State v. Machin

• Decision Date: 15 June 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. IN92-08-1508,IN92-08-1509,Cr. A,s. IN92-08-1508
• Citation: 642 A.2d 1235
• Parties: STATE of Delaware v. Ramberto MACHIN, Defendant. . Submitted:
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 1235

642 A.2d 1235

STATE of Delaware v. Ramberto MACHIN, Defendant.

Cr. A. Nos. IN92-08-1508, IN92-08-1509.

Superior Court of Delaware,

New Castle County.

Submitted: June 15, 1993.

Decided: Aug. 2, 1993.

Upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment. DENIED.

Ferris W. Wharton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for the State.

Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., Wilmington, Anthony V. Lombardino, and Michael S. Krome, of Richmond Hill, NY, for defendant.

OPINION

COOCH, Judge.

Defendant Ramberto Machin (Defendant) has moved to dismiss an indictment charging him with Trafficking in Cocaine (16 Del.C. § 4753A(a)(2)(a)) and Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine (16 Del.C. § 4751). Defendant contends that the issue of whether certain incriminating drug evidence should be suppressed has been already decided in July 1992 in a previous proceeding in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (District Court) and thus cannot be relitigated, being barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The State, in opposition, asserts that the District Court decision granting the motion to suppress the evidence was not "fully litigated" and that admission of the incriminating evidence is not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and holds that the issue of whether the evidence should be suppressed is not barred from relitigation as it was not fully litigated in the prior federal proceeding. ¹

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The State proffers that the following facts occurred that resulted in Defendant's arrest: ²

On April 30, 1992, Defendant was driving north on Interstate 95 through Delaware and was stopped by a Delaware State Police officer for allegedly driving erratically. The officer approached Defendant and noticed a briefcase and a Pepsi bottle in the front seat. In the back seat, the officer noticed a garment bag. Defendant produced a valid Texas driver's license and a rental car agreement upon the officer's request for a driver's license and registration.

Because of highway noise and for safety reasons, the officer asked Defendant to exit the vehicle and to stand outside on the shoulder of the road to answer further questions. During questioning, Defendant stated that he had not been drinking alcohol and had only been drinking Pepsi. He also stated that he was driving from Miami Beach, Florida to New York City to meet someone in there. During this questioning Defendant appeared nervous, was sweating and shaking, and avoided eye contact. The officer apparently believed Defendant was engaging in criminal activity and asked him to sit in the police car. The officer asked Defendant if he could search Defendant's car and Defendant replied in the affirmative. Defendant filled out a Delaware State Police Consent to Search Form authorizing a complete search of the car.

The officer then proceeded to search the vehicle. After searching the interior of the vehicle, the officer removed the keys from the ignition and opened up the truck. The officer looked under the spare tire cover and discovered what appeared to be a kilo of cocaine. The substance was seized and later tested positive for cocaine.

Defendant was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury in May 1992 in the District of Delaware for Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Defendant, through prior counsel, moved to suppress the physical evidence claiming that 1) the officer was required to have obtained a search warrant, 2) the officer lacked probable cause to have stopped or to have searched the car and 3) the officer exceeded the scope of the authorized search. The Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the case, Carolyn T. Greene, filed a brief in opposition to the motion.

A hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress evidence was scheduled for July 7, 1992. The United States appeared at the hearing but, for reasons not apparent from the record, Defendant and his attorney failed to appear so a new hearing was scheduled for July 21, 1992. On that date Defendant and his attorney appeared, but the Assistant United States Attorney, Greene, did not appear. She testified at the hearing on the instant motion that she was in the federal Grand Jury room at the time District Court personnel were looking for her on July 21. Greene testified that she had not been notified of the July 21, 1992 hearing nor had her secretary or anyone else in the office attempted to determine when the rescheduled hearing would take place after its rescheduling on July 7, 1992.

On July 21, 1992 the District Court issued an order granting Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. The Order entered by the District Court reads in pertinent part as follows:

WHEREAS, by Order dated July 8, 1992, the Court scheduled a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress for Tuesday, July 21, 1992, in Courtroom No. 4, at 12:00 noon;

WHEREAS, both the United States ("the Government") and Defendant were given notice of the hearing;

WHEREAS, the Government did not appear at the hearing, and no evidence was presented;

WHEREAS, the Court attempted to locate a representative of the Government to determine the reason for the Government's failure to appear but was unsuccessful in its efforts;

WHEREAS, the Defendant made an application that because of the Government's failure to appear that Defendant's Motion to Suppress be granted;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 21 day of July, 1992, that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.

United States v. Machin, Cr.A. No. 92-35-JJF (D.Del. Jul. 21, 1992) (emphasis added).

The United States neither filed a motion to reargue nor appealed this order. Instead, the Assistant United States Attorney, somewhat chagrined over what had transpired, contacted a Deputy Attorney General in the Delaware Department of Justice and requested that the State seek an indictment against Defendant from a State Grand Jury. The State agreed to do so. On August 4, 1992, on motion by the United States, the District Court dismissed the indictment against Defendant. Defendant was then indicted in this Court on the pending drug charges on August 31, 1992. Defendant then filed this motion to dismiss.

II. DISCUSSION

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Does Not Bar Introduction of the Physical Evidence in This Proceeding.

A. Summary of the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel in Delaware

The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata are related. While collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a factual issue previously litigated, res judicata prevents the same parties from bringing a suit subsequent to a previous suit based on the same cause of action. See Columbia Casualty Co. v. Playtex FP, Inc., Del.Supr., 584 A.2d 1214, 1216 n. 4 (1991); Foltz v. Pullman, Inc., Del.Super., 319 A.2d 38, 40 (1974).

The Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is a guarantee "that the State with all its resources and power [shall] not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). The doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied in the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. The burden is on a defendant to demonstrate that the issue in relitigation was actually decided in the first proceeding. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990).

The Supreme Court of the United States addressed this issue in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). The Supreme Court in Ashe held that collateral estoppel

means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.

397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. In Ashe, a group of men broke into a room and robbed a group of six poker players. Id. at 437, 90 S.Ct. at 1190. The defendant was alleged to be one of the robbers. Id. at 438, 90 S.Ct. at 1191. The defendant was prosecuted for the robbery of one of the poker players and was acquitted. Id. at 439, 90 S.Ct. at 1191. Later, the defendant was brought to trial again for the robbery of a different member of the group of poker players and was convicted. Id. at 440, 90 S.Ct. at 1192. The Supreme Court on appeal reversed the conviction, Id. at 447, 90 S.Ct. at 1196, and held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is "embodied" in the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy. Id. at 445, 90 S.Ct. at 1195. It was further held that the defendant who was acquitted by a previous jury which had already decided the issue of whether the defendant was one of the robbers could not be brought before a new jury and have the issue relitigated. Id. at 446-7, 90 S.Ct. at 1195-96.

Several cases decided subsequent to Ashe have held that Ashe 'mandates two inquiries in determining whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies: First, what facts were necessarily determined in the first law suit? ... Second, has the government in a subsequent trial tried to relitigate facts necessarily established against it in the first trial?' U.S. v. Mock, 604 F.2d 341, 343 (5th Cir.1979).

U.S. v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1508 (10th Cir.1992)

Additionally, the following criteria must be present in order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply:

(1) The issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and...