State v. Lipscomb
Decision Date | 13 June 2000 |
Docket Number | (AC 19353) |
Citation | 753 A.2d 415,58 Conn. App. 267 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CECIL LIPSCOMB |
Lavery, Hennessy and Daly, Js.1 Jon L. Schoenhorn, with whom, on the brief, was Jeanne M. Zulick, for the appellant (defendant).
Christopher T. Godialis, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Adam Scott, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant, Cecil Lipscomb, appeals from the judgment of conviction of operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, the defendant claims that he was seized by East Hartford police officers without any reasonable or articulable suspicion of criminal activity and that the subsequent discovery that he was operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension should be suppressed as the fruit of an unreasonable search and seizure. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. Shortly before midnight on March 17, 1998, East Hartford police officers Mark Allen and William Spragg were in a marked police vehicle in the Main Street area of East Hartford. Spragg was driving at that time, while Allen was riding as a front seat passenger. Allen observed a Ford Bronco turn from Main Street onto Connecticut Boulevard. He then saw a woman, Stephanie Beaulieu, standing on the corner waving her arm to the Bronco. After Allen observed this action, he told Spragg that Beaulieu was a prostitute. The officers then observed Beaulieu get into the Bronco, which pulled over to pick her up and subsequently drove away. The officers testified that this particular area in East Hartford is a high density, "high crime" area known for car thefts, prostitution, burglaries and robberies.
Allen also testified that he had observed Beaulieu in the past on two different occasions. Once, he saw her in the Main Street area during a motor vehicle stop in which she was the passenger in a car driven by a man. No criminal activity was seen at that time. The second occasion that Allen saw Beaulieu occurred when he was riding in a police vehicle with Officer Tracy O'Connell of the East Hartford police, who pointed Beaulieu out and said that she was a prostitute. Allen testified that it was his belief that O'Connell previously had arrested Beaulieu for prostitution. It was later determined that Beaulieu had no prior arrests or convictions for prostitution.
Spragg then proceeded to follow the Bronco onto Lynn Street, a dead-end street, where the officers motioned to the operator of the Bronco to stop.2 There were no motor vehicle violations observed at any time before the Bronco was stopped. Allen confronted the operator of the Bronco, the defendant, and asked for his license and registration. After a check, Allen found that the defendant's motor vehicle license was suspended and charged him with a violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c).
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of license suspension claiming that he was stopped by the police without a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The court denied the motion, and the defendant subsequently pleaded nolo contendere with the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a.3
The defendant claims on appeal that the police lacked a reasonable and articulable basis to stop his vehicle, and that the ensuing detention violated his rights pursuant to the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution,4 and article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut.5 The state argues in response that the investigatory stop of the defendant was justified on the basis of the facts that Allen thought Beaulieu was a prostitute, Beaulieu was engaged in conduct typical of a prostitute and the area was known for prostitution. We agree with the defendant that the facts of this case do not reveal a reasonable and articulable basis for a police stop.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 496, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 654, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992).6
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Watson, 165 Conn. 577, 584-85, 345 A.2d 532 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960, 94 S. Ct. 1977, 40 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1974). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 656. "`An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.'" State v. Scully, supra, 674.7
We conclude that a woman waving a car down and subsequently getting into it in an area known for prostitution does not form the proper basis for rational inferences that warrant a police officer's intrusion. The state argues that there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain the defendant because the officers (1) were aware of the area's reputation for prostitution, (2) had information that the woman was a prostitute and (3) saw the woman engage in conduct that is consistent with the modus operandi of prostitutes.8
Our Supreme Court has recently held in State v. Donahue, 251 Conn. 636, 646-47, 742 A.2d 775 (1999) (en banc), that police officers are not justified in stopping people because they are in a high crime area. See also State v. Oquendo, supra, 223 Conn. 655 n.11 ( ). The state claims, however, that the officers' suspicion in the present case was fueled by additional factors besides the fact that the actions took place in an area known for prostitution.
For instance, the state claims that the officers had information that Beaulieu was a prostitute. The trial court also found that Allen had knowledge that Beaulieu was a prostitute. A review of...
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State v. Lipscomb
...a finding of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment. State v. Lipscomb, 58 Conn. App. 267, 274-75, 753 A.2d 415 (2000). We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court p......
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State v. Turner
...is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lipscomb, 58 Conn. App. 267, 271-73, 753 A.2d 415, cert. granted, 254 Conn. 932, 761 A.2d 756 Although the reputation of an area as high crime, standing alone, does not just......
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