State v. Maier
| Citation | 824 S.E.2d 211 (Table) |
| Decision Date | 05 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. COA18-771,COA18-771 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Jeffrey Philip MAIER |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Alexander Walton, for the State.
Stephen G. Driggers, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.
Jeffrey Philip Maier ("defendant")1 appeals from judgments entered upon his convictions for obtaining property by false pretense and failing to work after being paid. For the following reasons, we find no error.
A Guilford County Grand Jury indicted defendant on two counts of obtaining property by false pretense on 20 January 2015 in file numbers 14 CRS 90531 and 90532, and on one count of failing to work after being paid on 26 September 2016 in file number 14 CRS 91658. Defendant was also charged by information in file number 14 CRS 92810 for an additional count of obtaining property by false pretense.
The case was tried in Guilford County Superior Court before the Honorable Paul L. Jones beginning on 6 December 2017. When the matter began, the State moved to join the indicted offenses for trial. Defendant joined the State’s motion and additionally requested that the count of obtaining property by false pretense charged by information be joined. Upon defendant’s waiver of a formal presentment to the Grand Jury, the trial court joined all four offenses for trial.2
The evidence shows that defendant, through the roofing repair company that he owned and operated, Hail Strike Restoration, accepted insurance money from homeowners who believed Hail Strike would repair storm damage to their roofs. Specifically, defendant used telemarketers to acquire business leads in areas affected by storms. Defendant then hired sales representatives as independent contractors to follow the leads. The sales representative would meet with homeowners and pitch Hail Strike’s services using information packets provided by defendant. If the homeowners were interested, the sales representative would assess the damage and help the homeowner file an insurance claim. At that time, the sales representative would have the homeowner sign a contingency agreement. After an insurance adjustor assessed the damage and approved repairs, the sales representative would return to have the homeowner sign a contract and collect the initial check from the insurance company. That check was then forwarded to defendant.
Pete Trudniak, a sales representative for Hail Strike who was hired by defendant after responding to an advertisement on Craigslist, went through this process with the owners of four properties in Guilford County. Those homeowners, Mr. and Mrs. Roberts, Ms. Briggs, and Ms. Allen, signed contracts and turned-over insurance checks to have storm damage repaired. Those repairs, however, were either never begun or were not completed.
On 8 December 2017, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court entered judgments thereon. Specifically, the trial court consolidated the failing to work after being paid conviction with one of the obtaining property by false pretense convictions and entered three separate judgments for the obtaining property by false pretense convictions sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of 8 to 19 months imprisonment. Defendant filed notice of appeal on 19 December 2017.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal: whether the trial court (1) lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgments due to insufficient indictments; and (2) erred in denying his motions to dismiss.
Defendant first contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgments on the obtaining property by false pretense convictions because the indictments and the information fail to sufficiently allege obtaining property by false pretense.
State v. Oxendine , 246 N.C. App. 502, 504, 783 S.E.2d 286, 289, disc. review denied , 368 N.C. 921, 787 S.E.2d 24 (2016). "Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." State v. Biber , 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our courts have long recognized that "[i]t is elementary that a valid bill of indictment is essential to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try an accused for a felony." State v. Sturdivant , 304 N.C. 293, 308, 283 S.E.2d 719, 729 (1981). "The purpose of the indictment is to give a defendant reasonable notice of the charge against him so that he may prepare for trial." State v. Campbell , 368 N.C. 83, 86, 772 S.E.2d 440, 443 (2015). Therefore, " ‘[a]n [information or] indictment must allege lucidly and accurately all the essential elements of the offense endeavored to be charged.’ " State v. Ellis , 368 N.C. 342, 344, 776 S.E.2d 675, 677 (2015) (quoting State v. Hunt , 357 N.C. 257, 267, 582 S.E.2d 593, 600 (2003) ); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-924(a)(5) (2017). "A criminal pleading ... is fatally defective if it ‘fails to state some essential and necessary element of the offense of which the defendant is found guilty.’ " Id . (quoting State v. Gregory , 223 N.C. 415, 418, 27 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1943) ).
However, " ‘[o]ur courts have recognized that[,] while an indictment should give a defendant sufficient notice of the charges against him, it should not be subjected to hyper technical scrutiny with respect to form.’ " State v. Harris , 219 N.C. App. 590, 592, 724 S.E.2d 633, 636 (2012) (quoting In re S.R.S. , 180 N.C. App. 151, 153, 636 S.E.2d 277, 280 (2006) ). " ‘The general rule in this State and elsewhere is that an indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient, if the offense is charged in the words of the statute, either literally or substantially, or in equivalent words.’ " State v. Simpson , 235 N.C. App. 398, 400-01, 763 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2014) (quoting State v. Greer , 238 N.C. 325, 328, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953) ).
Oxendine , 246 N.C. App. at 504-505, 783 S.E.2d at 289. "[A] conviction based on an invalid indictment must be vacated." Campbell , 368 N.C. at 86, 772 S.E.2d at 443.
The felony of obtaining property by false pretenses is set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100.
Obtaining property by false pretenses consists of four elements: "(1) a false representation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from another."
State v. Seelig , 226 N.C. App. 147, 152, 738 S.E.2d 427, 431 (quoting State v. Cronin , 299 N.C. 229, 242, 262 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1980) ), disc. review denied , 366 N.C. 598, 743 S.E.2d 182 (2013). "[T]o sustain a charge of obtaining property by false pretenses, the indictment must state the alleged false representation." State v. Braswell , 225 N.C. App. 734, 740, 738 S.E.2d 229, 233 (2013).
The indictments and the information purporting to charge obtaining property by false pretense in this case are similar in that each alleges that defendant "unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did knowingly and designedly with the intent to cheat and defraud, obtain [a specified amount of money] from [the specified victim] by means of a false pretense which was calculated to deceive and did deceive." The indictments and the information further allege that "[t]he false pretense consisted of the following: collecting money to conduct home repairs at [the specified address] and then failing to initiate said repairs." Each charging document fills in a specific amount of money from a specific victim for repairs to a specific address.
In his argument that the indictments and the information were deficient, defendant identifies only the descriptions of the false pretenses and contends "[t]hese descriptions do not plainly and concisely assert the facts of the alleged offense with sufficient precision to clearly apprise [him] of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation." (Internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). Defendant asserts that the descriptions "allege only that [he] failed to fulfill a contractual obligation," which, by the terms of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(b), is defined not to be obtaining property by false pretense. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(b) (2017) (). Defendant relies on State v. Compton , 90 N.C. App. 101, 367 S.E.2d 353 (1988), to point out that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(b)"recognizes the danger that juries may improperly infer criminal intent merely from a defendant’s failure to carry out his promise[.]" 90 N.C. App. at 104, 367 S.E.2d at 355. However, other than emphasizing what N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(b) clearly states, Compton is not pertinent to determining the sufficiency of an indictment. In Compton , the only argument before this Court was that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss because "the evidence [was] insufficient to enable the jury to find that he did not intend to comply with [a] contract and convey the property ...." Id. at 103, 367 S.E.2d at 355.
Defendant also points to evidence introduced at trial and argues that because the evidence was that defendant never directly communicated with the victims, the indictments needed to be more specific in the theories alleged. Defendant then asserts that "[f]or the...
To continue reading
Request your trial