State v. Lima

• Decision Date: 07 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 7571,7571
• Citation: 643 P.2d 536,64 Haw. 470
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William LIMA III, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 536

643 P.2d 536

64 Haw. 470

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William LIMA III, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 7571.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

April 7, 1982.

Reconsideration Denied May 10, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. An accused in every criminal case can only be convicted upon proof by the prosecution of every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. On appeal, the test to ascertain the legal sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact.

3. Substantial evidence means credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a man of reasonable caution to reach a conclusion.

4. Rape in the first degree under HRS § 707-730 (1976) requires a showing of "forcible compulsion." Forcible compulsion, for the purposes of this case, means physical force that overcomes earnest resistance; or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury. HRS § 707-700(12) (1976).

5. Earnest resistance is a relative term to be determined by the circumstances of the particular case. However, it must be shown that there had been a genuine physical effort on the part of the complainant to discourage and prevent her assailant from accomplishing his intended purpose.

6. A complainant need not resist to the utmost extent possible. Rather, the issue of whether there was earnest resistance is resolved by the particular circumstances surrounding the alleged assault.

Arthur E. Ross, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

G. Stephen Elisha, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., LUM and NAKAMURA, JJ., and OGATA and MENOR, Retired Justices, assigned by reason of vacancies.

OGATA, Justice.

On July 24, 1979, following a trial by jury, Respondent-Defendant, William Lima III (hereinafter "respondent"), was convicted of Rape in the First Degree in violation of HRS § 707-730(1)(a)(i) (1976), in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals, 624 P.2d 1374, determined that the jury verdict of guilt was not supported by substantial evidence; hence, respondent's conviction was reversed in a decision filed by the Court on March 11, 1981. On March 31, 1981, we granted certiorari to review the sufficiency question. Upon careful review of the record, we are compelled to reverse the judgment of the Intermediate Court.

I.

The charge of rape in the first degree levelled against respondent arose from an incident occurring on April 1, 1979. On that day, the complainant, a fourteen-year old female (hereinafter "complainant"), was visiting a friend in Hawaii Kai. She had planned to return to her home in Kuliouou by bus. At approximately four o'clock that afternoon, however, the complainant inadvertently met respondent. They were acquainted since respondent had once been married to the complainant's first cousin.

During the course of their conversation, respondent told the complainant that he was on his way to visit his ex-wife, the complainant's first cousin, who happened to live next door to the complainant in Kuliouou. Since respondent was going there, the complainant asked him for a ride home.

Enroute to Kuliouou, respondent asked the complainant whether she would like to go with him to steal some marijuana plants. She agreed but cautioned respondent that she had to be home by 5:00 p. m. Thereafter, they proceeded to St. Louis Park, where respondent claimed the plants were being grown.

Once there, upon leaving the car, respondent told the complainant to bring her towel so that they could conceal the marijuana plants. They walked through the picnic area, past various parties of park visitors, and up a wooded hiking trail. After walking approximately 300 yards up the trail, they left the trail and stopped at a flat clearing in the trees. This spot was down a steep incline from the trail and was surrounded by trees and low shrubbery. For the most part, the clearing was unobservable from the established hiking trail. At this point, respondent and the complainant were alone.

Respondent told the complainant to sit down and to be quiet, claiming he heard someone by the plants. After the complainant complied with this request, respondent sat down beside her. They shared some chewing gum, after which respondent put his hand on the complainant's back and inquired about the writing on her shirt. He then grabbed her left shoulder with his left hand and pinned her down. He placed his right hand on her breasts. She asked him to remove his hand. He told her to "shut up". He ran his hand down the side of her body and unbuttoned and removed her shorts. He released her momentarily to remove his own trousers. The complainant told him to stop because she was presently having her menstrual period. He did not respond but merely removed her tampon and completed the sexual intercourse.

At trial, the complainant testified that throughout these events she was crying and repeatedly told respondent, "Willie, why are you doing this to me, you're my cousin?" To this, respondent's only response was telling her to "shut up". The complainant also testified that during the alleged attack, she had tried, in vain, to push respondent off of her. The reason, she stated, that she did not resist to a greater degree was that she had been afraid.

After intercourse, respondent, who had been perspiring heavily, wiped himself with his shirt which he later discarded. ¹ The complainant also cleaned herself of semen and perspiration with her towel. They dressed and returned to the car. Respondent then drove the complainant within a block of her home and let her out.

On April 3, 1979, at the urging of her friends, the complainant went to a sex abuse treatment center. The medical examination revealed that while the complainant complained of tenderness in the upper arms, no physical trauma was evident on any part of her body. She did not sustain any bruises, abrasions, or lacerations from the alleged attacks.

Later that day, the police were notified and respondent was subsequently arrested. On June 5, 1979, respondent was indicted by the grand jury for the first degree rape of the complainant. A jury trial was held on June 24, 1979. During the trial, respondent moved the court, at the end of the prosecution's case, again at the end of his case, and after the jury had returned its verdict, for judgment of acquittal. These motions were denied. Consequently, respondent was found guilty as charged.

On October 2, 1979, respondent appealed his conviction. He argued, in the Intermediate Court, that the trial court's denial to grant his motions for judgment of acquittal was error because there had not been substantial evidence adduced at trial to show he had forcibly compelled the complainant to engage in sexual intercourse. ² The Intermediate Court, in reversing respondent's conviction, agreed. The court found that essential to the State's case is a showing, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that sexual intercourse was entered into by forcible compulsion. The court further found that under our statutory scheme, forcible compulsion could be proved in two alternative ways: (1) that respondent used physical force to overcome the earnest resistance of the complainant, or (2) that respondent threatened the complainant so as to place her in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury thereby forcing her to submit to the sexual intercourse. The court concluded that, upon review of the evidence presented at trial, there had not been substantial evidence adduced so as to support the finding as to this issue.

II.

It is well established, as a precept of constitutional as well as statutory law, that an accused in a criminal case can only be convicted upon proof by the prosecution of every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Nuetzel, 61 Haw. 531, 606 P.2d 920 (1980); State v. Napeahi, 57 Haw. 365, 556 P.2d 569 (1976); HRS § 701-114 (1976). Thus, in order to secure respondent's conviction here, the State was bound to prove all the elements of the offense charged to this requisite degree of certainty. Among the elements to be established for the offense of rape in the first degree is the requirement that respondent intentionally engaged in sexual intercourse, by forcible compulsion, with the complainant. ³

At trial, by motions for judgment of acquittal, and on appeal to the Intermediate Court, respondent has strenuously argued that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence on the issue of forcible compulsion to establish its prima facie case.

"On appeal, the test to ascertain the legal sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact." State v. Summers, supra, 62 Haw. at 331-332, 614 P.2d at 930. Moreover, "(i)t matters not if a conviction under the evidence as so considered might be deemed to be against the weight of the evidence so long as there is substantial evidence tending to support the requisite finding for conviction." Id. at 332, 614 P.2d at 930; State v. Hernandez, 61 Haw. 475, 478, 605 P.2d 75, 77 (1980). " 'Substantial evidence' as to every essential element of the crime charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a man of reasonable caution to reach a conclusion. (Citation omitted.) It is evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support such a conclusion." State v. Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 565, 617 P.2d 820, 823 (1980).

Given this standard of review, and with due regard to the jury's right to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences from the evidence presented, we cannot agree...