State v. Leitner

Decision Date26 June 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-1718-CR.,00-1718-CR.
Citation253 Wis.2d 449,2002 WI 77,646 N.W.2d 341
PartiesSTATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Anthony J. LEITNER, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs and oral argument by Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state public defender.

For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Mary E. Burke, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Shunette T. Campbell, assistant attorney general.

¶ 1. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.

This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the circuit court for La Crosse County, Michael J. Mulroy, Judge.1

¶ 2. Two issues of law are presented here: (1) Does Wis. Stat. § 973.015 (1999-2000)2 require district attorneys and law enforcement agencies to expunge their records documenting the facts underlying an expunged record of a conviction? (2) May a circuit court consider, when sentencing an offender, the facts underlying a record of a conviction expunged under § 973.015?3 ¶ 3. The circuit court and court of appeals concluded that the record referred to in Wis. Stat. § 973.015 is a court record and that § 973.015 does not require district attorneys or law enforcement agencies to expunge their records documenting the facts underlying an expunged record of a conviction. Both courts further concluded that a circuit court may consider, when sentencing an offender, the facts underlying a record of a conviction expunged under § 973.015. We agree with both courts on both issues and affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

I

¶ 4. Anthony J. Leitner, the defendant, was charged with hit and run causing great bodily harm in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1)(a) and (c) (1997-98). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant entered a no contest plea to reckless driving causing great bodily harm in violation of § 346.62(4) (1997-98). The plea agreement reduced the defendant's maximum exposure to prison from twenty-four months to eighteen months. ¶ 5. The facts are undisputed and are set forth in greater detail in the published decision of the court of appeals. We state only those facts pertinent to the two issues presented for review in this court.

¶ 6. The circuit court ordered a presentence investigation report. The report contained a negative assessment of the defendant and recommended that he serve prison time. It also stated that the defendant had been convicted of misdemeanor hit and run and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing injury, both of which related to an incident that had occurred on October 28, 1997. This information about the prior convictions in the presentence investigation report came from the district attorney's case files. The presentence investigation report did not mention that the records of the 1997 convictions had been expunged.

¶ 7. During sentencing, the prosecutor agreed that it was inappropriate to refer to the defendant's 1997 convictions because the court records of these convictions had been expunged. The prosecutor went on, however, to recount the facts underlying the expunged records of the defendant's 1997 convictions by relying on information in the police reports and the district attorney's case files.

¶ 8. Although the defense counsel objected to the circuit court's consideration of the expunged records of the convictions, the defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's recitation of facts underlying the expunged records of the defendant's 1997 convictions. Indeed, the defense counsel also addressed the underlying facts of the expunged records of the defendant's 1997 convictions to emphasize the minor nature of the injury involved in the prior incident.

¶ 9. The circuit court sentenced the defendant to fifteen months in prison. The circuit court did not consider the 1997 convictions. The circuit court did, however, consider the facts underlying the expunged records of the 1997 convictions, referring to them as follows:

You say you have no problem with alcohol and yet this is the second incident that you have been involved in that has resulted in your being charged with an alcohol-related offense, although it was not charged in this particular case, but certainly alcohol was involved.

¶ 10. The court of appeals affirmed both the judgment of conviction and the circuit court's order denying the defendant's motion for resentencing. The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 973.015 does not require district attorneys or law enforcement agencies to destroy their records relating to records of convictions expunged under § 973.015. The court of appeals further held that § 973.015 does not prohibit a sentencing court from considering the facts underlying the record of a conviction expunged under § 973.015.

¶ 11. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. Like the court of appeals, we reach the merits of the issues presented. We do not decide the present case on grounds of waiver, although the defendant failed to object at sentencing to the introduction of the facts underlying the expunged records of convictions.

[1]

¶ 12. Furthermore, we decide the two issues presented, even though the defendant is likely to have already served his fifteen-month sentence, and it is arguable that the present case is now moot. The parties did not raise the issue of mootness. The court raised it at oral argument. The parties urged the court to decide the issues presented, and we do so.

[2]

¶ 13. Mootness remains the general rule in Wisconsin. "Ordinarily, this court, like courts in general, will not consider a question the answer to which cannot have any practical effect upon an existing controversy."4 In the interest of judicial economy, moot cases are generally dismissed without discussion on the merits.

[3]

¶ 14. Moot cases may, however, be decided on their merits in a variety of circumstances:

[The court] will retain a matter for determination although that determination can have no practical effect on the immediate parties: Where the issues are of great public importance; where the constitutionality of a statute is involved; where the precise situation under consideration arises so frequently that a definitive decision is essential to guide the trial courts; where the issue is likely to arise again and should be resolved by the court to avoid uncertainty; or where a question was capable and likely of repetition and yet evades review because the appellate process usually cannot be completed and frequently cannot even be undertaken within the time that would have a practical effect upon the parties.5

¶ 15. We need not analyze the present case under each exception to the general mootness rule. It is sufficient to state that this case falls within the exception that the issues presented are likely to arise again and should be resolved by this court to avoid future uncertainty.6 Accordingly, we reach the merits of the present case.

II

[4, 5]

¶ 16. The first issue involves whether Wis. Stat. § 973.015 requires district attorneys and law enforcement agencies to expunge their records documenting the facts underlying an expunged record of a conviction. We must interpret § 973.015. The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent.7 Statutory interpretation and the application of a statute to undisputed facts present issues of law that this court determines independent of the circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting from their analyses.8

¶ 17. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 authorizes the expunction of the record of a misdemeanor conviction9 if a person is under the age of twenty-one at the time of the commission of the offense and if the circuit court determines that the person will benefit and society will not be harmed by this disposition. Section 973.015 reads as follows:

(1) When a person is under the age of 21 at the time of the commission of an offense for which the person has been found guilty in a court for violation of a law for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for one year or less in the county jail, the court may order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence if the court determines the person will benefit and society will not be harmed by this disposition.
(2) A person has successfully completed the sentence if the person has not been convicted of a subsequent offense and, if on probation, the probation has not been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the conditions of probation. Upon successful completion of the sentence the detaining or probationary authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which shall be forwarded to the court of record and which shall have the effect of expunging the record.

¶ 18. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 is silent regarding whether the records to be expunged are records of courts, district attorneys, or law enforcement agencies. The statute uses the word "record" three times. In subsection (1), the statute uses the word "record" but does not expressly identify the nature of the record. In subsection (2), the statute uses the word "record" twice. First, it refers to a court of record and requires the detaining or probationary authority to issue a certificate of discharge to the court of record when the convicted person has successfully completed the sentence. Second, it states the certificate of discharge "shall have the effect of expunging the record." (Emphasis added.) ¶ 19. The defendant makes the following arguments to justify reading Wis. Stat. § 973.015 to require the expunction of not only court records, but also of records of district attorneys and law enforcement agencies relating to the record of a conviction expunged under § 973.015:

(1) The ordinary meaning of the word "record" is not necessarily limited to court record
...

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