State v. Mangual

• Decision Date: 28 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 32122.,32122.
• Citation: 129 Conn.App. 638,21 A.3d 510
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticutv.Ada MANGUAL.

129 Conn.App. 638

21 A.3d 510

STATE of Connecticut

v.Ada MANGUAL.

No. 32122.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 14, 2011.Decided June 28, 2011.

Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Scott J. Murphy, state's attorney, and Brett J. Salafia, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).ROBINSON, BEAR and DUPONT, Js.ROBINSON, J.

The defendant, Ada Mangual, appeals from the trial court's judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of possession of narcotics with the intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a–278 (b) and possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public school in violation of General Statutes § 21a–278a (b). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court improperly denied her motion to suppress a statement that she made to police during the execution of a search and seizure warrant, and (2) her constitutional right to present a defense was violated when the court precluded her from introducing evidence of third party culpability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In January, 2008, Officer John Blackmore of the New Britain police department (department) received information from a confidential informant that heroin was being sold from an apartment in a multifamily residence located on North Street in New Britain. After receiving this information, the department began surveillance of the apartment.¹ In addition to surveillance, the department also used confidential informants to make three controlled purchases of heroin from the apartment.² On the basis of information gathered from these investigative activities, the department suspected that three individuals, including a Hispanic male named “Bebo” and a woman named “Ada,” were selling heroin from the apartment.

Blackmore obtained a search and seizure warrant for the apartment, which the police executed on February 5, 2008. In executing the warrant, Blackmore and several other officers entered the multifamily residence and proceeded to the apartment, while Officer Gerald Hicks of the department and two other uniformed officers remained outside. After reaching the apartment, an officer knocked on the front door and advised the occupants of the warrant. The defendant answered the door and allowed the officers admission. Upon entry, the officers gathered the defendant and three other occupants into the living room area.

After the apartment was secured, Hicks proceeded inside. Without issuing a Miranda warning,³ Hicks asked the defendant “if there [were] any drugs or weapons in the apartment.” The defendant responded in the affirmative and then led Hicks to her bedroom. Once there, she pointed to a can of hairspray located on her dresser and stated that it contained heroin. After removing the can's false bottom, Hicks discovered 235 packets of heroin. The defendant was placed under arrest. A search of her person incident to arrest revealed that the defendant was in possession of two $20 dollar bills. It later was determined that these $20 dollar bills had been used by confidential informants in two different controlled purchases.

The defendant subsequently was charged with possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent and possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public school. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement that she made to Hicks during the execution of the search and seizure warrant. On October 20, 2009, the first day of the defendant's trial, the court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress outside the presence of the jury. At the hearing, the defendant, Hicks and Irma Sierra, who was present when the warrant was executed, testified. After considering the testimony and the arguments of the parties, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress.

After the motion to suppress was denied, the state introduced the statement that the defendant made to Hicks. On October 26, 2009, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts, and the defendant was sentenced on January 6, 2010.⁴ This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied her motion to suppress the statement that she made to police during the execution of the search and seizure warrant. According to the defendant, she was “in custody” when Hicks asked her if there were any drugs in the apartment. Therefore, she argues that because she was not provided with a Miranda warning prior to police questioning, her statement should have been suppressed. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claim. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Hicks provided the following testimony about the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statement. When he entered the four room apartment, a total of seven officers were present in the living room area where the defendant and the other occupants were seated on a couch. At this point, none of the officers had their weapons displayed, and neither the defendant nor the other occupants were handcuffed. Although they were not handcuffed, Hicks admitted that the occupants were being detained and, consequently, were not free to leave the apartment. Hicks testified that although the occupants could not leave the apartment, no one asked for permission to do anything else, such as change seats or use the rest room.

According to Hicks, before the officers searched the apartment, he asked the defendant, who was seated on the couch with the other occupants, whether “there [was] anything in the house that we should know about, in regards to guns or drugs.” ⁵ The defendant answered “yes” and informed him that “there's drugs in the bedroom.” Thereafter, the defendant led Hicks to her bedroom and pointed out the can of hairspray. Aside from the initial question, Hicks stated that he did not ask the defendant any more questions.

In support of her motion, the defendant called Sierra. Sierra testified that during the execution of the search warrant, the officers denied her requests to use the rest room and to have the defendant sit in the living room area with the other occupants. In addition, she claimed that the officers removed the defendant's pit bull dog from the apartment and in doing so “put [a] gun in the dog's face....” Finally, she testified that she did not feel free to leave the apartment while the officers were executing the search warrant.

The defendant offered the following testimony in support of her motion. When the police entered the apartment, they were carrying rifles and did not inform her that they had a search and seizure warrant. She asked to sit next to her daughters and to use the bathroom, but the officers denied both requests. She admitted that the officers did not place her in handcuffs but testified that she did not feel free to leave the apartment or to ask the officers to leave.

After considering the testimony, the court made only limited findings of facts. It found that the defendant was not handcuffed but that she had been confined to a certain area. On the basis of these findings, the court concluded that the evidence did not establish that the defendant was in custody.

“It is well established that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Two threshold conditions must be satisfied in order to invoke the warnings constitutionally required by Miranda: (1) the defendant must have been in custody; and (2) the defendant must have been subjected to police interrogation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 361, 952 A.2d 784 (2008). The defendant bears the burden of proving both conditions. See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 409, 736 A.2d 857 (1999); State v. Brown, 118 Conn.App. 418, 433, 984 A.2d 86 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 901, 988 A.2d 877 (2010).

In denying the defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court's decision was based upon its conclusion that the evidence failed to establish that the defendant was in custody at the time she was subjected to police questioning. When reviewing the trial court's conclusion as to custody, we “conduct a plenary, scrupulous examination of the record in order to make an independent determination on the ultimate issue of custody, but we ... defer to the trial court's historical findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Pinder, supra, 250 Conn. [at] 410–12 ; see also State v. Lapointe, 237 Conn. 694, 725, 678 A.2d 942, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 994, 117 S.Ct. 484, 136 L.Ed.2d 378 (1996).” State v. Doyle, 104 Conn.App. 4, 12, 931 A.2d 393, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 935, 935 A.2d 152 (2007); see also State v. Hasfal, 106 Conn.App. 199, 205, 941 A.2d 387 (2008).

To determine whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda, we must evaluate the circumstances confronting the defendant and ascertain whether there was a restraint on his or her freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994); State v. Turner, 267 Conn. 414, 434, 838 A.2d 947, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809, 125 S.Ct. 36, 160 L.Ed.2d 12 (2004). “[T]he United States Supreme Court has adopted an objective, reasonable person test for determining whether a defendant is in custody.... Thus, in determining whether Miranda rights are required,...