State v. Linehan
| Decision Date | 14 April 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 40331,40331 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Dennis Darol LINEHAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Defendant, charged by indictment in separate counts with murder in the first degree, murder in the third degree, and kidnapping, tendered a plea of guilty to murder in the third degree as charged. The plea was refused. The indictment was dismissed. An information was then filed charging the crime of kidnapping. Defendant pleaded guilty as charged in the information and was sentenced according to law. This procedure is not forbidden by constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.
2. In the absence of a showing of prejudice, the lack of a preliminary hearing or waiver thereof prior to the entry of a plea of guilty to the crime charged in an information does not offend a defendant's constitutionally protected rights where the information has replaced a grand jury indictment charging substantially the same offense as that charged in the information.
3. A claim made before the supreme court that a plea of guilty was interposed because of a mistaken belief that confessions claimed to have been illegally obtained could be introduced as evidence in the event of trial will not be considered until the trial court has had an opportunity to evaluate the claim upon a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.AT C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Ronald L. Haskvitz, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., Gerard Snell, Sol. Gen., William B. Randall, County Atty., Mentor C. Addicks, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.
Appeal from district court judgment of conviction.
On August 6, 1965, an indictment was returned charging defendant in separate counts with murder in the first degree, murder in the third degree, and kidnapping. On September 17, 1965, defendant was arraigned on the indictment in the District Court of Ramsey County. He tendered a plea of not guilty to murder in the first degree, guilty to murder in the third degree, and not guilty to kidnapping by reason of double jeopardy. The trial judge refused to accept it. On September 27, 1965, the trial court denied defendant's motion to proceed with presentence examination for sentencing upon the third-degree murder plea. On October 1, 1965, the court granted the state's motion to dismiss the indictment and file an information charging the crime of kidnapping. Defendant was again arraigned. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced according to law.
The appeal from the conviction is on the grounds that the trial court erred (1) in refusing to sentence defendant upon his plea of guilty to murder in the third degree as charged in the indictment and allowing the state to dismiss the indictment and proceed by information after defendant had already entered a plea to murder in the third degree as charged in the indictment; and (2) in accepting defendant's plea of guilty when such plea was motivated by two illegally obtained confessions.
REFUSAL TO SENTENCE ON MURDER THIRD AN ALLOWING DISMISSAL OF
Subsequent to defendant's attempt to plead guilty to murder in the third degree and the trial court's refusal to accept such plea or conduct a presentence examination for sentencing thereon, the following proceedings were had in district court:
'MR. LENZMEIER (the assistant public defender): May we have a ten minutes recess to discuss this matter with the defendant before arraignment--and when I say 'discuss this matter with the defendant,' we've been aware of it, as Mr. Tolaas indicated, that the State intended to do this as of late yesterday afternoon and we've been in conference with him, but we would want ten minutes, if the Court please, before the defendant is arraigned.
Following this, defendant was arraigned, and he pleaded guilty. He was then sworn and interrogated. He told how he had discussed the charges with his attorneys and gave his version of the events in question which showed him to be guilty of the crime.
1. Because defendant tendered a plea of guilty to murder in the third degree as charged in the indictment, it is urged that the information charging kidnapping arising out of the same conduct on the part of the defendant is barred on grounds of double jeopardy. We do not agree.
Minn.St. 630.11 requires that the arraignment include the reading of the indictment to the defendant (unless he waives its being read) and 'asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty To the indictment'. (Italics supplied.) Minn.St. 630.13 provides that after being arraigned, defendant 'shall answer to the arraignment, and either move the court to set aside The indictment, or demur or plead Thereto.' (Italics supplied.)
The only provision argarding pleas of guilty to something less than the entire indictment is § 630.30, which states:
'When any person charged with crime shall be Permitted by any court or magistrate to plead guilty to A lesser degree of the offense than that which he is charged, or to a lesser offense included within the offense with which he is charged, the reasons for the acceptance of such plea shall be set forth in an order of the court directing such acceptance and entered upon the minutes, and any recommendations of the county attorney or other prosecuting officer in reference thereto, with his reasons therefor, shall be stated in writing and filed as a public record with the official files of the case.' (Italics supplied.)
It is clear to us that the above sections contemplate not an absolute right on the part of a defendant to plead guilty, but a power on the part of the court, in its discretion, to allow him to do so in proper cases.
Defendant urges that § 630.30 does not apply in the present case because the indictment specifically charged defendant with the crime of murder in the third degree. In tendering a plea of guilty to that offense, he reasons, he was not offering to plead to a 'lesser degree' of or a 'lesser offense included' in the crime charged. Any implication of judicial discretion to be drawn from the language of § 630.30 would not apply if defendant's position in this respect is right. But we do not think it is. Defendant did not offer to plead guilty to the indictment as charged. Like the defendant who is prepared to plead guilty to a lesser degree of the charged offense or a lesser offense included in it, this defendant's proposal was something less than that. He proffered a plea of guilty to a part of the indictment only. This situation so much parallels the procedure envisioned by § 630.30 as to suggest that here also the power of the trial court to accept or reject the plea as tendered was discretionary.
Defendant argues that since he could have been convicted of murder in the third degree even if it had not been specifically charged (such crime being included in the crime of murder in the first degree), the fact that it was specifically charged must be taken as showing the grand jury's intention that he be allowed to plead guilty thereto. It is difficult to see how defendant can attribute the intention of allowing him to limit his punishment to 25 years to a body which has determined the state had a prima facie case against him on crimes carrying life and 40-year sentences. There is nothing in the grand jury's action showing an intent to vary the rule that the defendant has no absolute right to plead guilty to anything less than the entire indictment.
Section 609.035 is consistent with this result. The policy of that section is to protect the criminal defendant from multiple prosecutions and punishment for offenses arising out of the same conduct. The policy is facilitated when the state includes all offenses arising out of given conduct in one prosecution, stating the offenses in separate counts. It would be manifestly contrary to this policy for the defendant to have the absolute right to select from an indictment the count charging the crime carrying the lowest penalty; plead guilty thereto; demand that the plea be accepted; and then set up a double-jeopardy defense to the balance of the indictment.
2. At oral argument, the fact that defendant had not had, nor had he waived, any complaint, warrant, or preliminary hearing on the offense charged in the information was considered.
Although the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part that '(n)o person...
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Chapman v. State, 41285
...obtained confession, and (b) his plea of guilty must have been prompted by the existence of the confession. See, also, State v. Linehan, 276 Minn. 349, 150 N.W.2d 203; State ex rel. Turner v. Tahash, supra; State ex rel. Schuler v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 302, 154 N.W.2d 200; State v. Kobi, 277 M......
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Fabian v. State
...Heath v. State, 198 Md. 455, 85 A.2d 43; United States ex rel. Morford v. Hocker, 268 F.Supp. 864 (D.C.1967); State v. Linehan, 276 Minn. 349, 150 N.W.2d 203 (1967); State v. Crump, 412 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. 1967); Goyer v. State, 26 Wis.2d 244, 131 N.W.2d 888 (1967). There is no merit to the con......
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State v. Donesay, 77558
...court in its discretion may allow a defendant to plead to less than the entire indictment 'in proper cases.' State v. Linehan, 276 Minn. 349, 353, 150 N.W.2d 203, 206 (1967); see also Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.04, subd. 3(2) ('The court may accept a plea agreement of the parties when the interest......
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State v. Martinez–mendoza, A09–2151.
...And a defendant does not have the right to plead guilty to less than all of the charges brought against him. State v. Linehan, 276 Minn. 349, 353, 150 N.W.2d 203, 207 (1967); Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.07. A district court “must reject or accept the plea of guilty on the terms of the plea agreemen......