State v. Little

• Decision Date: 09 June 2021
• Docket Number: 2021-UP-196
• Parties: The State, Respondent, v. General T. Little, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2018-000561
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent, v. General T. Little, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000561

No. 2021-UP-196

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

June 9, 2021

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

Heard January 12, 2021

Appeal From Charleston County Thomas L. Hughston, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Vordman Carlisle Traywick, III, of Robinson Gray Stepp &amp Laffitte, LLC, and Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, both of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Assistant Attorney General Michael Douglass Ross, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM

General T. Little appeals his conviction for the murder of his wife Barbara Little (Victim). Little argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) refusing to suppress evidence found in Little's vehicle and home because officers conducted a warrantless search by looking through the window of his vehicle while it was in his driveway, (2) denying his motion for a mistrial, and (3) qualifying the State's witness as a footwear expert and admitting her testimony. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.We affirm the trial court's admission of evidence found in Little's vehicle and home. See State v Robinson, 410 S.C. 519, 526, 765 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2014) ("Because the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, appellate courts should not reverse the decision of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion."). The record showed Deputy Matthew Colburn was the first to respond to the crime scene, where he found a large pool of blood on the floor, blood on the walls, and towels and a blanket soaked in blood. He located the Victim, who was covered in blood, and was unable to determine whether the killer had used a firearm. Deputy Colburn made contact with Little, who agreed to meet him at the crime scene. When Little failed to appear, detectives sent Deputy Colburn to Little's home to locate him. Due to the exigencies presented by the violence at the crime scene-as well as Deputy Colburn's legitimate officer safety concerns-we find the evidence supports the trial court's ruling that Deputy Colburn's minimally intrusive search was reasonable. See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210, 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' . . . ."); id. ("A fairly perceived need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."); id. ("Protecting the safety of police officers has also been held an exigent circumstance."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 591, 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In the Fourth Amendment context, a court is concerned with determining whether a reasonable officer would be moved to take action." (quoting State v. Wright, 416 S.C. 353, 369, 785 S.E.2d 479, 487 (Ct. App. 2016))); id. at 592, 803 S.E.2d at 880 ("Exigent circumstances-such as imminent destruction of evidence, the potential for a suspect to flee, or a risk of danger to police or others-may justify a warrantless entry, but absent hot pursuit, there must be at least probable cause to believe the exigent circumstances were present." (emphasis added)).

2. We find the trial court did not err in denying Little's motion for a mistrial because he was not prejudiced by the PowerPoint slide. See State v. Inman, 395 S.C. 539, 565, 720 S.E.2d 31, 45 (2011) ("The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law."); State v. Rowlands, 343 S.C. 454, 457, 539 S.E.2d 717, 719 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Whether a mistrial is manifestly necessary is a fact specific inquiry."); State v. Harris, 340 S.C. 59, 63, 530 S.E.2d 626, 628 (2000) ("In order to receive a mistrial, the defendant must show error and resulting prejudice."). During the pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court suppressed the admission of Little's wedding ring, which had traces of blood on it, finding it was obtained from an unlawful search. During the State's closing, it presented a PowerPoint slide, which stated "no jewelry (no ring???)." The slide did not inform the jury of the blood evidence on the wedding band, and the slide was presented to the jury only briefly before the trial court ordered the State to take down the reference to the ring, which the trial court had excluded in its earlier evidentiary hearing. Without the broader context of the ring's blood evidence, the State's error did not prejudice Little, and we are unconvinced by Little's argument that because wedding bands are symbolic, the fact he was not wearing one inherently prejudiced him. See Harris, 340 S.C. at 64, 530 S.E.2d at 628 ("[F]or the defendant to be prejudiced, the misconduct must have affected the verdict."); State v. Huggins, 325 S.C. 103, 107, 481 S.E.2d 114, 116 (1997) ("A new trial will not be granted unless the prosecutor's comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.").

3. We find the trial court did not err by qualifying Dawn Claycomb as an expert in footwear examination and by admitting her testimony. See State v. White, 382 S.C. 265, 269 676 S.E.2d 684, 686 (2009) ("A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be reversed absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion."). Claycomb testified at length about her experience in footwear examination. She explained she worked in crime scene analysis for five years,...