State v. Lusi
| Decision Date | 08 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-310-C,92-310-C |
| Citation | 625 A.2d 1350 |
| Parties | STATE v. Armand T. LUSI. A. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case comes before us on the basis of four certified questions from the District Court, pursuant to G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-24-27. The relevant facts are not in dispute and are as follows.
The defendant, Armand T. Lusi (defendant or Lusi), was charged with driving under the influence of liquor in violation of G.L.1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-27-2, P.L.1991, ch. 65, § 1. The charge arose out of a stop that occurred on December 6, 1991, at 8:44 p.m. The matter was heard before a justice of the District Court on March 20, 1992. At trial, the arresting officer, Trooper William Trinque of the Rhode Island State Police, testified that he stopped Lusi for driving in excess of the posted speed limit. Trooper Trinque further testified that, after stopping Lusi, he detected indicia of alcohol. Trinque subsequently charged Lusi with driving under the influence and placed him under arrest.
As part of its case in chief the state introduced into evidence the observation testimony of Trooper Trinque, as well as the results of a breathalyzer test given to Lusi by Trooper Trinque. The test was administered in two phases, the first phase at 9:54 p.m. and the second phase at 10:25 p.m. Each phase of the test indicated that Lusi had a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.11 percent.
At trial, Lusi offered the testimony of Dr. Harvey Cohen, an expert witness in BAC, to rebut the test results. Doctor Cohen testified that there was a "substantial likelihood" or a "reasonable likelihood" that Lusi's BAC at the time he was driving the vehicle was less than 0.10 percent.
Upon completion of the trial the trial justice found that Trooper Trinque's observations of Lusi at the scene and at the police station were insufficient to sustain a conviction. She accepted, however, Dr. Cohen's testimony that Lusi's BAC at the time of driving was less than 0.10 percent. Relying on her findings, the trial justice found Lusi guilty of driving under the influence of liquor in violation of § 31-27-2.
Thereafter, defense counsel asked the court's permission for both parties to file memoranda with respect to the question of whether § 31-27-2 requires the state to prove, by expert extrapolation evidence, a defendant's BAC at the time he or she was actually driving or whether a defendant's BAC at the time the breathalyzer test was administered is proof of BAC at the time of driving. After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties, the trial justice issued a decision on May 6, 1992, vacating the guilty verdict pending the resolution by this court of four certified questions. The questions are as follows:
We shall address questions 1 and 2 together and questions 3 and 4 separately.
This court in State v. Lussier, 511 A.2d 958 (R.I.1986), observed that "[s]cientific evidence and sad experience demonstrate that any driver with 0.10 percent blood alcohol is a threat to the safety of the public and to himself." Id. at 960 (quoting Burg v. Municipal Court for the Santa Clara County Judicial District, 35 Cal.3d 257, 267, 673 P.2d 732, 738, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 150 (1983)). We recognize, therefore, that many states, including Rhode Island, have passed statutes that prohibit driving with a BAC of 0.10 percent or greater. The first certified question before us today asks whether under § 31-27-2 a blood-alcohol level of at least 0.10 percent determined solely by a breathalyzer test that is administered after a defendant's arrest for drunk driving satisfies the statute or whether extrapolation evidence, which uses the results of a breathalyzer test to demonstrate the blood-alcohol level at the time a defendant was actually driving, is required to establish the statutory offense. Simply stated, the issue is whether it is the blood-alcohol level at the time of the chemical test or at the time of the operation of the motor vehicle that establishes the statutory offense.
The issue is one of first impression in Rhode Island. It requires this court to interpret the provisions of § 31-27-2, P.L.1991, ch. 65, § 1. This statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
The defendant argues that the statute requires a finding of proof of a BAC of 0.10 percent or more at the time of driving. In so arguing, defendant contends that any contrary interpretation of the statute by this court would render a drunk-driving conviction fortuitous on the basis of when the police officer administered the breathalyzer test as opposed to whether a defendant was actually operating his or her vehicle under the influence of liquor or drugs. The defendant therefore concludes that the state has the burden of extrapolating breathalyzer test results back to the time of actual operation.
In support of his contentions, defendant relies on this court's holding in State v. Lussier. In Lussier the defendant, who had been found guilty of driving to endanger, death resulting, was also charged with driving under the influence in violation of § 31-27-2. 511 A.2d at 958. In his charge to the jury, the trial justice explained that under Rhode Island law a finding of 0.10 percent or above of BAC was proof of intoxication. Id. at 959. The defendant objected to the trial justice's instruction. In affirming the lower court's decision, we ruled:
We agree with defendant here that there is no question that, under § 31-27-2, the critical issue is the condition of the driver at the time that he or she was operating the motor vehicle. Consequently the simple answer to question 1 is that § 31-27-2 requires the state to prove a driver's BAC at the time that he or she was stopped on suspicion of driving under the influence. However, the method of proving the BAC at that time is the crux of the first two certified questions and is a question of statutory construction.
First and foremost, we are mindful that in construing § 31-27-2, this court must effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Krikorian v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 606 A.2d 671, 675 (R.I.1992); Lake v. State, 507 A.2d 1349, 1351 (R.I.1986). Legislative intent is ascertained by an "examination of the language of the statute itself, giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning." Krikorian, 606 A.2d at 675 (quoting McGee v. Stone, 522 A.2d 211, 216 (R.I.1987)). We have, however, repeatedly stated that with respect to penal statutes this court will not interpret a statute literally when to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result or would impede a clear legislative intent. State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 111 (R.I.1984); State v. Dussault, 121 R.I. 751, 754, 403 A.2d 244, 246 (1979).
It is beyond dispute that the Legislature's intent in enacting Rhode Island's drunk-driving statute was to reduce "the carnage occurring on our highways which is attributable to the persons who imbibe alcohol and then drive." State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843, 850 (R.I.1980) (quoting DiSalvo v. Williamson, 106 R.I. 303, 305-06, 259 A.2d 671, 673 (1969)). It was with that clear intent in mind that the Legislature in 1983 made significant changes to this state's drunk-driving laws. Of particular consequence to the question before us is the amendments to § 31-27-2. Public Laws 1983, ch. 227, § 1, added subsection (b) to § 31-27-2. As we have previously indicated, subsection (b)(1) provided for a violation of the statute to be based on a showing of a person's BAC to be "one-tenth of one percent (.1%) or more by weight as shown by chemical analysis of a blood, breath or urine sample." Section 31-27-2(b)(1). Subsection (b)(1), therefore, essentially furnished law enforcement officers in this state with an objective vehicle with which to prove the offense of driving under the influence. Prior to the enactment of subsection (b), the state had to produce an expert witness to demonstrate how alcohol had affected that defendant and to prove the actual intoxication of the...
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