State v. Loera
| Citation | 167 Idaho 533,473 P.3d 802 |
| Decision Date | 05 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 46849 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Justin James LOERA, Defendant-Appellant. |
Eric D. Fredericksen, Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, attorney for Appellant. Brian Dickson argued.
Lawrence Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Respondent. Kenneth Jorgensen argued.
This appeal arises from Justin James Loera's conviction for battery on a correctional officer. Loera asserts the district court erred in three respects: first, by partially quashing his subpoena duces tecum based on its relevance rather than the standards prescribed in Idaho Criminal Rule 17(b) ; second, for ordering restitution without sufficient evidence; and third, by failing to address his request for credit for time served. We affirm the district court's decision to partially quash Loera's subpoena duces tecum . However, we vacate the district court's order awarding restitution and remand the case with instructions for the court to award Loera 202 days of credit for time served.
The State charged Loera with aggravated battery on a correctional officer with a persistent violator enhancement. Loera issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") for documents pertaining to Idaho maximum security institution standard operating procedures for management of tiers housing security threat group ("STG") inmates, including, but not limited to, proper conduct by correctional officers and staff. An STG exists when two or more inmates act in concert to threaten the security, safety, or operations of the prison facility (mainly through gang activity). IDOC moved to partially quash Loera's subpoena duces tecum , claiming that production of these materials was unreasonable because it required disclosure of confidential information protected by the Idaho Public Records Act and presented a serious security risk to IDOC facilities. In support of its motion, IDOC filed an affidavit of the Deputy Chief of the Division of Prisons, Randy Blades, who explained that STG's present particular threats to facility personnel, other inmates, and the public at large. Blades asserted that disclosure of these strategies would "jeopardize[ ] the orderly operation of the Department's prison facilities, including the Department's ability to track, monitor, and manage STG members, putting staff, inmates and the public at risk."
Loera objected to IDOC's motion to partially quash the subpoena, claiming it related to a "potential necessity defense" based on the allegation that Loera was placed in a position where he was required to aggressively react toward the correctional officers in order to protect himself from later becoming the victim of violence at the hands of other prisoners. Loera claimed that presentation of this defense required an examination of the management policies related to his housing tier. Loera also argued the STG strategies were necessary to determine whether the victim was acting as a correctional officer at the time that he was involved in the altercation, because if he was not following policies and procedures, he would be acting outside the scope of his job and duties.
The district court granted IDOC's motion to partially quash Loera's subpoena duces tecum . During a hearing on the motion, the district judge asked about the relevance of the STG policies and procedures before concluding, "I fail to see how the policies and procedures are relevant to any issue in this case." Ultimately, the judge characterized Loera's request as a "fishing expedition[,]" and determined it was improper based on the facts of the case. The judge explained that there is case law covering how excessive force can remove the propriety of an officer's actions, and that the question, "[didn't] have anything to do with what policies and procedures are in place." In closing, the judge explained that the risk of publically disclosing internal policies and procedures for management of prisoners in IDOC was high and "outweigh[ed] what appear[ed] [ ] to be nonexistent relevance to any issue in this case." The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a guilty verdict for the lesser included offense of battery on a correctional officer. Loera admitted to the persistent violator enhancement and was sentenced to ten years, with five years determinate, consecutive to sentences currently being served.
The district court also ordered restitution to the State Insurance Fund ("SIF") in the amount of $1,537.05 for payments made on behalf of the officer involved. The award stemmed from a letter in which SIF listed the assailant as "Justin Loera" and the date of incident as 06/22/18—the date of the battery. Attached to the letter was a "Paid Cost Summary," which listed the correctional officer victim as the claimant, and contained six payments made to local area medical facilities. Four of the payments listed the service date as 06/23/18 and the remaining two listed 06/26/18. The district judge ordered Loera to make restitution to SIF in the amount requested, $1,537.05, stating, "I will order restitution unless there's a specific objection to a specific receipt because I think PTSD is a real injury." The judge was evidently referencing the victim's impact statement in which the officer stated the incident caused him some issues with anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder
("PTSD"); however, the SIF paperwork did not mention any PTSD-related treatment. Loera objected to the order granting restitution because no medical documentation was provided showing the payments made by SIF were related to the incident. The judge responded, The State never provided any more documentation.
Following his conviction, Loera filed a motion for reduction of sentence and request for credit for time served under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. Loera asserted he had a right to credit for time served between the date of his first appearance, August 8, 2018, and the date of his sentencing hearing, February 25, 2019. The district court denied the motion for a reduced sentence, not mentioning whether Loera had a right to credit for time served. The record reveals that Loera remained in custody for 202 days. Loera filed a timely notice of appeal.
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted IDOC's motion to partially quash Loera's subpoena duces tecum ?
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the district court's order granting $1,537.05 in restitution to the State Insurance Fund?
3. Did the district court err by not granting Loera's motion for credit for time served?
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to quash a subpoena for an abuse of discretion. State v. Joy , 155 Idaho 1, 12, 304 P.3d 276, 287 (2013). Additionally, "[t]he decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court's discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7)." State v. Corbus , 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011) (citing State v. Richmond , 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002) ). When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion, the inquiry requires consideration of four essentials to determine whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
State v. Le Veque , 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461, 464 (2018).
"The district court's factual findings with regard to restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence." State v. Straub , 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013) (quoting Corbus , 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401 ). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id . (citing Kinney v. Tupperware Co ., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990) ).
Loera's first argument on appeal is that the district court erred by granting IDOC's motion to partially quash his subpoena duces tecum . Idaho Criminal Rule 17(b) provides the applicable legal standard governing a motion to quash a subpoena. Rule 17(b) states: "The court, on motion, may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive." I.C.R. 17(b). That said, under Rule 17(b), "a trial court does not have discretion to restrict a defendant's access to potentially admissible evidence because some of it might be irrelevant." Joy , 155 Idaho at 13, 304 P.3d at 288. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to quash a subpoena for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 12, 304 P.3d at 287.
Loera claims the district court acted contrary to the applicable legal standards articulated by this Court in State v. Joy , by improperly focusing on the perceived relevance and admissibility of the evidence sought by his subpoena instead of the standards in Rule 17(b). In Joy , the defendant was charged with several crimes in connection to an altercation with his wife. 155 Idaho at 4, 304 P.3d at 279. The defendant filed a subpoena duces tecum to obtain images from the victim-wife's computer to impeach her testimony at trial. Id. at 4–5, 304 P.3d at 279–80. The State moved to quash the subpoena, first arguing the evidence...
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