State v. Linares

• Decision Date: 14 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 14861,14861
• Citation: 655 A.2d 737,232 Conn. 345
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut, v. Kathaleen LINARES.

Page 737

655 A.2d 737

232 Conn. 345

STATE of Connecticut, v. Kathaleen LINARES.

No. 14861.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 2, 1994.

Decided March 14, 1995.

Timothy H. Everett, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Erin K. Olson, Portland, OR, pro hac vice, and David Polsky, legal intern, for appellant-appellee (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, State's Atty., and Joan Alexander, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee-appellant (state).

Martin B. Margulies, Bridgeport and Martha Stone, Hartford, filed a brief for Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Kathaleen Linares, challenges the constitutionality of General Statutes § 2-1d(a)(2)(C) and (E), ¹ which prohibit intentional interference with the legislative process. After being charged with interfering with the legislative process in violation of § 2-1d, ² the defendant moved to dismiss the information, claiming that the statute is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the facts of her case, in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution ³ and the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 2, 4, 5, 9 and 14. ⁴ The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. ⁵ The defendant subsequently entered a written plea of nolo contendere conditional on her right to appellate review of the denial of her motion to dismiss pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a and Practice Book § 4003. ⁶ The trial court found the defendant guilty as charged in the long form information and fined her $90.

The defendant appealed from that judgment to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of conviction under § 2-1d(a)(2)(C) and reversed the judgment of conviction under § 2-1d(a)(2)(E). State v. Linares, 32 Conn.App. 656, 674, 630 A.2d 1340 (1993). The Appellate Court concluded that § 2-1d(a)(2)(E) prohibits constitutionally protected conduct, and invalidated that provision as unconstitutionally overbroad under the first amendment to the United States constitution. Id., at 668, 630 A.2d 1340. The Appellate Court, however, concluded that, because § 2-1d(a)(2)(C), "does not involve protected speech, we need not analyze either the federal or state constitutional provisions that guarantee freedom of expression." Id., at 672, 630 A.2d 1340. Further, the Appellate Court stated that "[b]ecause we conclude that [subdivision (2)(C) ] does not involve protected speech and [subdivision (2)(E) ] is void for overbreadth [under the federal constitution], we need not determine if the state constitution affords greater free speech protection than the federal constitution." Id., at 672 n. 13, 630 A.2d 1340. Concurring in the judgment, Judge Schaller agreed that subdivision (2)(E) is unconstitutional and that subdivision (2)(C) passes constitutional muster, but only after he first determined that subdivision (2)(C) warranted free speech analysis and then analyzed it under the Connecticut constitution, which in his view "encompasses a broader spectrum of speech protections than those afforded under the first amendment." Id., at 676, 630 A.2d 1340 (Schaller, J., concurring).

We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal on the issues of the statute's constitutionality both on its face and as applied to the defendant. ⁷ We also granted the state's petition for certification to cross appeal on the issue of whether subdivision (2)(E) is overbroad in violation of the first amendment to the United States constitution. ⁸ We agree with the Appellate Court's conclusion as to subdivision (2)(C), but reject its determination that subdivision (2)(E) is void for overbreadth. Further, although we concur in the Appellate Court's conclusion as to subdivision (2)(C), we disagree with its analysis of the defendant's claims pertaining to that subdivision.

The videotape and audio cassette recording in the record of this case demonstrate the following undisputed facts.

The occasion was Governor William A. O'Neill's budget address to the General Assembly in the Hall of the House of Representatives. The governor, Lieutenant Governor Joseph Fauliso and other state officials were on the podium. The lieutenant governor introduced the governor, and the audience applauded, with some whistling, for thirty-four seconds. The governor then spoke without interruption for approximately two minutes, when his speech was interrupted by applause and whistles for approximately twenty-two seconds. ⁹ He then continued speaking without interruption for approximately four minutes, when he was again interrupted by applause and whistles for approximately seventeen seconds. He then continued speaking for approximately two minutes, when he was interrupted by applause and whistles for approximately eighteen seconds. He then continued speaking for approximately one minute, when the incident in question occurred.

The defendant and others were in the gallery of the Hall of the House. The gallery is located directly behind and above the podium, and is the only place in the Hall where members of the public, not otherwise permitted to be either on the floor of the House or on the podium itself, are permitted. ¹⁰ It is obvious that anything of any significance that occurred in the front part of the gallery, at the railing overlooking the podium, was within the line of vision of persons in the Hall, who generally faced the podium as the governor delivered his speech.

The defendant unfurled a large pink banner that was tied to the railing with string or rope. Gauging by its comparison to the people behind it, we estimate the size of the banner to be approximately 6 feet by 9 feet. On the banner, within a triangle, was the legend, in large block letters: "WE DEMAND LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS, BILL." The content of this message had nothing to do with the content of the governor's speech, either generally or at that particular moment; the speech was devoted to budgetary matters. Simultaneously, the defendant and others chanted or shouted in loud voices, "gay rights lesbian rights," over and over again without stopping.

The chanting and the presence of the unfurled banner, facing the audience in the Hall of the House, continued unabated for approximately one minute and twenty-five seconds. During this period the governor stopped speaking and the audience can be seen on the videotape looking up in the direction of the banner and the chanting. Also, at some point after the banner was unfurled and the chanting began, but after the governor had stopped speaking, the governor looked over his left shoulder in the direction of the banner and the chanting. At the end of the one minute and twenty-five seconds, a capitol security officer entered the gallery, seized the banner by untying or tearing it from the railing, and arrested the defendant.

I

The defendant claims that subdivisions (2)(C) and (E) of § 2-1d(a) are impermissibly vague, facially and as applied, in violation of the United States constitution. The defendant also claims that these provisions are overbroad in violation of the first amendment to the United States constitution. The defendant contends that these provisions, on their face, impermissibly sweep within their proscriptions speech that may not be punished by the government. We disagree.

A

We first consider whether these provisions are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the United States constitution. "Under the requirements of due process of law mandated by our federal and state constitutions, a penal statute must be sufficiently definite to enable a person to know what conduct he must avoid. State v. Proto, 203 Conn. 682, 696, 526 A.2d 1297 (1987); State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 59-60, 428 A.2d 322 (1980); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77, 96 S.Ct. 612 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); State v. Eason, 192 Conn. 37, 46, 470 A.2d 688 (1984) [overruled in part on other grounds, Paulsen v. Manson, 203 Conn. 484, 525 A.2d 1315 (1987) ]. [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); State v. Eason, supra; State v. Pickering, supra, [180 Conn. at] 60 ." State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456, 469-70, 534 A.2d 230 (1987).

" '[P]erhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.' Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186 [1193-94], 71 L.Ed.2d 362, reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 2023, 72 L.Ed.2d 476 (1982)." State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 803-804, 640 A.2d 986 (1994).

We apply these principles to determine whether subdivisions (2)(C) and (E) of the statute are vague on their face. ¹¹ We turn first to subdivision (2)(C), which provides that "[a] person is guilty of interfering with the legislative process when he ... [a]lone or in concert with others, with intent to do so, disturbs, disrupts or interferes with, or attempts to disturb, disrupt or interfere with, any session, meeting or proceeding of the general assembly or either house thereof or any committee of the general assembly or either house thereof, whether within or outside the presence of said general assembly, either house thereof, or any such committee by ... making unreasonable noise." The plain language of this provision, therefore, proscribes only those instances of "unreasonable noise" that: (1...