State v. Lindsey
Decision Date | 14 February 1947 |
Docket Number | 30019. |
Citation | 177 P.2d 387,27 Wn.2d 186 |
Parties | STATE v. LINDSEY. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1
Rehearing Granted April 1, 1947.
John Richard Lindsey was convicted of murder in the first degree and of first degree assault, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Robert M. Jones, judge.
Ray R Greenwood and Roy A. Holland, both of Port Orchard, for appellant.
Lloyd Shorett and Duane T. Shinn, both of Seattle, for respondent.
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of the crime of murder in the first degree, and of first degree assault committed by shooting the deceased and defendant's wife.
The first assignment of error pertains to the court's failure to give a requested instruction. However, there was no error in this, for the reason that the instruction was principally a restatement of the evidence submitted by defendant.
The second assignment of error is that the trial court overruled defendant's motion for a new trial. The ground of this assignment is because of the alleged misconduct of the deputy prosecuting attorney in his cross-examination of defendant. The direct and cross-examination of defendant concerning a prior conviction is as follows:
Direct Examination:
Q. Seventeen. You got into some trouble in Indiana, as I understand it. A. Yes.
Cross-Examination:
'Q. (By Mr. Shinn) What was the offense regarding which you were convicted? A. I was convicted of assault and battery with intent to commit a felony and conspiracy of a felony.
'Q. What felony? A. Well, there was no felony. That was the charge.
'Q. Well, what was the felony? There was some felony involved.
'Mr. Greenwood: I object to any further questioning long that line. He had now answered the question. He could try that case all over if he could start in.
'Mr. Shinn: We have a right to know that felony it was, Your Honor.
'Mr. Greenwood: I don't know. You should have a certified copy of it.
'Mr. Shinn: That is not necessary and you know it.
'Mr. Greenwood: I don't know it. I know that it is, and if he is permitted to start along that line he could go on and on and try that all over again.
'The Court: No, we will----
'Mr. Greenwood: I think that the question is for one purpose only. It is a yes or no answer, he has been convicted of a felony, and further than that I object to any further questioning.
'The Court: Well, he may ask what is the felony.
'Mr. Greenwood: Yes. He asked that and it is answered.
'The Court: I don't think so. You may answer what the felony charge was that you were convicted of.
'The Witness: Well we were tried on--well, we were found convicted--found guilty of assault and battery with intent to commit a felony. It was alleged that we had robbed a man, but it wasn't proved.
'Q. (By Mr. Shinn) Well, we are not going into details about whether you were rightfully convicted or not.
'Mr. Greenwood: Well, never mind, now. He wasn't convicted of the charge of which he now speaks. 'What were you actually convicted of?' That is what the question is, I think.
'Mr. Greenwood: I object to that as----
'The Court: Sustained.
'Mr. Greenwood: Objected to as improper, and I think Counsel should now be instructed not to go further along this line.
* * *
'The Court: I will sustain it for another reason.
'Mr. Greenwood: The purpose of the question is plainly just to over-emphasize that point, and it is only admissible for one purpose.
'The Court: I have sustained the objection.
'The Court: Objection overruled.
(Italics ours.)
The deputy prosecuting attorney stated that he knew what the usual rule was; however, he added, '* * * but I understood that in insanity that this man's life is an open book.'
After obtaining from the defendant the information that he had been convicted of a specific crime, the deputy prosecutor proceeded to ask the defendant:
(1) 'The felony was robbery wasn't it?' (2) 'Well, what was the felony you were convicted of?' (3) 'Did anybody die as a result of that?' (4) 'How much time did you serve in the reformatory as a result of that crime?' (5) 'Now, having been convicted of a felony, didn't you realize that it was against the law for you to possess a gun?' (6) 'When you came to Seattle, did you register with the police as an convict?'
Respondent justifies this cross-examination by citing the holding of this court in State v. Brames, 154 Wash. 304, 282 P. 48, and State v. Kelly , 187 Wash. 301, 60 P.2d 50.
In State v. Brames, supra, [154 Wash. 304, 282 P. 50] the defendants were charged on several counts with violations of the state liquor laws, and during cross-examination of one of the defendants, the following question was asked and answered: This court stated that this question was not prejudicial and made the following quotation from State v. Gleen, 135 Wash. 153, 237 P. 292: 'If it be conceded that the court erred in his ruling, it must be held that the error was without prejudice because the witness anwered in the negative.'
In the same case, State v. Brames, supra, this court stated as follows: 'Equally without merit is the assignment that the court erred in permitting the prosecuting attorney to cross-examine the appellants regarding the nature and details of prior convictions.'
Cross-examination regarding the nature and details of the prior convictions is not set out. However, the court quotes at length from the case of State v. Steele, 150 Wash. 466, 273 P. 742, 743. Referring to the latter case we find the following statement:
This court then adopted the principle that it was proper to show the nature of the offense of which the defendant was convicted and the extent of the punishment, for the reason that these matters were set forth in the judgment of conviction.
State v. Kelly, supra, was a case where the defendants were charged in different counts with the crime of forcible rape and with being personally present and aiding and abetting. While the crime was being committed, defendant stole some money from the prosecuting witness. On page 307 of 187 Wash., on page 53 of 60 P.2d, the court states as follows: ...
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...State v. Merra, 103 N.J.L. 361, 137 A. 575, 577 (1927); State v. Silver, 2 N.J.Misc. 479, 127 A. 545, 546 (1925); State v. Lindsey, 27 Wash.2d 186, 177 P.2d 387, 389 (1947). For the above reasons, the trial court did not err in admitting the entire certified record of each Turning to the co......
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...the definition of a fair and impartial trial which this court has approved on several occasions. It is stated in State v. Lindsey, 27 Wash.2d 186, 191, 177 P.2d 387, 390, 181 P.2d 830 (1947), as Judge Mitchell stated, in the case of State v. Devlin, supra (145 Wash. 44, 258 P. 826): 'The qu......
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