State v. Loyuk, S–13–806
| Decision Date | 30 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. S–13–806,S–13–806 |
| Citation | 857 N.W.2d 833 |
| Parties | State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Anoroy Y. Loyuk, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Dennis R. Keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender, Valerie McHargue, and Paul E. Cooney, Grand Island, for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Kimberly A. Klein, Lincoln, for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, Miller–Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error.Statutory interpretation, the constitutionality of a statute, and whether jury instructions are correct are questions of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
2. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Presumptions.A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and all reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
3. Criminal Law: Statutes: Legislature: Intent.In reading a penal statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.
4. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error.An appellate court will not look beyond a statute to determine the legislative intent when the words are plain, direct, or unambiguous.
5. Administrative Law: Public Officers and Employees: Prisoners.The control requirement in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28–322(2)(a) (Reissue 2008) applies only to those nonemployees or noncontractors to whom the Department of Correctional Services has authorized or delegated control over an inmate or an inmate's activities.
6. Sexual Assault: Prisoners: Words and Phrases.Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28–322.02 (Reissue 2008), the word “subject” means to cause to undergo the action of something specified.
7. Constitutional Law: Statutes.An attack on a statute's overbreadth is a claim that it impermissibly infringes on a constitutionally protected right.
8. Constitutional Law: Statutes.A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad only if its overbreadth is substantial, i.e., when the statute would be unconstitutional in a substantial portion of the situations to which it is applicable.
9. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error.When a defendant challenges both the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, an appellate court analyzes overbreadth first.
10. Due Process.The Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that relates to the content of the statute specifying when a right can be lost or impaired.
11. Due Process.Under the Due Process Clause, a statute that infringes upon a “fundamental liberty interest” must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
12. Due Process.Under the Due Process Clause, a statute that infringes upon a liberty interest that is not fundamental must only be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
13. Constitutional Law: Assault.A court applies strict scrutiny to a “direct and substantial interference” with intimate associations, while lesser intrusions are subject only to rational basis review.
14. Constitutional Law: Assault.A direct and substantial interference with intimate associations exists if a large portion of those affected by the rule are absolutely or largely prevented from forming such associations or if those affected by the rule are absolutely or largely prevented from forming intimate associations with a large portion of the otherwise eligible population.
15. Criminal Law: Sexual Assault: Prisoners.The statutes defining the crime of sexual abuse of an inmate or parolee do not directly and substantially interfere with the right to intimate association.
16. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Statutes.The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
17. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Legislature: Notice.The more important aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
18. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Standing.To have standing to assert a claim of vagueness, a defendant must not have engaged in conduct which is clearly prohibited by the questioned statute.
19. Equal Protection: Statutes.Under the Equal Protection Clause, legislative classifications involving either a suspect class or a fundamental right are analyzed with strict scrutiny, and legislative classifications not involving a suspect class or fundamental right are analyzed using rational basis review.
20. Equal Protection.The initial inquiry in an equal protection analysis is whether the challenger is similarly situated to another group for the purpose of the challenged government action.
21. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error.All the jury instructions must be read together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and the evidence, there is no prejudicial error necessitating reversal.
22. Jury Instructions: Proof: Appeal and Error.The appellant has the burden to show that a questioned jury instruction prejudiced him or otherwise adversely affected his substantial rights.
23. Arrests.Whether an individual is in custody depends on all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.
24. Arrests.The test for whether an individual is in custody is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have felt free to leave.
25. Arrests: Police Officers and Sheriffs.In determining whether an individual is in custody, circumstances relevant to whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have felt free to leave include the location of the
interrogation, whether the defendant initiated contact with the police, and whether the police told the defendant he was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time.
A jury convicted Anoroy Y. Loyuk of first degree sexual abuse of an inmate or parolee. First degree sexual abuse of an inmate or parolee involves a statutorily defined “person” associated with the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) who subjects an inmate or parolee to sexual penetration with or without the inmate or parolee's consent. Witnesses testified, and Loyuk admits, that while employed as an officer by the DCS, Loyuk had sex with R.S., a parolee. Loyuk argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because it did not show that he had control over R.S. If the State did not have to prove such control, Loyuk argues that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague and violate his rights to intimate association and equal protection. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Loyuk's conviction and that the statutes did not violate his constitutional rights.
The DCS employed Loyuk as a corporal at the Community Corrections Center—Lincoln (CCCL). The CCCL is a transitional facility where inmates from more secured facilities serve time before being released on parole. As a corporal, Loyuk's responsibilities included manning the control center,
transporting inmates, conducting searches, and maintaining the “overall security of the facility.”
From September 2011 to January 2012, R.S. was an inmate at the CCCL. While incarcerated, R.S. had contact with Loyuk while she was “in chow” or as Loyuk delivered mail. R.S. testified that Loyuk, who she identified as a “guard,” was “one of the nice guys” but denied that they developed a friendship or romantic interest during her incarceration.
R.S. was paroled on January 25, 2012, and moved to a halfway house. Her parole officer was not Loyuk or any other person employed at the CCCL. Loyuk had no authority to punish R.S. for parole violations or other misconduct.
A month after she was paroled, R.S. had a chance encounter with Loyuk in a Lincoln grocery store. While shopping, R.S. spotted Loyuk, who was wearing jeans and a T-shirt. R.S. started a conversation, and the two chatted about “how things were going.” The conversation lasted for 30 minutes to an hour and concluded with an exchange of mailing addresses. A correspondence later developed.
Eventually, Loyuk revealed to R.S. that “he was having more feelings for [her] than just a friendship,” and R.S. testified that the feeling was mutual. They had sex several times at Loyuk's house and later at two motels in March and April 2012.
R.S. testified that Loyuk did not pressure or coerce her into having sex with him. If anything, R.S. said that “I was probably the one pressuring him most of the time.” R.S. testified that she and Loyuk were engaged at the time of trial.
After his relationship with R.S. became intimate, Loyuk approached Ross Peterson, a lieutenant at the CCCL, and said he wanted to talk. Loyuk told Peterson that an inmate assigned to the CCCL had given him information about misconduct committed by other inmates. After questioning by Peterson, Loyuk reluctantly identified the informant as R.S. Peterson had concerns and contacted the CCCL's warden. A Nebraska State Patrol officer interviewed Loyuk, and he admitted to having sex with R.S. about 15 times while she was on parole and he was employed at the CCCL. Loyuk was arrested after the interview concluded.
The State charged Loyuk with first degree sexual abuse of an inmate or parolee. The district court entered a not guilty plea after Loyuk stood mute at the arraignment.
Loyuk moved to quash, arguing that the definition of “person” in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28–322(2)(a) (Reissue 2008) was vague and overbroad, and that a conviction would violate his “rights to freedom of intimate association, due process, privacy, and Equal Protection under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” The court determined that § 28–322(2)(a) was not vague and that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Henry
...289, 842 N.W.2d 740 (2014).9 Ederer v. Van Sant, 184 Neb. 774, 172 N.W.2d 96 (1969).10 Brief for appellant at 31.11 State v. Loyuk, 289 Neb. 967, 857 N.W.2d 833 (2015).12 Id.13 See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006).14 Brief for appellant at 34.15 § ......
-
State v. Hinrichsen
...v. Dominguez, 290 Neb. 477, 860 N.W.2d 732 (2015) ; State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55, 815 N.W.2d 897 (2012).5 State v. Loyuk, 289 Neb. 967, 857 N.W.2d 833 (2015) ; State v. Valverde, 286 Neb. 280, 835 N.W.2d 732 (2013).6 See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29–2027 (Supp.2015) ; State v. Smith, 284 Neb. 636, 822......
-
Bryan M. v. Anne B.
...A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and all reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of its constitutionality. State v. Loyuk, 289 Neb. 967, 857 N.W.2d 833 (2015).(a) Equal Protection Challenge Bryan claims that § 43–1411 violates the Equal Protection Clause because it impermissibly ......
-
State v. Erpelding
...State v. Poe, No. A–91–102, 1992 WL 90034 (Neb.App. May 5, 1992) (not designated for permanent publication).3 See State v. Loyuk, 289 Neb. 967, 857 N.W.2d 833 (2015).4 See, State v. Nolan, 283 Neb. 50, 807 N.W.2d 520 (2012) ; State v. Epp, 278 Neb. 683, 773 N.W.2d 356 (2009) ; State v. Davi......