State v. Maines

• Decision Date: 06 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 118,118
• Citation: 273 S.E.2d 289,301 N.C. 669
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Jerry MAINES.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 289

273 S.E.2d 289

301 N.C. 669

STATE of North Carolina v. Jerry MAINES.

No. 118.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 6, 1981.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty Gen. by T. Buie Costen, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Wade E. Vannoy, Jr., West Jefferson, for defendant appellant.

HUSKINS, Justice:

Denial of his motion for judgment of nonsuit at the close of all the evidence constitutes defendant's sole assignment of error. The assignment turns on whether defendant's possession of stolen goods soon after the breaking and entering and larceny is a circumstance tending to show defendant is guilty of the breaking and entering and larceny. We hold the possession shown in defendant Jerry Maines in this case is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty of the breaking and entering and larceny charged in the bill of indictment. Accordingly, this defendant's nonsuit motion should have been granted.

The State relies, as indeed it must in this case, on the doctrine of recent possession. That doctrine is simply a rule of law that, upon an indictment for larceny, possession of recently stolen property raises a presumption of the possessor's guilt of the larceny of such property. State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25, 153 S.E.2d 741 (1967); State v. Allison, 265 N.C. 512, 144 S.E.2d 578 (1965). The presumption is strong or weak depending upon the circumstances of the case and the length of time intervening between the larceny of the goods and the discovery of them in defendant's possession. State v. Williams, 219 N.C. 365, 13 S.E.2d 617 (1941). Furthermore, when there is sufficient evidence that a building has been broken into and entered and thereby the property in question has been stolen, the possession of such stolen property recently after the larceny raises presumptions that the possessor is guilty of the larceny and also of the breaking and entering. State v. Lewis, 281 N.C. 564, 189 S.E.2d 216, cert. denied 409 U.S. 1046, 93 S.Ct. 547, 34 L.Ed.2d 498 (1972). The presumption or inference arising from recent possession of stolen property "is to be considered by the jury merely as an evidential fact, along with the other evidence in the case, in determining whether the State has carried the burden of satisfying the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." State v. Baker, 213 N.C. 524, 526, 196 S.E. 829, 830 (1938); accord, State v. Greene, 289 N.C. 578, 223 S.E.2d 365 (1976).

Proof of a defendant's recent possession of stolen property, standing alone, does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. That burden remains on the State to demonstrate defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Baker, supra. In order to invoke the presumption that the possessor is the thief, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each fact necessary to give rise to the inference or presumption. When the doctrine of recent possession applies in a particular case, it suffices to repel a motion for nonsuit and defendant's guilt or innocence becomes a jury question.

In summary then, the presumption spawned by possession of recently stolen property arises when, and only when, the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the property described in the indictment was stolen; (2) the stolen goods were found in defendant's custody and subject to his control and disposition to the exclusion of others though not necessarily found in defendant's hands or on his person so long as he had the power and intent to control the goods; State v. Eppley, 282 N.C. 249, 192 S.E.2d 441 (1972); State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480, 151 S.E.2d 62 (1966); State v. Turner, 238 N.C. 411, 77 S.E.2d 782 (1953); State v. Epps, 223 N.C. 741, 28 S.E.2d 219 (1943); and (3) the possession was recently after the larceny, mere possession of stolen property being insufficient to raise a presumption of guilt. State v. Jackson, 274 N.C. 594, 164 S.E.2d 369 (1968).

The possession sufficient to give rise to such inference does not require that the defendant have the article in his hand, on his person or under his touch. It is sufficient that he be in such physical proximity to it that he has the power to control it to the exclusion of others and that he has the intent to control it. One who has the requisite power to control and intent to control access to and use of a vehicle or a house has also the possession of the known contents thereof.

State v. Eppley, supra, 282 N.C. at 254, 192 S.E.2d at 445 (citations omitted).

This case turns upon the second element as outlined above: whether the stolen goods were found in defendant's custody and subject to his control and disposition to the exclusion of others. What amounts to exclusive possession of stolen goods to support an inference of a felonious taking most often turns on the circumstances of the possession. The crucial circumstances of possession in this case are: the goods were found in a car and persons other than defendant were present in the car, including the owner of the vehicle. Both fact situations have been addressed by various courts with varied results. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 727 (1973). The variances in the cases can perhaps be explained by the presence of additional circumstances. When the stolen goods are found in a car in which more than one person is present, the question may narrow to whether the defendant was the owner, driver or mere passenger in the car. In this case Steve Dunn was an owner and passenger in the car and defendant was the driver.

The "exclusive" possession...