State v. Lipscomb

• Citation: 258 Conn. 68,779 A.2d 88
• Decision Date: 11 September 2001
• Docket Number: (SC 16395)
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CECIL LIPSCOMB
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

258 Conn. 68

779 A.2d 88

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CECIL LIPSCOMB

(SC 16395)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 17, 2001.

Officially released September 11, 2001.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Palmer and Vertefeuille, JS. Christopher T. Godialis, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Adam Scott, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Jon L. Schoenhorn, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

SULLIVAN, C. J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court, in reversing the judgment of the trial court, properly concluded that an investigative stop of the defendant's motor vehicle by the police was not justified by reasonable suspicion. We conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained by the police during that stop. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The state charged the defendant, Cecil Lipscomb, with driving a motor vehicle with a suspended license in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c).¹ The defendant moved to suppress evidence that his operator's license was suspended, arguing that the police discovered the suspension after detaining him without reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the investigative stop conducted by the police was appropriate under the circumstances of this case. The defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a.² The trial court, accordingly, rendered a judgment of conviction.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court concluded that the reasons for the stop, as articulated by the officers, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment. State v. Lipscomb, 58 Conn. App. 267, 274-75, 753 A.2d 415 (2000).

We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that an investigative stop of the defendant's motor vehicle was not justified by a reasonable suspicion?" State v. Lipscomb, 254 Conn. 932, 761 A.2d 756 (2000). This appeal followed.

At the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court found the following relevant facts. In the late evening hours of March 17, 1998, and the early morning hours of March 18, 1998, Officers Mark Allen and William Spragg of the East Hartford police department were on patrol in a marked police vehicle in the Connecticut Boulevard and Main Street area of East Hartford. Allen observed the defendant's Ford Bronco travel down Main Street and turn onto Connecticut Boulevard. Allen also observed a woman standing on the corner of Connecticut Boulevard and Main Street "waving her arm." Both officers watched the Bronco approach the woman and saw her enter the vehicle with the defendant. The Connecticut Boulevard and Main Street area in East Hartford is known to police as a "high crime" area, which is often the site of motor vehicle thefts, prostitution, burglaries and robberies. Allen also personally had observed the same woman on the street corner in this area on prior occasions and had learned from Officer Tracy O'Connell that she was involved in prostitution at a local hotel. On the night of the defendant's arrest, Allen made Spragg aware of the woman's reputation as a prostitute. As a result of their observations, the officers followed the defendant's vehicle to a dead-end street where they motioned for him to pull over.³ The officers conducted a routine motor vehicle check and discovered that the defendant's operator's license was under suspension.

The defendant sought to suppress the evidence of his license suspension, claiming that the officers' stop of his motor vehicle violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, and article first, §§ 7, 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution.⁴ The defendant argued in his motion to suppress that: (1) at the time of the stop, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that he was committing an offense; (2) the officers did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain him or his vehicle; and (3) the seizure of the defendant, and the subsequent search of his person and vehicle, did not fall within any acknowledged exception to the warrant requirements of the state or federal constitutions.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress and denied the motion. In its denial of the defendant's motion, the trial court held that under the totality of the circumstances the police had detained the defendant only upon "a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring or [was] about to occur, to wit, solicitation of prostitution and prostitution. Therefore, the conduct of the East Hartford police officers to accomplish an investigative stop, in order to investigate further the circumstances that give rise to the suspicion of criminal conduct, was appropriate under the circumstances. Furthermore, the resulting information that the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license was under suspension was not obtained illegally."

The defendant appealed from the ensuing judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming that there was no reasonable and articulable basis for the police to have stopped his motor vehicle, nor was there justification for the subsequent investigation of his license status. He argued that the officers' discovery that he was operating his vehicle with a suspended license should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unreasonable search and seizure. The Appellate Court concluded that the officers' inference that the defendant's passenger was a prostitute was tenuous at best, and that, even if she were a prostitute, her action of waving to the defendant and getting into his car did not amount to "furtive conduct" that should warrant detention by the police. State v. Lipscomb, supra, 58 Conn. App. 271. The Appellate Court based its conclusion on State v. Donahue, 251 Conn. 636, 646-47, 742 A.2d 775 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 924, 121 S. Ct. 299, 148 L. Ed.2d 240 (2000),⁵ and State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 655 n.11, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992), in which we held that "[a] history of past criminal activity in a locality does not justify suspension of the constitutional rights of everyone, or anyone, who may subsequently be in that locality." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The state claims that the investigative stop of the defendant's motor vehicle was justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Specifically, the state argues that the combined circumstances of that evening gave the officers reason to believe the defendant was engaged in soliciting a prostitute.

First, the state argues that the area in which the defendant was detained is known for criminal activity. In addition, the state argues that: (1) both the defendant and his female companion were in an area frequented by local prostitutes; (2) prostitutes in that area routinely stand on street corners and "flag down" customers by waving to signal them to pull to the curb; (3) the officers saw a woman standing on a street corner, late at night, waving her arm and saw the defendant immediately pull his vehicle to the curb, pick her up and drive to a dead-end public street; and (4) the woman picked up by the defendant was suspected of prostitution by the police. The state argues that this "totality of the circumstances" warranted the officers' investigative stop and justified their search of the defendant's motor vehicle history. We agree with the state. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the defendant lawfully was detained after police observed suspicious behavior in a high crime area that led them to believe that he had solicited a prostitute. Because these facts support a finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress.

In reviewing the Appellate Court's reversal of the trial court's finding that a brief detention of the defendant was justified, we undertake a two part analysis. First, it is the function of this court to determine whether the trial court's underlying factual findings were clearly erroneous. State v. Cofield, 220 Conn. 38, 44, 595 A.2d 1349 (1991); State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 625, 500 A.2d 1299 (1985); Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). Second, "[t]he trial court's conclusions must stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the facts." State v. Torres, supra, 625; State v. Lasher, 190 Conn. 259, 267, 460 A.2d 970 (1983). In conducting our review, we recognize that the trial court is given great deference in its fact-finding function because it is in the "unique [position] to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties, which is not fully reflected in the cold, printed record which is available to us." Lupien v. Lupien, 192 Conn. 443, 445, 472 A.2d 18 (1984). In light of the facts found by the trial court, we must determine whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the police lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity on which to base their initial investigative stop of the defendant's vehicle.

After reviewing the record in this case, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaging in, or was about to engage in,...