooters; and inattention to driving.

Prior to the enactment of the Statewide Traffic Code contained in HRS chapter 291C, our hit-and-run state was also a part of HRS chapter 291, Part I (§§ 291-2 and 291-3). However, because HRS chapter 291C adequately covered the hit-and-run subject under its Part II, the legislature in enacting this chapter in 1971, repealed the hit-and-run provisions as contained in HRS chapter 291, Part I (§§ 291-2 and 291-3.) ¹⁰ The phraseology of the hit-and-run provisions now appearing under Part II of HRS chapter 291C follows substantially and appears to be patterned after the hit-and-run provisions contained in the Uniform Vehicle Code ¹¹ and the legislature in 1971, did not incorporate into HRS chapter 291C any part of the hit-and-run provisions as they existed in HRS §§ 291-2 and 291-3. Part II of HRS chapter 291C...