State v. Linton, 30893.

Decision Date03 April 1950
Docket Number30893.
Citation36 Wn.2d 67,216 P.2d 761
PartiesSTATE, v. LINTON.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1950. Robertson and Smith, Spokane, George N Apostol, Seattle, for appellant.

John Hancock, Okanogan, for respondent.

ROBINSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction on a two-count information.

Count I was based upon Rem.Rev.Stat, § 2436, and charged the defendant with carnally knowing and abusing a female child under the age of eighteen years, to wit, of the age of seventeen years not then his wife.

Count II read as follows:

'And the Prosecuting Attorney aforesaid charges the defendant Ralph Linton, in Count II of this amended Information and as a part of the same act and transaction as set out in Count I of this Amended Information and connected therewith, with the crime of assault in the second degree, committed as follows to-wit:

'That he, the said Ralph Linton, in the County of Okanogan, State of Washington, on or about the 10th day of August, 1948, willfully and unlawfully did make an assault upon one ________, a female child under the age of 18 years, not the wife of said defendant, with intent then and there to commit a felony, to-wit: The crime of carnal knowledge upon the person of said ________, and said Ralph Linton did willfully and unlawfully inflict grievous bodily harm upon the person of said ________, a human being, by then and there striking and hitting the said ________ with his hands and fists, all contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.'

We will not fully set out the evidence in the case. We may say, however, that it would have sustained a verdict of guilty if the defendant had been charged under § 2435 of the code, since it sufficiently established that the complaining witness made a most vigorous resistance, which was forcibly overcome.

However, some quotation from the evidence is necessary to establish a background for discussion of certain questions raised by the appellant's assignments of error.

It was charged that the alleged crime was committed on August 10, 1948. The complaining witness testified that, having been born on February 3, 1931, she was seventeen years and about six months old at the time of the alleged assault. That she was born on February 3, 1931, was corroborated by the introduction of state's exhibit No. 1, a certified copy of the registry of births of the county of Roseau, state of Minnesota. She further testified that, on the evening of August 10, 1948, she went to the bus depot at Omak, Washington, to meet her brother, and, finding that the bus on which he was expected to arrive would be an hour late, decided to go to the home of a girl friend, rather than to wait at the station; and that, while she was en route to her girl friend's house, the defendant, Linton, in an automobile, pulled over to the curb and called her name, and she went over to the car.

'Q. * * * You say by the Chevrolet garage Mr. Linton pulled over to the curb and called your name. * * * A. He asked me what I was doing and I told him I was waiting for the bus for my little brother and he asked me to ride around for awhile until it was time for the bus.

'Q. And did you ride with him after he asked you to? A. Yes.

'Q. Just go ahead and tell us where you went with him and what occurred and what happened. A. Well, we came down to Okanogan and he offered me a drink of whiskey and I told him 'No', and when we got to Okanogan he asked me if I would like a bottle of beer and I said I might drink one and he went to a tavern and got about six bottles of beer and he opened two bottles and I drink one and he drove out across the bridge to the reservation. I thought he was taking the river road to Omak. He took off on a side road up there.'

This side road, locally called the 'corkscrew grade,' is a lonely and little traveled road leading into the Colville Indian Reservation. The complaining witness further testified that, after driving up this road for a little distance, defendant made a U-turn and parked the car, headed in the direction from which they had come.

According to her further explicit testimony, the defendant then removed portions of her clothing and consummated the act which constituted carnal knowledge, as defined in Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2437.

The complaining witness further testified:

'Q. You stated that you saw the lights of a car coming. About how far away was the car, do you know, at the time that you first saw the lights? A. I don't know how far it was away.

'Q. Did this car stop or go by the car in which you were with Linton at that time? A. They stopped a little ways past and then backed up.

'Q. Did you endeavor to make any scream or try to holler to attract their attention? A. Yes.

'Q. Did you make any noise or holler? A. Yes, I screamed.

'Q. What did the defendant Linton do at the time you screamed and the car backed up? A. He put his hand over my mouth and I bit him and he took it away and I screamed again and he got out of the car and ran around to the other side and I got out and took my clothes and went to the other car.

'Q. What do you mean by your clothes? A. My jeans and panties.

'Q. And where were the jeans and pants that you picked up at that time A. They were at the end of the seat.

'Q. That is the end where your feet were? A. Yes.'

In giving his version of the matter, the defendant, Linton, as would be expected, denied a great deal of the testimony given by the prosecuting witness. For example, while she testified that he called to her from his car and she went over to him and he asked her if she would like to take a drive with him, he testified that she came over to his car and asked him to take her to Okanogan. She testified that, after she got into the car, he produced a bottle of whiskey, which she refused. He testified that she took two drinks of whiskey on the drive from Omak to Okanogan.

In addition to a transcription of Linton's testimony given at the trial, we have an exhibit, called a statement, which opens with the following:

'I, Ralph Linton, make the following statement and confession of my own free will and accord, without threat of any kind being made to me or without any promise of immunity being made to me.'

We quote the following excerpts from the body of the instrument:

'While I was sitting in my car near the bus depot, a girl, whom I have been informed was [naming the prosecuting witness], came up to my car and wanted to know if I would take her to Okanogan. When she got in the car she said she wanted a drink and I gave her some drinks. When we got to Okanogan I bought six bottles of beer and drove out on the reservation with her. We did some drinking in the car, and I wrestled around with her in the car and kissed her a time or two. * * * She got out of the car and said she was going to urinate. About that time I saw a car coming and she started to get back into the car and had her jeans pulled part-way up. When the car came alongside of my car, she screamed and hollered for help and got out and ran over to the car and got in it. * * *

'There wasn't any fight or struggle in the car, and the scratches which I have on my body are scratches that I acquired while moving an old barn at Brewster. The girl didn't scratch me or try to hit me with anything while she was in the car and there was no fight or struggle. There was no blood on the seat of my car yesterday, and the blood that is there now must have been caused by her being sick.'

The statement closes as follows:

'I have read the above and foregoing statement, and the statements contained therein are true.

'Dated at Okanogan, Washington, this 11th day of August, 1948.

[Signed] Ralph Linton

Witnesses:

Lester H. Moss

John Hancock'

The complaining witness testified that, at or about the time, or immediately after, the defendant accomplished his purpose, she saw the lights of an approaching car and began screaming; whereupon the defendant got out of the car and pulled up his trousers, and she got out of the car and grabbed her jeans and panties, and ran over to the approaching car to ask for help. That she did so scream and run over to the car was admitted by the appellant. However, he testified that at that time her jeans and panties were pulled up above her knees, which was consistent with his other testimony that she had left the car to answer a call of nature. Testimony of the complaining witness that she was carrying her jeans and panties was corroborated by the occupants of that car.

Charles Hassenphlug and wife testified that they lived on a farm about eighteen miles from Okanogan on the Indian reservation, and on August 10, 1948, that date being fixed in their minds because August 10 was Hassenphlug's birthday, they drove up the 'corkscrew grade' about eleven p.m., en route home after having had a birthday dinner with their children in Okanogan. Mr. Hassenphlug testified that, as they rounded a curve coming up the grade, they saw a car ahead of them, parked alongside the road. As appellant contends that a great deal of his testimony was inadmissible, we find it necessary to quote a considerable portion thereof.

'A. * * * All at once we noticed the right door was swinging back and forth and Mamma says, 'There must be some trouble.' I decided maybe it was just a party of some kind and was going to go on an just as we got on by we heard some sort of scream and so I stopped, and Mamma says, 'There is somebody in that car hurt.' There was a piece of floor mat hanging there and she thought there was somebody underneath the car so I stopped. At that time she took the flashlight and about that time we heard another party...

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    ...in nature.” State v. Salinas, 87 Wash.2d 112, 121, 549 P.2d 712 (1976) (internal quotations omitted) (citing State v. Linton, 36 Wash.2d 67, 95–96, 216 P.2d 761 (1950)). Current law defines “substantial bodily harm” as bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, ......
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