State v. Mangual

• Decision Date: 04 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 18842.,18842.
• Citation: 85 A.3d 627,311 Conn. 182
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Ada MANGUAL.

311 Conn. 182

85 A.3d 627

STATE of Connecticut

v.Ada MANGUAL.

No. 18842.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 2012.

Decided March 4, 2014.

Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state's attorney, and Brett J. Salafia, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.^*

PALMER, J.

A jury found the defendant, Ada Mangual, guilty of possession of narcotics with the intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a–278 (b), and possession of narcotics with the intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public school in violation of General Statutes § 21a–278a (b), following a police investigation that culminated in the seizure of a quantity of heroin from the defendant's home pursuant to a duly authorized search warrant. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of eight years imprisonment. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant challenged, inter alia, the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress certain statements, claiming that those statements had been obtained in violation of her rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution when a police officer questioned her during the execution of the search warrant without first advising her of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).¹ The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claim upon concluding that the trial court properly determined that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time of the police questioning and that, as a result, Miranda warnings were not required. See State v. Mangual, 129 Conn.App. 638, 642, 648–49, 21 A.3d 510 (2011). The Appellate Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court; id., at 651, 21 A.3d 510; and we granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when a police officer interrogated her during the execution of a search warrant on her residence?” State v. Mangual, 302 Conn. 916, 27 A.3d 368 (2011). We agree with the defendant that she was in custody when the officer questioned her and, consequently, that the police were required to advise her in accordance with Miranda. Because we also agree with the defendant that the Miranda violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to a new trial. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts that are relevant to the defendant's claim. “In January, 2008, Officer John Blackmore of the New Britain [P]olice [D]epartment (department) received information from a confidential informant that heroin was being sold from an apartment in a multifamily residence located on North Street in [the city of] New Britain. After receiving this information, the department began surveillance of the apartment. In addition to surveillance, the department also used confidential informants to make three controlled purchases of heroin from the apartment. On the basis of information gathered from these investigative activities, the department suspected that three individuals, including a Hispanic male named ‘Bebo’ and a woman named ‘Ada,’ were selling heroin from the apartment.

“Blackmore obtained a search and seizure warrant for the apartment, which the police executed on February 5, 2008. In executing the warrant, Blackmore and [three] other officers [who were equipped with handguns, tactical vests, and at least one rifle] entered the multifamily residence and proceeded to the apartment, while Officer Gerald Hicks ... and two other uniformed officers remained outside. After reaching the apartment, an officer knocked on the front door and advised the occupants of the warrant. The defendant answered the door and allowed the officers [to enter, some of whom did so with their weapons drawn]. Upon entry, the officers [removed the defendant's dog from the four room apartment and guided] the defendant and [her three daughters] into the living room area.² [All four occupants were ordered to remain on the couch in the living room and were kept under police observation for the duration of the search.]

“After the apartment was secured, Hicks [and the two other officers] proceeded inside. Without issuing a Miranda warning [or informing the defendant whether she was under arrest or merely being detained temporarily until the officers completed the search], Hicks asked the defendant ‘if there [were] any drugs or weapons in the apartment.’ ” (Footnotes altered.) State v. Mangual, supra, 129 Conn.App. at 640–41, 21 A.3d 510. “The defendant answered ‘yes' and informed [Hicks] that ‘[there were] drugs in the bedroom.’ Thereafter, the defendant led Hicks to her bedroom ... [where she] pointed [to a] can of hairspray”; id., at 643, 21 A.3d 510; that was “located on her dresser and stated that it contained heroin. After removing the can's false bottom, Hicks discovered 235 packets of heroin.³ The defendant was placed under arrest.” ⁴ (Footnote added.) Id., at 641, 21 A.3d 510.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress her statements in response to Hicks' inquiry on the ground that she had not been advised of her Miranda rights before being questioned.⁵After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court determined that the defendant was not in custody when Hicks questioned her and, consequently, that the police were not required to issue Miranda warnings. In support of its brief oral ruling, the trial court stated that, “although [the defendant] was confined to a certain area,” she was not handcuffed, and the police “had every right to secure the apartment and ... to ensure their safety by ... making everyone stay where they were.” In accordance with this ruling, Hicks was permitted to testify at trial that the defendant had told him that there were drugs in her bedroom and that she had led him to the hairspray can on her dresser that contained those drugs. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of possession of narcotics with the intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent and possession of narcotics with the intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public school.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress because she was in custody when Hicks questioned her without first issuing Miranda warnings. ⁶State v. Mangual, supra, 129 Conn.App. at 642, 21 A.3d 510. The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claim, concluding that she had not demonstrated, as Miranda requires, “that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that she was in police custody of the degree associated with [a] formal arrest.” Id., at 647, 21 A.3d 510. In reaching this determination, the Appellate Court observed that Hicks' questioning was limited in scope and duration, the defendant was in the familiar surroundings of her apartment, she was not restrained physically, and she had not been threatened or told that she was under arrest. Id., at 647–48, 21 A.3d 510. The Appellate Court also relied on Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); see State v. Mangual, supra, at 648, 21 A.3d 510; in which the United States Supreme Court held that, for purposes of the fourth amendment, police executing a search warrant for a home may detain the occupants during the search; Michigan v. Summers, supra, at 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587; and observed that the detention of the respondent in that case was “substantially less intrusive” than an arrest. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 702, 101 S.Ct. 2587. On the basis of this distinction between a formal arrest and the detention of the occupant of a home incident to the execution of a search warrant, the Appellate Court reasoned that “a defendant is normally not in custody, and ... Miranda warnings are not required, when he or she is detained during the execution of a search warrant.” State v. Mangual, supra, at 648, 21 A.3d 510. The Appellate Court ultimately concluded that “the trial court did not make any factual findings that would lead [the Appellate Court] to conclude that the defendant was subject to greater constraints on her freedom of movement than those normally occurring during the execution of a search ... warrant.” Id.

On appeal to this court following our grant of certification, the defendant claims that (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court properly had denied her motion to suppress because, contrary to the conclusion of those courts, she was in custody for purposes of Miranda when Hicks questioned her, and (2) the resulting use of her statements by the state constituted harmful error requiring a new trial. We agree with both of the defendant's contentions.

I

We first address the defendant's claim that she was entitled to suppression of her statements because she had not been advised of her Miranda rights before Hicks elicited those statements, even though she was in police custody at that time. We agree that she was in custody, and, therefore, the police were required to administer Miranda warnings prior to any questioning.⁷

The following principles concerning the requirement of Miranda warnings govern our analysis of the defendant's claim. Although “[a]ny [police] interview of [an individual] suspected of a crime ... [has] coercive aspects to it”; Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); only an interrogation that occurs when a...