State v. Lopez

• Decision Date: 16 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 32757.,32757.
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Miguel Angel LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

160 P.3d 1284

144 Idaho 349

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Miguel Angel LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 32757.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

May 16, 2007.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daniel W. Bower, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

Miguel Angel Lopez appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss this case for alleged violation of his rights to a speedy trial under the United States and Idaho Constitutions. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In May of 2004, Lopez was charged with three felonies. In October 2004, defense counsel indicated to the district court that Lopez would waive his right to a speedy trial. The district court rescheduled the trial several times due to a congested court calendar. Ultimately, Lopez's trial was given a first-priority setting for October 2005. Two days before trial, Lopez filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion. Lopez then entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Waiver

We address first the State's contention that because Lopez's counsel waived his right to a speedy trial at a hearing before the district court, Lopez was precluded from later claiming a deprivation of that right. The State bases its argument on a notation found in the district court's minute entry for an October 8, 2004 status conference. The minute entry indicates that Lopez was not present and states that defense counsel "advised the Court that his client would waive speedy trial." The prosecutor mentioned this waiver at the hearing on Lopez's motion to dismiss, but the prosecutor presented no evidence that Lopez had authorized defense counsel to enter a waiver on his behalf, and the prosecutor did not ask the district court to hold that the motion was barred because of the waiver. Instead, after noting that no written waiver had been filed, the prosecutor asked the district court to consider the waiver as a factor to be applied against Lopez in determining the reason for the delays in bringing the case to trial. Specifically, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel's representations lulled the court into giving the case low priority trial settings behind other cases. In accord with the prosecutor's argument, the district court made no findings as to whether the waiver was authorized and referenced the oral waiver for the sole purpose of attributing some of the delay in the case to Lopez.

A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, and courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 114 (1972). Therefore, although an unequivocal written waiver of speedy trial signed by a defendant is dispositive of a later motion to dismiss on this basis, State v. Youngblood, 117 Idaho 160, 162, 786 P.2d 551, 553 (1990), this Court has held that "[t]he unauthorized representations of defense counsel do not constitute a waiver of [a defendant's] rights that would preclude [a defendant] from later asserting a violation of his right to a speedy trial." State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 419, 913 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Ct.App.1996). See also State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 496-97, 745 P.2d 1115, 1117-18 (Ct.App.1987). Instead, a defense attorney's unauthorized representation that his client will waive speedy trial rights is applied as a factor, in appropriate circumstances, to be weighed against the defendant in determining the causes of the delay. Beck, 128 Idaho at 419-20, 913 P.2d at 1189-90. That is precisely what the district court was asked to do, and did, in ruling on the present motion. In the record presented on appeal, the State has not shown the scope of Lopez's waiver or that Lopez authorized defense counsel to enter it. Consequently, we will address Lopez's speedy trial issue on the merits.

B. Speedy Trial

Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). We will defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence and will exercise free review of the trial court's conclusions of law. Id.

Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. The speedy trial guarantees are designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial; to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail; and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311, 106 S.Ct. 648, 654, 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 651 (1986); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 704 (1982).

In Barker, the United States Supreme Court adopted a four-part balancing test to determine whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial right has been infringed. The four factors to be balanced are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the accused. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116. We utilize the same test for speedy trial claims under our state constitution. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 531 P.2d 236 (1975).

1. Length of the delay

The first factor, the length of the delay, is initially a triggering mechanism. Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, it is unnecessary to inquire into the other three factors. Id. Under the Sixth Amendment, the period of delay is measured from the date there is "a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 479 (1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that for cases prosecuted in state courts, the filing of a complaint constitutes a formal charge that begins the time computation for Sixth Amendment purposes. State v. Russell, 108 Idaho 58, 62, 696 P.2d 909, 913 (1985); Lindsay, 96 Idaho at 476, 531 P.2d at 238. See also Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953. Similarly, under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first. Id.; State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 173, 715 P.2d 833, 843 (1985).

Lopez's first formal charge was brought by complaint on May 10, 2004, and he was under arrest on that date. The complaint was amended on May 20, 2004, and on May 28, 2004, to allege additional charges. For analysis of Lopez's claim, we will begin measuring from May 10, 2004, when the first formal charge was filed.

Barker's four-part speedy trial test creates no bright line boundaries. Rather, the Supreme Court pointed out that because of the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke an inquiry into whether those rights have been violated is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116-17. The nature of the case is also of import in determining the period of delay that can be tolerated, for the period that is reasonable for prosecution of an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a complex conspiracy charge. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117; State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct.App.2005); State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268, 272, 954 P.2d 686, 690 (Ct.App.1998).

Here, the delay was sufficient to trigger inquiry. The nature of the charges Lopez was facing, two counts of grand theft and one of burglary, cannot be characterized as complex, for all three stemmed from items alleged to have been taken by Lopez during a single burglary with one accomplice. Our Supreme Court has held that a delay of fourteen months in a drug delivery case is sufficient to trigger a constitutional speedy trial inquiry. Lindsay, 96 Idaho at 476, 531 P.2d at 238. Similarly, this Court has held that a delay of one year in a robbery case is presumptively prejudicial, see State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 708, 662 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Ct.App.1983), and that a delay of over thirteen months was sufficient to trigger analysis in a complex conspiracy case. See State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 34, 921 P.2d 206, 211 (Ct.App.1996). Here, the delay was nearly seventeen months. That period is long enough to be presumptively prejudicial and therefore provoke an inquiry into whether Lopez's constitutional speedy trial rights were violated.

Once the balancing test is triggered, the length of the delay also becomes a factor in the balancing itself. State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 853, 153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct.App. 2006). The district court held that under the circumstances here, it would ascribe heavy weight to the delay. We agree. A delay of seventeen months, while this case largely languished in inactivity, is unreasonable; the record on appeal shows no difficulty with complexity of investigation, lost witnesses, trouble marshalling evidence, or any other mitigating circumstance justifying the delay. The length of delay therefore weighs significantly in favor of Lopez in balancing the speedy trial factors.

2. The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial rights

Lopez did not assert his right...