State v. Lee

• Decision Date: 12 February 1970
• Docket Number: No. 4793,4793
• Citation: 51 Haw. 516,465 P.2d 573
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii v. Alfred LEE also known as Alfred Samuel F. M. Moy.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 573

465 P.2d 573

51 Haw. 516

STATE of Hawaii v. Alfred LEE also known as Alfred Samuel F. M. Moy.

No. 4793.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Feb. 12, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

1. To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require interference and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

2. Where the conduct of an individual, or a class of individuals, does not directly harm others the public interest is not affected. However, where the legislature has determined that the conduct of a particular class of people recklessly affects their physical well-being and that the consequent physical injury and death is so widespread as to be of grave concern to the public and where the incidence and severity of the physical harm has been statistically demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court, then the conduct of that class of people affects the public interest and is properly within the scope of the police power.

3. The accelerating rate of deaths and injuries due to motorcycle accidents coupled with the increase in motorcycle registrations has reached such proportions and the class of motocycle users has become so large and widespread that the continued viability of our society requires that they protect themselves from physical injury or death.

4. Requiring motorcycle users to wear safety helmets is reasonably necessary and sufficiently narrow to accomplish the purpose of decreasing fatalities and injuries due to motorcycle accidents.

5. The description 'safety helmet' is an adequate standard to ascertain the reasonableness of the rules promulgated by the Coordinator.

Francis T. De Mello, Honolulu, for appellant.

John Campbell, Jr., Deputy Pros. Atty., Barry Chung, Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for respondent.

Dennis C. H. Leong, H. K. Bruss Keppeler, Deputy Attys. Gen., Bert T. Kanbara, Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., MARUMOTO, ABE and LEVINSON, JJ., and M. DOI, Circuit Judge, for KOBAYASHI, J., disqualified.

RICHARDSON, Chief Justice.

Appellant was cited on May 15, 1968, for failing to wear a safety helmet as required by HRS § 286-81(1)(A): 'No person shall: (1) Operate a motorcycle or motor scooter on any highway in the State unless he and any passenger he carries on the motorcycle or motor scooter wears (A) a safety helmet securely fastened with a chin strap * * *.' Appellant was convicted. He appeals from a judgment sustaining the constitutionality of the statute.

' The term 'police power' connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests. * * * The classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137, 14 S.Ct. 499, 501, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1964) (1894), is still valid today: 'To justify the state in (thus) * * * interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear-First, that the interests of the public (generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class) * * * require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. '' Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962).

Appellant argues that the first precondition required by the due process clause of the U. S. Constitution to the exercise of the police power by the legislature enumerated above, namely, 'it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference' has not been met. He contends that other members of the public at large are not affected in a deleterious manner, if indeed at all, by the conduct regulated by this statute; that the only realistic effect of the statute is to compel motorcyclists to take precautionary measures so that they will not harm themselves; that harm to self or harm to a particular class is not within the public interest and is outside the scope of the police power to legislate in the public interest.

The State argues that decreasing fatalities and injuries from motorcycle accidents does impinge directly on the public interests in three respects: (1) economic impact: (a) lessens burden on public agencies such as hospitals, medical and ambulance facilities; (b) reduces addition to the public assistance roles of disabled motorcyclists and their dependents or survivors; (2) 'flying missile theory': loose stones on the highway or fallen objects may strike the motorcyclist on the head, thus causing him to lose control and become a menace to other vehicles on the highway; (3) the increase in fatalities and serious injuries is so alarming, so widespread and of such grave dimension that it threatens the very fabric of society.

The legislature has clearly stated its purpose. 'Deaths of persons and injuries to them and damage to property with the other losses suffered on account of highway traffic accidents are of grave concern to the State and its citizens as well as to the federal government. The legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest that the State initiate, coordinate and accelerate every available means to decrease the fatalities, injuries, damages and losses resulting from highway traffic accidents.' S.L.H.1967, c. 214, § 1.

It is true that courts often attribute to statutes the constitutionally permissible objectives which the statute might plausibly be construed to reflect, rather than that purpose which the statute in fact, or most probably, reflects. See, e. g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 81 S.Ct. 1135; 6 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). However, where the legislature has clearly stated its purpose, we are reluctant to attribute other purposes, unless the facts underlying such other purposes are clearly and convincingly shown. In this case the legislature has not alluded to either 'economic impact' or the 'flying missile theory', there was no evidence introduced by the State to substantiate either argument, and the claimed facts are not susceptible to judicial notice.

Thus we are squarely faced with the issue whether the legislature may constitutionally regulate the conduct of an individual so as to require him to protect himself from physical injury and/or death; that is, whether physical harm to self is a proper subject of public interest and thus subject to the police power of the legislature. This case raises a question that goes to the very heart of the nexus between the individual and the state: where does the public interest begin? This is particularly difficult where the purpose of the statute is beneficent, as Justice Brandeis pointed out in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572-573, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928): 'Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest danger to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.'

It is contended that the increase in fatalities and serious injuries largely to people under 25 due to motorcycle accidents is so alarming, so widespread and of such grave dimension that it threatens the very fabric of society. It would seem a necessary implication of such contention that when the physical harm to a group of people due to their own recklessness or imprudence becomes sufficiently widespread the public interest generally is affected. Unfortunately, the State merely asserts this proposition without offering statistical evidence to document the degree and extent of the claimed epidemic of motorcycle injuries and fatalities. However, there is statistical evidence available which is properly susceptible of judicial notice.

The Secretary of Transportation's report, 'National Uniform Standards for State Highway Safety Programs', H.R.Doc.No.138, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which set up the motorcycle safety helmet as a minimum standard to which state highway safety programs must conform, contained the following background information:

'Deaths and injuries from motorcycle accidents doubled between 1963 and 1965. This fact is particularly alarming when it is understood that most of those killed and injured were young people under the age of 25. Motorcycle registrations have jumped from 574,080 in 1960 to 1,914,700 in 1966. By 1970 the annual increase is expected to reach 1 million per year. Motorcycle safety takes on grave dimensions in view of the fact that since 1960 the rate of motorcycle fatalities has increased at about the same rate as the number of motorcycles (i. e., almost 3 1/2 times in 6 years).'

The New York Department of Motor Vehicles' statistics:

'A summary of the Department statistics indicates that 89.2% of the motorcycle accidents result in injury or death and that almost all fatalities accurring as a result of such accidents involve head injuries. Most of these fatalities could have been avoided, or the severity lessened, by the use of a proper helmet.' N.Y. Session Laws, pp. 2961, 2962 (McKinney 1966).

Michigan State Police data:

'Michigan State Police datum 1962-1966 (Exhibit A) shows a mortality rate of 11.5 for 10,000 registrations of motorcycles, as compared with 5.2 per 10,000 for all vehicles in the same period.' American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich.App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72, 75 n. 9 (1968). However, this figure is not reflective of the total statewide picture since '* * * accidents which occurred in cities over 25,000 population (were) not included in this summary.' Brief for Defendants and Appellees in ...