State v. Luna

• Decision Date: 30 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 20288,20288
• Citation: 126 Idaho 235,880 P.2d 265
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joel Haro LUNA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 265

880 P.2d 265

126 Idaho 235

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joel Haro LUNA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20288.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Aug. 30, 1994.

Spencer E. Daw, Idaho Falls, for appellant.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent. Michael A. Henderson argued.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

Joel Luna was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(f); possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A); and failure to affix a drug tax stamp, I.C. § 63-4207(2), I.C. § 37-2732(c). Prior to trial, Luna moved to suppress two items of evidence he expected the State to introduce: the cocaine seized from the car in which he was a passenger at the time of his arrest, and an incriminating statement he made to a police officer after his arrest. The suppression motion was denied by the district court, and the State introduced these items in evidence at the trial. Luna appeals from the judgment of conviction, asserting that the district court erred by denying the suppression motion. We conclude that the district court should have suppressed the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the motion to suppress and we vacate the judgment of conviction.

The facts presented at the suppression hearing show the following. Luna was in an automobile, with three other men, traveling on a highway when the car was stopped by the police. One of the other men was driving the vehicle; another was the owner of the car, and Luna and the fourth man were passengers. Luna was seated on the passenger side in the front of the car. An Idaho State Police officer had noticed the vehicle traveling below the speed limit and erratically crossing the centerline. Suspecting that the driver might be under the influence of alcohol, the officer stopped the vehicle. He was assisted by another State patrolman who arrived at the scene. After interrogating the driver, conducting field sobriety tests and running a records check, the officers determined that the driver was not under the influence or wanted on any outstanding warrants. The officer who had stopped the vehicle decided he would not cite the driver for any offense. However, he continued to talk with the driver, in his police vehicle, while the second patrolman remained near the stopped car containing Luna and the other occupants. Eventually, at the officer's request, the driver consented to a search of the automobile although the officer had no articulable basis for searching the vehicle. The search uncovered a kilogram of cocaine hidden under a blanket on the back seat. All four of the occupants of the vehicle were then arrested for possession of the cocaine. In the booking process at the jail, an officer asked Luna where he got the cocaine. According to the officer, Luna stated that the driver of the car had paid cash for the drugs in Las Vegas. The cocaine and the officer's testimony concerning this statement were introduced against Luna at trial.

Before trial, Luna moved to suppress the incriminating statement. He also moved to have the cocaine suppressed, as did the driver and the owner of the car. The other passenger pled guilty. The district court determined that although the police had a valid reason for initially stopping the car, the officers had improperly continued to detain the car and its occupants, and had coercively obtained consent from the driver to search the car. The court held that the seizure of the cocaine was illegal with respect to the driver and the owner of the car and suppressed the cocaine in relation to them. The charges against those two defendants were ultimately dismissed. However, the district court also determined that Luna, as a passenger, did not have standing to challenge the legality of the stop of the car, its continued detention, the search of the car or the seizure of the cocaine. The court further found that Luna had not invoked his right to remain silent when he made the incriminating statement at the jail. Accordingly, the State was allowed to introduce the evidence at trial. Following entry of the judgment of conviction, Luna brought this appeal.

First, we note that our review of decisions regarding motions to suppress is bifurcated. We defer to the lower court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 776 P.2d 458 (1989); State v. Carr, 123 Idaho 127, 844 P.2d 1377 (1992). However, we exercise free review over the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found. Carr, 123 Idaho at 127, 844 P.2d at 1377.

I.

The dispositive issue is whether Luna had standing to challenge the seizure of the cocaine. Suppression of evidence may be obtained only by those whose rights are infringed. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981). In State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 679 P.2d 1123 (1984), the Idaho Supreme Court held that both the driver of a vehicle and a passenger in the vehicle have standing to contest the reasonableness of an investigatory stop of the vehicle.

Here, the district court held that the initial stop of the vehicle by the police was justified as an investigatory stop under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). See also, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). However, the court determined that the continued detention of the vehicle and its occupants became unreasonable after the reasons for the initial stop dissipated and the officer concluded that the driver was not operating the vehicle while under the influence, was not wanted on any outstanding warrant and would not be cited for any traffic violation. Accordingly, the district court held that the consent to search, given during the ensuing illegal detention, was invalid and that the cocaine found as a result of the consensual search would be suppressed as to the driver and the owner of the vehicle. The court refused to suppress the evidence as to Luna or the other passenger, ruling that neither Luna nor the other passenger had standing to challenge the seizure of the cocaine.

We conclude that the district court's ruling is contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Haworth. In Haworth, an Idaho State police officer observed an automobile traveling slowly, at 10:00 o'clock at night, coming from a small town unprotected by any law enforcement agency. The automobile's trunk lid was open, and the officer observed a large object in the trunk which weighted the rear end down. ¹ The officer stopped the vehicle, searched it, and seized evidence upon which the two occupants (the driver, Haworth, and the passenger, Cowan) were then charged with robbery. The defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized from their automobile. The district court ruled that the stop of the vehicle was an improper investigative stop and granted the defendants' motion to suppress. On an appeal brought by the State, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the defendants had standing to challenge the investigatory stop of the vehicle. The Court approached the question by noting that there is a distinction between standing to challenge an allegedly unreasonable stop and standing to challenge an allegedly unreasonable search. To contest a search of the vehicle, a defendant "must demonstrate some proprietary interest in the premises searched or some other interest giving [the defendant] a reasonable expectation of privacy." 106 Idaho at 407 n. 2, 679 P.2d at 1125 n. 2. With regard to standing to challenge the allegedly illegal stop, however, the Court explained:

"[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of [the fourth amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (emphasis added). The personal rights of both Cowan as passenger and Haworth as driver 'to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference from others,' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), were infringed upon by the investigatory stop. Therefore, both have standing to contest the reasonableness of the stop.

106 Idaho at 406, 679 P.2d at 1124 (emphasis added).

Here, the district court held that the initial stop of the vehicle was a valid investigatory stop to "find [whether] a traffic violation was in progress in relation to either driving under the influence or inattentive driving." The court also noted that an officer may ask a detainee a moderate number of questions to determine the driver's identity and gain information to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions, but "unless the detainee's answers supply probable cause to arrest, then [the detainee] must be released." The court further recognized that during a traffic-violation stop the officer may conduct "a warrant check." The court then opined that a lawful investigatory stop may become an illegal detention when the detainee is under apprehension of being charged with an offense, the restraint is for more than a momentary period, and the detention occurs in an isolated setting where the detainee is alone with police officers. The district court stated:

When you take those indicia that I have gleaned from those cases and apply them to the facts here and reading the explanation from Officer Gonzales, why he went on with the questioning as a P R [public relations] move and talked about their [the occupants'] travel, and you view that in the totality of circumstances of what had gone on before, the field test, multiple commands to remove himself from the car,...