State v. Lucas, 67269

• Decision Date: 25 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 67269,67269
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Joseph Leroy LUCAS, Appellant.

Page 228

323 N.W.2d 228

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Joseph Leroy LUCAS, Appellant.

No. 67269.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Aug. 25, 1982.

Francis C. Hoyt, Jr., Chief State Appellate Defender, and Chris Odell, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Lona Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Considered en banc.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

Defendant, Joseph LeRoy Lucas, appeals from his conviction and sentence upon a guilty plea to the charge of sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of section 709.3, The Code. Although his appeal was untimely, we allowed a belated appeal. We find no error and affirm.

Defendant's claims of error all evolve from the failure of the trial court to hold a competency hearing under section 812.3, The Code. He (1) attacks the procedures of the trial court in accepting the guilty plea without a competency hearing, (2) claims denial of due process when the trial court failed to sua sponte hold a section 812.3 hearing, and (3) claims ineffective assistance of counsel. We hold that (a) defendant's failure to challenge his guilty plea by a motion in arrest of judgment precludes his procedural claims, (b) failure of the trial court to hold a section 812.3 hearing does not deny defendant due process, and (c) the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is better reserved for a post-conviction proceeding.

Defendant was hospitalized for psychiatric care after he was charged with sexual abuse in connection with an incident involving his four-year-old daughter. At arraignment defendant entered a plea of guilty to this charge, waived both a presentence report and time for sentencing, and received an immediate sentence as prescribed by statute. No one raised the issue of defendant's competency until after judgment and sentence. Defendant's counsel at arraignment did present the district court with a letter from defendant's psychiatrist. The letter described testing and treatment and concluded that defendant had been suffering from severe psychological difficulty for quite some time.

I. Procedural objections. The determination of whether Iowa R.Crim.P. 23(3)(a) may be applied to defendant's plea proceedings governs the procedural objections in this appeal. Rule 23(3)(a) provides in pertinent part:

Motion in arrest of judgment; definition and grounds. A motion in arrest of judgment is an application by the defendant that no judgment be rendered on a ... plea .... A defendant's failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude his or her right to assert such challenge on appeal.

(emphasis added).

We have consistently held that unless the trial court failed to address the defendant as required by Iowa R.Crim.P. 8(2)(d), we would not review the validity of a guilty plea in the absence of a rule 23(3)(a) motion in arrest of judgment. E.g. State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980); State v. Smith, 300 N.W.2d 90, 91 (Iowa 1981). The first question is therefore whether the court advised defendant of a rule 23(3)(a) motion as required by Iowa R.Crim.P. 8(2)(d).

Rule 8(2)(b) prohibits a court from accepting a guilty plea unless the court is satisfied that the defendant understands the nature of the charge, the penalty, and the right to a jury trial and to cross-examine witnesses. Iowa R.Crim.P. 8(2)(b)(1)-(4). In addition, rule 8(2)(d) provides that "[t]he court shall inform the defendant that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal." In the instant case, the record shows the following colloquy:

THE COURT:

....

I am willing to proceed with sentencing at this time if you care to do so. However, if we do I will tell you you can appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court when we finish the sentence. But there's one thing that you cannot appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court if we proceed with the sentencing at this time. I told you when I started this plea that there are certain things that I am required by law to do in accepting a guilty plea from a defendant in a criminal matter. If you feel that I've not complied with that law before you can raise that question on appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court you must file first a motion in this Court raising those legal deficiencies, if any there are. That motion is called a Motion in Arrest of Judgment and it must be filed within forty-five days of this date or not less than five days prior to sentencing. Obviously if we proceed with sentencing at this time you would waive your right to appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court any legal deficiencies in the guilty plea you've entered today, if any there are.

If you'd care to take a few moments and visit with Mr. Frerichs about that please feel free to do so.

MR. FRERICHS [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think I've talked to him briefly about that before, and he believes that he understands, your Honor.

From this colloquy it is obvious that the court advised defendant of the necessity of a motion in arrest of judgment and the consequences of an early sentencing.

Defendant claims the requirements of rule 8(2)(d) were not met by the court merely addressing him. He claims that he must personally acknowledge the significance of the information such that there is a showing that he understands the consequences of dispensing with the motion in arrest of judgment. We find that the requirements of the rule were met.

Rule 8(2)(d) requires only that the court "inform the defendant" and contains no duty to obtain an acknowledgment from the defendant. As the record here indicates an understanding, we need not decide if an affirmative showing of defendant's understanding must be shown by the State. Suffice it to say that the court asked the defendant to confer with his counsel, and counsel indicated that defendant believed he understood the proceedings and their consequences. We find this to be substantial compliance with the rule. See State v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1981).

Defendant maintains that the failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment does not bar challenges on the plea proceedings because the court acted illegally by not holding a hearing to determine competency pursuant to section 812.3. Defendant cites Hickey v. District Court of Kossuth County, 174 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa 1970), and State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1979). Defendant's reliance on these cases is misplaced.

Section 812.3, The Code, provides:

If at any stage of a criminal proceeding it reasonably appears that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents him or her from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense, further proceedings must be suspended and a hearing had upon that question.

(emphasis added). Our ruling in Hickey was governed by section 783.1, The Code 1966, which was repealed and supplemented by section 812.3, The Code. (Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 1245, subch. 2, § 1203, subch. 4, § 526, 1976 Iowa Acts 604, 774-75). A competency hearing was required under section 783.1 when there existed a "reasonable doubt" as to competency. In contrast, a section 812.3 hearing is held when it "reasonably appears" that a competency question exists. Further, the determination of the court under section 783.1 was an exercise of judicial discretion. State v. Evans, 259 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 1977). Section 812.3, on the other hand, requires the court to make the determination as a matter of law. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d at 706. Due to these changes in the statute, the Hickey standards are no longer applicable.

Similarly, we note that rule 23(3)(a) is substantially different than the corresponding rule in Kempf. Rule 23(3)(a) explicitly provides that without a filing of a motion in arrest of judgment, no appellate review may be obtained on the validity of the plea proceeding. Kempf, on the other hand, was decided under the authority of State v. Gardner, 274 N.W.2d 328, 329 (Iowa 1979), which held that under the rules of criminal procedure then in effect, a motion in arrest of judgment need not be filed before the validity of a plea may be challenged on appeal. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d at 706. Defendant's reliance on Kempf is thus equally misplaced.

Having concluded that Kempf and Hickey do not apply in this case, the question remains whether the current rule 23(3)(a), despite its language, could possibly be construed to allow us to review the validity of defendant's plea proceedings. We conclude that it does not.

Rule 23(3)(a) requires a court to grant a motion in arrest of judgment "when upon the whole record no legal judgment can be rendered." Defendant's claim that the district court should have conducted a hearing on the issue of defendant's competence is in fact a claim that "upon the whole record no legal judgment can be pronounced." This claim is a "challenge [to] the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding." It goes to the very heart of the court's determination that the plea was entered voluntarily, intelligently, and understandably. We conclude that rule 23(3)(a) encompasses challenges to the plea-taking process based on a claim that the judge should have held a hearing pursuant to section 812.3.

Our ruling here addressed only defendant's statutory claims. The constitutional claims of due process and ineffective assistance of counsel are discussed in the following division.

II. Constitutional claims. Defendant attacks the plea proceedings on two constitutional grounds. First, he claims that due process mandates a hearing under section 812.3, The Code, when a reasonable doubt exists as to his competency to enter a guilty plea. Along with this claim he maintains the record shows that he was incompetent to enter a plea. Second, he claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney...