State v. Long

• Decision Date: 12 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2012–1410.,2012–1410.
• Citation: 8 N.E.3d 890,138 Ohio St.3d 478
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. LONG, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

138 Ohio St.3d 478

8 N.E.3d 890

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.LONG, Appellant.

No. 2012–1410.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 11, 2013.

Decided March 12, 2014.

Syllabus of the Court

1. A court, in exercising its discretion under R.C. 2929.03(A), must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a sentence of life without parole. (Miller v. Alabama, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), followed.)

2. The record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender's youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life without parole is imposed.

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. Springman, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Peter K. Glenn–Applegate, Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General.

Marsha L. Levick, urging reversal for amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center.

Kilpatrick, Townsend & Stockton, L.L.P., and Gia L. Cincone, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

LANZINGER, J.

{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked whether a trial court violates the Eighth Amendment by imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for an aggravated murder committed by a juvenile. We hold that a court, in exercising its discretion under R.C. 2929.03(A), must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a sentence of life without parole in light of Miller v. Alabama, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).

I. Case Background

{¶ 2} Appellant, Eric Long, and his two codefendants were charged in a 13–count indictment with several offenses stemming from two separate shootings in March 2009. When the offenses were committed, Long was 17 years old. According to public information from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, codefendant Fonta Whipple was 26 years old, and codefendant Jashawn Clark was 25. http:// www. drc. state. oh. us/ Offender Search/ Search. aspx.

{¶ 3} Following a joint jury trial, all three codefendants were found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder, three counts of felonious assault, two counts of having weapons while under disability, one count of improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation, and various firearm specifications. Long was also convicted of one count of carrying concealed weapons. At a joint sentencing hearing with his two codefendants, Long was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole on the aggravated-murder counts and an additional 19 years on the remaining counts and specifications, also consecutive.

{¶ 4} Long appealed to the First District Court of Appeals. Among the various assignments of error, he challenged his consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without parole. Long argued that the trial court had failed to consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) and the principles and purposes of sentencing. Specifically, he contended that the trial court had failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor on the record and that a life term imposed on a teenager amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.

{¶ 5} In rejecting Long's assignment of error based on the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the First District noted that the United States Supreme Court had recently held that a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for juvenile offenders is cruel and unusual punishment in Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The court of appeals distinguished Miller on grounds that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not mandatory. R.C. 2929.03(A) allows the trial court to exercise its discretion when sentencing for aggravated murder by imposing life imprisonment without parole or with parole eligibility after 20, 25, or 30 years.

{¶ 6} The appellate court further determined that the trial court “was able to consider whether Long's ‘youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole) more appropriate.’ Miller at [2460].” 2012-Ohio-3052, 2012 WL 2550960, ¶ 52. The court of appeals then detailed how it believed the record reflected that the trial court did consider Long's youth and its attendant characteristics. Id. at ¶ 53–54.

{¶ 7} We accepted Long's discretionary appeal on reconsideration. 133 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2012-Ohio-5693, 979 N.E.2d 348. The sole proposition of law before this court is that “[t]he Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child to life without parole for a homicide.” In adopting this proposition, we further hold that the record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender's youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life without parole is imposed.

II. Legal Analysis

A. Eighth Amendment

{¶ 8} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” As we recently noted, “Central to the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is the ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ” In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 25, quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). As applied to juveniles, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and the imposition of life without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Most recently, the Eighth Amendment was held to ban mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juveniles in Miller.

B. Threshold Question

{¶ 9} We first address Long's threshold question of whether despite being convicted of aggravated murder, Long committed a “homicide” offense as that term is used in Graham. The United States Supreme Court stated in Graham that a “juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability,” id. at 69, 130 S.Ct. 2011, and held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile for a nonhomicide offense, id. at 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Long argues that by using a complicity instruction, the trial court permitted the jury to convict him of aggravated murder without necessarily finding that he acted with prior calculation or with a specific intent to kill. He concludes that this means that he was not actually convicted of a homicide offense and could not be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole pursuant to Graham. But because Long did not raise this issue in the court of appeals or argue it in his memorandum seeking jurisdiction in this court, we will not consider this issue, as it is not properly before the court.¹See State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 26.

{¶ 10} We now turn to Long's argument that Miller requires us to remand this case for a resentencing hearing that complies with Miller and Graham.

C. Miller v. Alabama

{¶ 11} Long argues that Miller requires a trial court to consider the defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics when imposing sentence if that defendant committed the offense as a juvenile. And he contends that the record must show that the trial court actually considered the defendant's youth. We agree.

{¶ 12} In Miller, the United States Supreme Court began by reviewing its previous decisions regarding the sentencing of juveniles.

Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. at 2026, 176 L.Ed.2d 825. Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a “ ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1. Second, children “are more vulnerable * * * to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child's character is not as “well formed” as an adult's; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” Id., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1.

Miller, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2464, 183 L.Ed.2d 407.

{¶ 13} The Miller court continued:

Most fundamentally, Graham insists that youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole. In the circumstances there, juvenile status precludeda life-without-parole sentence, even though an adult could receive it for a similar crime. * * * “An offender's age,” we made clear in Graham, “is relevant to the Eighth Amendment,” and so “criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Id., at 76, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825.

Id. at 2465–2466.

{¶ 14} Miller concluded, “Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment [to impose life without parole] in homicide cases, we require...