State v. Leonard, 58446

• Decision Date: 14 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 58446,58446
• Citation: 240 N.W.2d 690
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lang J. LEONARD, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 690

240 N.W.2d 690

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lang J. LEONARD, Appellant.

No. 58446.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 14, 1976.

Jurgemeyer & Frey, Clinton, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Thomas Mann, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and G. Wylie Pillers, III, County Atty., for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, REES and HARRIS, JJ.

LeGRAND, Justice.

Defendant was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses in violation of § 713.1, The Code, 1973. He appeals, alleging numerous errors which he says require a reversal. Since we agree the case must be dismissed because defendant was denied a speedy trial under § 795.2, The Code, we consider none of the other matters raised.

Since State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973), an opinion rendered to meet the demands of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we have had a number of appeals predicated on the denial of a speedy trial. Among them are State v. King, 225 N.W.2d 337, 339--340 (Iowa 1975); State v. Lyles, 225 N.W.2d 124, 125 (Iowa 1975); State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Iowa 1975); State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609, 611--612 (Iowa 1974); State v. Nelson, 222 N.W.2d 445, 448--449 (Iowa 1974). See also State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 355--356 (Iowa 1972), which was decided prior to Gorham.

As first stated in Gorham and repeated in later cases, each time this issue arises it must be decided on its own facts under 'a delicate balancing process.' State v. Hines, supra, 225 N.W.2d at 163; State v. Nelson, supra, 222 N.W.2d at 448; State v. Gorham, supra, 206 N.W.2d at 914.

Briefly stated, the rule by which we now abide interprets § 795.2 as requiring trial within 60 days from the date an indictment or information is filed unless defendant waives this right, unless the delay is attributable to defendant, or unless the State shows good cause for postponement.

In the case now before us, there is no claim of waiver. Defendant vigorously insisted upon a speedy trial at all stages of the proceedings. He did so at the time of arraignment, he did so again at the pretrial conference which we discuss later, and he filed a timely motion to dismiss for failure to afford him a speedy trial, as mandated by State v. Myers, 215 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Iowa 1974).

Eliminating, then, the question of waiver, we must decide if either of the remaining two alternatives was established by the State. Did defendant himself cause his trial to be delayed until the ninety-sixth day after the information was filed? Did the State show good cause for a postponement?

We set out the facts important to our consideration. On December 19, 1974, the county attorney's information was filed. Defendant was arraigned the same day and declined to waive speedy trial. At the time of arraignment, the court set January 28, 1975, as the trial date. The selected date was well within the limits of § 795.2.

On January 7, 1975 (21 days before the trial date), defendant filed notice of his intention to depose nine witnesses on January 17, 1975. At the same time, he filed a motion to suppress evidence, which he combined with a motion to compel the State to elect which of several informations it intended to try him on. (There had been other informations filed earlier charging defendant with similar crimes on different dates, all allegedly involving the same general scheme to defraud.)

At a pretrial conference called by the court on January 10, 1975, the trial court on its own motion took the case out of the assignment for January 28th and continued it until March 25, 1975, thirty-five days beyond the time permitted by § 795.2. The pertinent portion of that statute is here set out:

'If a defendant indicted for a public offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial within sixty days after the indictment is found, the court must order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown.'

The section applies to cases presented on county attorney's information as well as those based on indictment. § 769.13, The Code; State v. Hines, supra, 225 N.W.2d at 158. Defendant did not ask for a continuance. Neither, in fact, did the State. Both announced they were ready to proceed to trial on January 28th. Nevertheless the trial court ordered the case continued and listed reasons dealing with docket congestion; the 'complexity' of the case; pending motions and deposition requests; and the busy schedule of counsel.

Despite the fact that granting a continuance is largely a matter of trial court discretion, State v. Hines, supra, 225 N.W.2d at 160--161, we hold this case must be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the case continued under the circumstances shown by the record now before us.

We have considered each of the grounds relied on by the court in continuing the case. Neither singly nor cumulatively do they permit the result reached. We have recognized there are circumstances preventing a trial within 60 days because pending motions or other preliminary matters raised by defendant make such a course impossible. These constitute causes attributable to defendant. See State v. King, supra, 225 N.W.2d at 339--340 and citations. We have also held that docket congestion due to exceptional circumstances and unavailability of prosecutor or judge may constitute good cause for trial delay. State v. Hines, supra, 225 N.W.2d at 158--159; State v. Jennings, supra, 195 N.W.2d at 356. See also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26, 32 (1970).

However, all such matters must be reviewed in the light of this statement in the Jennings case:

'The public policy inherent in § 795.2 requires trial within 60 days absent good cause, and it is the State's duty to effectuate that policy.' (195 N.W.2d at 356.)

This is an unusual case. Both the State and the defendant announced they were ready for trial. Neither claimed the pending motions or proposed depositions would necessitate a delay, and it appears later developments bore them out. Nor did either counsel beg off because of other commitments, one of the reasons given for the...