State v. Longley

• Decision Date: 31 January 1921
• Citation: 112 A. 260
• Parties: STATE v. LONGLEY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

112 A. 260

STATE

v. LONGLEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 31, 1921.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Franklin County, at Law.

Clarence J. Longley was charged with a violation of Public Laws 191?, c. 219, § 64, as amended, his demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and he excepts. Exceptions overruled, and respondent permitted to plead anew.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, HANSON, PHILBROOK, MORRILL, and WILSON, JJ.

J. Blaine Morrison, of Phillips, for plaintiff.

H. S. & E. L. Wing, of Kingfield, for the State.

MORRILL, J. The respondent was ar">raigned at Kingsfield, in Franklin county, be">fore a trial justice of that county, upon a complaint charging him with a violation of Public Laws 1917, c. 219, § 64, as amended by Public Laws 1919, c. 180. The offense is charged as committed at Dead River plantation, in Somerset county. Upon appeal to this court held in Franklin county, he filed a general demurrer to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled, and the case is here upon exceptions.

In support of the demurrer the respondent contends:

"First. The charge in the complaint is vague and indefinite, is not formally, fully, and precisely set forth as required by law so that the accused may know and be prepared to meet the exact charge against him.

"Second. The statute conferring jurisdiction upon trial justices and all other courts of offenses under the fish and game laws, committed in an adjoining county, is void as against public policy and is repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution of Maine."

Under the first contention the respondent argues that the complaint is vague and indefinite because: (a) It charges two offenses in a single count; and (b) does not sufficiently specify the place in Dead River plantation where the offense was committed.

We think that the complaint is sufficient. It charges that the respondent "did, at Dead River plantation, Somerset county, Me., on the 16th day of October, A. D. 1919, have a loaded shotgun in his automobile upon the highways and fields in said Dead River plantation, against the peace of the state," etc. This complaint charges but a single offense. If it appeared in evidence that upon the day named the respondent rode with a loaded shotgun in his automobile along certain highways and, leaving the highway, across two or more fields in Dead River plantation, he would be guilty of but one offense, a single act at one time and place. State v. Burgess, 40 Me. 592; State v. Gates, 99 Me. 68, 58 Atl. 238; Woodford v. People, 62 N. Y. 117, 20 Am. Rep. 464; State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 26 Atl. 500, 39 Am. St. Rep. 401; Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 519, 520; 1 Wharton's Crim. Proc. (10th Ed.) § 292. And the complaint may be sustained if the evidence shows that he rode over a certain highway, and not over any fields. The offense would be complete.

"It is a general rule, that runs through the whole criminal law, that it is sufficient to prove so much of the indictment as shows that the defendant has committed a substantive crime therein specified." State v. Burgess, supra, 40 Me. at page 595; Roscoe's Crim. Ev. (3d Am. Ed. by Sharswood) p. 98; 1 Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, § 436.

Nor is the complaint defective because the highway or field in which the offense was committed is not specified. The offense is charged as committed in Dead River plantation, in Somerset county. That is sufficient; the locality of the highway or field not being an essential element in constituting the offense against the statute, as was the case in State v. Turnbull, 78 Me. 392, 6 Atl. 1. The respondent relies upon State v. Lashus, 79 Me. 541, 11 Atl. 604; but the complaint in that case did not allege an offense committed within the jurisdiction of the court. It is familiar law that the object of the rule requiring the charge to be particularly, certainly, and technically set forth is threefold: To apprise the defendant of the precise nature of the charge made against him; to enable the court to determine whether the facts constitute an offense and to render the proper judgment thereon; that the judgment may be a bar to any future prosecution for the same offense.

The allegations of this complaint meet this test. The respondent cannot be in doubt as to the offense with which he is charged. And the court, according to the modern practice in eases of general allegations, will take care that the defendant shall not be surprised, but that in proper cases he shall seasonably be furnished with such specifications and particular statements as may be necessary to enable him to prepare for his trial, and to meet all the proof which may be brought against him. Com. v. Pray, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 359, 363.

Under the second contention in support of the demurrer the defendant challenges the authority of the Legislature to enact section 84 of chapter 219 of the Public Laws of 1917, as amended by section 33 of chapter 196 of the Public Laws of 1919, conferring jurisdiction upon trial justices and other courts of offenses under the inland fish and game laws committed in an adjoining county. This provision originated in R. S. 1883, c. 30, § 16, as amended by Public Laws of 1891, c. 95, § 8, and was enacted in its present form of Public Laws of 1899, c. 42, § 51.

The authority of the Legislature to enact this provision cannot be denied unless it is restrained by some constitutional provision or declaration, intended as a limitation upon its authority. By the common law the grand jury was sworn to inquire only for the body of the county, and therefore they could not regularly inquire of a fact done out of that county for which they were sworn, unless particularly enabled by an act of Parliament. Blackstone mentions many acts of Parliament by which offenses committed in one county might be inquired of and tried in another county (4 Black. Com. 303); and in this state such statutes, other than the one in question, are found (R. S. c. 133, §§ 2, 4, 5). Some are of early enactment. Laws 1821, c. 59, §§ 40, 41.

It is contended that such limitation upon the authority of the Legislature is found in section 6 of the Declaration of Rights:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right * * *

To have a speedy, public and impartial trial, and, except in trials by martial law or impeachment, by a jury of the vicinity."

The argument is that the word "vicinity" is equivalent to the word "county," and "was intended to limit the trial of offenses to the county in which the crime was committed."

An examination of "American Charters, Constitutions and Organic Laws," compiled and edited by Francis Newton Thorpe under act of Congress of June 30, 1906, and published by the United States government, discloses that in some 25 states the constitutional guaranty of an impartial trial requires a jury of the county or district—in Louisiana, of the parish—where the offense was committed. 'In the Constitution of Kentucky (1792, 1799, 1850, and 1890), Michigan (1835), Pennsylvania (1790, 1838, and 1873), and Virginia (1776, 1830, 1850, 1864, 1870, and 1902) the word "vicinage" is used, "a jury of the vicinage"; and it is an interesting fact that this word "vicinage" was found in the earlier Constitutions of Illinois (1818) Louisiana (1812, 1845, and 1852), and Missouri (1820 and 1865), and was later changed to the other form of expression. The word "vicinage" does not mean "county"; it means "neighborhood." Taylor Law Glossary. Bouvier. In the New International Dictionary it is given as the synonym of "vicinity." In State v. Lowe, 21 W. Va....