State v. Lorraine
| Decision Date | 20 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2017-T-0028,2017-T-0028 |
| Citation | 2018 Ohio 3325,120 N.E.3d 33 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles L. LORRAINE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
{¶ 1} Appellant, Charles L. Lorraine, appeals from the March 2, 2017 judgment entry of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, denying his "Motion for Leave to File a Motion for New Mitigation Trial." The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
{¶ 2} Appellant was charged with various crimes, including aggravated murder, in 1986. The charges stemmed from the stabbing deaths of Raymond and Doris Montgomery. Appellant had befriended the Montgomerys, who hired him to do small tasks at their home. At the time of the murders, Mr. Montgomery was 77 years of age; Mrs. Montgomery was 80 years of age and bedridden.
{¶ 3} On the evening of May 5, 1986, appellant went to the Montgomery home and told Mr. Montgomery he had left an item in an upstairs room. When they reached the room, appellant attacked Mr. Montgomery from behind and stabbed him five times, killing him. Appellant then went to Mrs. Montgomery's room and stabbed her nine times, killing her. Appellant burglarized the home before he retired to a local tavern, where he bragged to friends about the killings. He and one of the friends then broke into a nearby house, stealing money and a car, before returning to the Montgomery home for further looting.
{¶ 4} The following day, while at the police station on other business, appellant confessed the murders to the police.
{¶ 5} On May 9, 1986, the Trumbull County Grand Jury returned a multi-count indictment against appellant. Relevant to this appeal are Counts One through Four. Counts One and Three were for the aggravated murder of Mrs. Montgomery; Counts Two and Four were for the aggravated murder of Mr. Montgomery. All four counts carried two death penalty specifications pursuant to former R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) & (7) : that the aggravated murders were committed while committing aggravated robbery and in a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of two or more people.
{¶ 6} The case came on for trial in the fall of 1986. The jury returned its verdict on November 19, 1986, finding appellant guilty on each count of aggravated murder and each death penalty specification. The sentencing phase ensued. The trial court removed Counts Three and Four from the jury's consideration. On December 4, 1986, a unanimous jury found the aggravating circumstances of the murders outweighed any mitigating factors by proof beyond a reasonable doubt and recommended the death sentence be imposed. After independently weighing the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors, the trial court imposed the death sentence upon appellant. On December 9, 1986, the trial court issued its sentencing opinion.
{¶ 7} This court affirmed appellant's convictions and death sentence on August 10, 1990. State v. Lorraine , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 3838, 1990 WL 116921 (Aug. 10, 1990). The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed our decision in State v. Lorraine , 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 613 N.E.2d 212 (1993), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Lorraine v. Ohio , 510 U.S. 1054, 114 S.Ct. 715, 126 L.Ed.2d 679 (1994).
{¶ 8} On September 30, 1994, appellant filed a postconviction relief petition, pursuant to former R.C. 2953.21, which the trial court denied. This court affirmed the trial court's decision in State v. Lorraine , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 95-T-5196, 1996 WL 207676 (Feb. 23, 1996), and appellant appealed our decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.
{¶ 9} On April 10, 1996, while the foregoing appeal was still pending before the Ohio Supreme Court, appellant filed a motion for relief from the trial court's judgment that denied his petition for postconviction relief, pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). The trial court overruled appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion. This court reversed that decision because the trial court was without jurisdiction while the appeal was pending. State v. Lorraine , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 96-T-5494, 1997 WL 799551 (Dec. 12, 1997).
{¶ 10} Upon remand, the trial court granted appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment and reactivated the case for disposition of appellant's petition for postconviction relief. The trial court subsequently denied, for a second time, the petition for postconviction relief. This court affirmed that decision in State v. Lorraine , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 99-T-0060, 2000 WL 1262447 (Sept. 1, 2000).
{¶ 11} Appellant then raised his postconviction issues in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted habeas relief and set aside appellant's death sentence; the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that ruling and reinstated the death sentence. Lorraine v. Coyle , 291 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.2002). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Lorraine v. Coyle , 538 U.S. 947, 123 S.Ct. 1621, 155 L.Ed.2d 489 (2003).
{¶ 12} On June 9, 2003, appellant filed a second petition for postconviction relief in the trial court, alleging a claim of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), which the trial court denied. This court reversed the trial court's ruling and ordered the trial court to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on remand and to appoint experts to evaluate whether appellant is, in fact, mentally retarded. State v. Lorraine , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0159, 2005-Ohio-2529, 2005 WL 1208119.
{¶ 13} Upon remand, the trial court ordered that appellant's institutional mental health records be unsealed. This court affirmed that decision in State v. Lorraine , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2006-T-0100, 2007-Ohio-6724, 2007 WL 4376250. The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing. Appellant appeared in court, with counsel, and informed the trial court that he wished to waive his right to the hearing; the trial court accepted appellant's written waiver. The trial court subsequently found that appellant was not mentally retarded under Atkins and denied appellant's second petition for postconviction relief on March 1, 2010. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from that entry.
{¶ 14} On January 11, 2017, appellant filed a "Motion for Leave to File a Motion for New Mitigation Trial," which is the subject of the instant appeal. The arguments raised in this motion are based on a recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Hurst v. Florida , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016).1 The Hurst Court held Florida's death penalty sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury, not a judge, find the facts that support the decision to sentence a defendant to death.
Id. at 622, applying Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) and citing Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Appellant argues Ohio's death penalty sentencing scheme similarly violates the Sixth Amendment.
{¶ 15} Appellant asserted the trial court should grant him leave to file a delayed motion for a "new mitigation trial," under Crim.R. 33(A)(1), (4), and (5), because he "could not have anticipated" the holding in Hurst and, thus, "could not have filed his motion for new trial within fourteen days of the imposition of sentence." Appellee responded, in part, that Crim.R. 33 is not designed for the relief sought by appellant, i.e. a "new mitigation trial," and that the trial court should construe the motion as a petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21.
{¶ 16} The trial court denied the motion on March 2, 2017. The trial court found the motion was time barred, whether considered pursuant to Crim.R. 33 or R.C. 2953.21. The trial court further found the motion was substantively meritless and that Ohio's death penalty scheme is sufficiently different from what was invalidated in Hurst to survive constitutional scrutiny.
{¶ 17} Appellant filed a timely appeal and raises one assignment of error for our review:
{¶ 18} "The trial court erred when it denied Lorraine's motion for leave to file his motion for a new trial."
{¶ 19} Appellant first argues the trial court misconstrued the applicable law concerning whether his motion was timely filed. This argument raises an issue of law we review de novo. See, e.g. , State v. Fortune , 11th Dist. Lake, 2015-Ohio-4019, 42 N.E.3d 1224, ¶ 16 (citation omitted).
{¶ 20} Appellant asserts his proposed "Motion for a New Mitigation Trial" is based on the provisions in Crim.R. 33(A), which governs motions for new trial. The timeliness of motions for new trial is governed by Crim.R. 33(B), which states:
Application for a new trial shall be made by motion which, except for the cause of newly discovered evidence, shall be filed within fourteen days after the verdict was rendered, or the decision of the court where a trial by jury has been waived, unless it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new trial, in which case the motion shall be filed within seven days from the order of the court finding that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing such motion within the time provided herein.
{¶ 21} The jury verdict in appellant's case was rendered in 1986; thus, the trial court was required to determine whether appellant was "unavoidably prevented" from filing his motion within fourteen days of the verdict. The trial court did not engage in this analysis. It instead stated:
{¶ 22} We agree with appellant that the trial court did not engage in the proper...
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