State v. Lewis
| Decision Date | 28 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 43613,43613 |
| Citation | 85 Wn.2d 769,539 P.2d 677 |
| Parties | , 80 A.L.R.3d 273 The STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. William B. LEWIS, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
John C. Merkel, Pros. Atty., Port Orchard, for petitioner.
Elvidge, Veblen, Twell, Bergmann & Taylor, Richard J. Thorpe, Seattle, for respondent.
The defendant was convicted of one count of second degree perjury and two counts of grand larceny by possession of stolen automobiles. He appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the grand larceny convictions, but reversed the perjury conviction. State v. Lewis, 12 Wash.App. 208, 529 P.2d 835 (1974). The state petitioned for review of the reversal of the perjury conviction which is the sole issue here. We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the conviction.
From the testimony, the jury could have found that the defendant acquired several stolen cars of a make and model similar or identical to ones which he legally owned. To acquire license plates for the stolen vehicles, defendant would apply for replacement plates for vehicles to which he had title. The perjury charge arose from the defendant's affidavit by which he applied for such a set of replacement license plates.
Defendant sought those replacement plates from a local agent who was authorized by the state to sell them. The defendant told the agent that a car, which he legally owned, had been wrecked and that the registration and license plates were lost. This conversation occurred on a Saturday so the agent advised defendant to return when the county auditor's office was open so he could obtain necessary information. A short time later the defendant applied to an employee of the state agent for the plates. At that time the defendant signed a form affidavit furnished by the State Department of Motor Vehicles. It was entitled 'Affidavit of Loss for Tab, License Plate or Registration.' It was signed by defendant. Above his signature appear these words: 'I, William B. Lewis, being duly sworn on oath repose and say . . ..' The employee later presented the affidavit to the agent, a notary, who was not present when the defendant signed. The employee advised the notary that it had been signed in her presence and the notary recognized the defendant's signature. The agent notarized and processed the affidavit. Defendant received replacement plates although the originals in fact were not lost.
The second degree perjury statute, RCW 9.72.030, provides:
Every person who, whether orally or in writing . . . shall knowingly swear falsely concerning any matter whatsoever, shall be guilty of perjury in the second degree . . .
'Oath' and 'swear' are defined in RCW 9.72.040:
The term 'oath' shall include an affirmation and every other mode authorized by law of attesting the truth of that which is stated. A person who shall state any matter under oath shall be deemed to 'swear' thereto.
It is well established that no particular ritualistic form is necessary for one to take an oath. Rather, emphasis is upon some unequivocal act by which a person consciously takes on himself the obligation of an oath. In re Rice, 35 Ill.App.2d 79, 84, 181 N.E.2d 742 (1962).
We have held that merely signing an affidavit in the presence of a notary or other official authorized to administer oaths is sufficient to constitute the taking of an oath. State v. Douglas, 71 Wash.2d 303, 428 P.2d 535 (1967); State v. Dodd, 193 Wash. 26, 74 P.2d 497 (1937). Authorities to the contrary are more stringent and require a formalized oath-taking process. Clearly we have departed from such an approach. O'Reilly v. People, 86 N.Y. 154, 40 Am.Rep. 525 (1881). The only possible distinction between this case and the Douglas and Dodd holdings is that the affidavit was signed out of the presence of the notary.
However, the legislature has declared that irregularity in administering or taking of an oath is no defense to a prosecution for perjury. RCW 9.72.050 provides:
It shall be no defense to a prosecution for perjury that an oath was administered or Taken in an irregular manner . . . It shall be sufficient that he actually gave such testimony or made such deposition, certificate or Affidavit.
(Italics ours.)
Here the defendant signed, in the presence of an employee of the notary, a document entitled an affidavit which affirmatively stated that it was sworn on oath. The defendant voluntarily signed that affidavit, knowing it was to be notarized and processed, all at his request and initiation and for his benefit. The physical absence of the notary was an irregularity within the statute's meaning. The signing of the affidavit, under these facts, declaring the defendant to be duly sworn on oath was a sufficiently unequivocal act by which the defendant consciously took upon himself the obligation of an oath. Obviously the defendant was attesting to the truth of that which he stated within the meaning and intent of RCW 9.72.040.
We emphasize that this holding is limited to the matter of a perjury conviction under these facts. It in no manner is concerned with the sufficiency or legal effect of the notarization process for other purposes.
The Court of Appeals is reversed and the perjury conviction affirmed.
The majority opinion ignores the plain requirements of our statutes, creating an oath where there was none and then upholding a perjury conviction for violating it. The respondent was convicted under a statute which makes it a crime to 'swear falsely.' RCW 9.72.030. To 'swear,' one must state something 'under oath,' and an 'oath,' to be legally recognizable, must be taken in a 'mode authorized by law . . .' RCW 9.72.040.
The sole legally authorized method for taking an oath in applications for replacements for lost license plates is established by RCW 46.16.270, which requires that statements in such applications
shall be subscribed and sworn to Before...
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