State v. Brackett
| Decision Date | 14 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 41578 |
| Citation | 377 P.3d 1082,160 Idaho 619 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Robert Benjamin BRACKETT, Defendant–Appellant. |
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
SUBSTITUTE OPINION
THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION DATED APRIL 27, 2016, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN
Robert Benjamin Brackett appeals from his judgment of conviction for eight counts of possession of sexually exploitative material and five counts of sexual battery on a minor child of sixteen or seventeen. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In January 2011, a minor reported to authorities that she had a sexual relationship with forty-six-year-old Brackett. At the time of the relationship, the minor was sixteen years old. Officers recovered a camera containing many sexually explicit photos of the minor, which the minor claimed were taken by Brackett and some of which depicted her having sexual contact with Brackett. Brackett was charged with eight counts of possession of sexually exploitive materials, I.C. § 18–1507A, and eight counts of sexual battery on a minor child of sixteen or seventeen, I.C. § 18–1508A. Brackett's first trial ended in a mistrial after Brackett, during his opening statement, violated the district court's pretrial order. After his second trial, Brackett was found guilty by a jury of eight counts of possession of sexually exploitive materials and five counts of sexual battery on a minor child of sixteen or seventeen. Brackett appeals.
Brackett argues that the district court erred in denying his motions to dismiss for violating his right to a speedy trial under the Idaho and United States Constitutions. Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark , 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). We will defer to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence; however, we will exercise free review of the trial court's conclusions of law. Id .
Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. State v. Lopez , 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 2007). The speedy trial guarantees are designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial; to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail; and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges. United States v. Loud Hawk , 474 U.S. 302, 311, 106 S.Ct. 648, 654, 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 651–52 (1986) ; United States v. MacDonald , 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 703–04 (1982).
When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and federal constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). State v. Young , 136 Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001) ; Lopez , 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1288 ; State v. Avila , 143 Idaho 849, 853, 153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors to be considered are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191–92, 33 L.Ed.2d at 115–17. None of the four Barker factors is, by itself, "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial." Moore v. Arizona , 414 U.S. 25, 26, 94 S.Ct. 188, 189, 38 L.Ed.2d 183, 185 (1973). If the reason for the delay is sufficient, these factors are not needed; if the reason for the delay is insufficient, the other factors will not avail to avoid dismissal. Clark , 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936.
The first factor, the length of the delay, is initially a triggering mechanism. Young , 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, it is unnecessary to inquire into the other three factors. Id . Under the Sixth Amendment, the period of delay is measured from the date there is a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge. United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 478–79 (1971) ; Young , 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, for cases prosecuted in state courts, the filing of a complaint constitutes a formal charge that begins the time computation for Sixth Amendment purposes. Young , 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953. Similarly, under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first. Id .
Brackett was in custody on charges related to his relationship with the minor between his January 14, 2011, arrest and his January 29, 2013, second trial—more than twenty-four months. The threshold issue for this Court is what portion of the twenty-four months should be used for purposes of the Barker analysis. Brackett argues that the entire twenty-four months, including the time between a mistrial and his second trial, should be considered. The state argues that only the twenty-one months between Brackett's arrest and mistrial should be considered, especially because Brackett's actions during the first trial resulted in the mistrial.
Appellate courts throughout the United States have split on whether to consider the time between the individual's arrest and second trial as one combined period of time or as two separate periods of time before and after the first trial ended in a mistrial. The Idaho appellate courts have not determined which of these two approaches to utilize in Idaho. This Court holds that, for purposes of the Barker analysis, the combined period from when an individual is charged or arrested until his or her final trial—the trial that results in a disposition—is the proper period to be considered. We acknowledge the merit of the state's argument that the period between the mistrial and final trial should not be considered, especially when the defendant is the cause of the mistrial. However, rather than disregarding the period while performing the Barker analysis, the period of time should be considered and the defendant's cause of the additional delay will weigh against the defendant in the second prong of the Barker analysis. Accordingly, this Court will consider the entire twenty-four months between Brackett's arrest and his final trial.
Barker 's four-part speedy trial test creates no bright-line boundaries. Rather, the United States Supreme Court stated that, because of the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke an inquiry into whether those rights have been violated is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. Barker , 407 U.S. at 530–31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191–92, 33 L.Ed.2d at 115–17. The nature of the case is also of import in determining the period of delay that can be tolerated because the period that is reasonable for prosecution of an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a complex conspiracy charge. Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117 ; State v. Davis , 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) ; State v. McNew , 131 Idaho 268, 272, 954 P.2d 686, 690 (Ct. App. 1998).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a delay of fourteen months in a drug delivery case was sufficient to trigger a constitutional speedy trial inquiry. State v. Lindsay , 96 Idaho 474, 476, 531 P.2d 236, 238 (1975). This Court has held that a delay of one year in a robbery case was presumptively prejudicial, triggering a speedy trial inquiry. State v. Campbell , 104 Idaho 705, 708, 662 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Ct. App. 1983). This Court has also held that a delay of over thirteen months in a complex conspiracy case was sufficient to trigger analysis. State v. Rodriquez–Perez , 129 Idaho 29, 34, 921 P.2d 206, 211 (Ct. App. 1996). The nature of the charges Brackett was facing, eight counts of sexual battery on a minor child of sixteen or seventeen and eight counts of possession of sexually exploitive materials, all stemmed from Brackett's relationship with one minor, over approximately four months. These facts are more complex than an ordinary street crime, but are far less than a complex conspiracy charge. Accordingly, here, the twenty-four-month delay (eleven months longer than was found sufficient to trigger inquiry in a complex conspiracy) was sufficient to trigger inquiry into whether Brackett's constitutional speedy trial rights were violated.
Once the balancing test is triggered, the length of the delay also becomes a factor in the balancing itself. Avila , 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199. This Court ascribes heavy weight to the delay. A delay of twenty-four months, while Brackett remained in custody, is unreasonable. The record on appeal shows no difficulty with complexity of investigation, trouble collecting evidence, or any other mitigating circumstance justifying the delay. The length of delay, therefore, weighs in favor of Brackett in balancing the speedy trial factors.
Brackett admits that portions of the twenty-four-month delay are attributable to him and, therefore, weigh against him. However, Brackett contends that, as a whole, the reason for the delay is neutral—neither...
To continue reading
Request your trial