State v. Manning, 90CA004871
| Decision Date | 08 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90CA004871,90CA004871 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MANNING, Appellant. * |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Gregory A. White, Pros. Atty., Elyria, for appellee.
Jack W. Bradley, Lorain, for appellant.
Defendant-appellant, Ginger A. Manning, shot and killed her husband, Todd Manning, as he slept during the early morning hours of March 8, 1990. She was convicted of murder, R.C. 2903.02(A), with a firearm specification, R.C. 2929.71, in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. Manning now appeals, raising eleven assignments of error.
In January 1990, Ginger Manning learned that Lorain County Children Services had received a report that Todd Manning had molested her daughter, Jennifer. Todd was not the biological father of the five-year-old. He was forced to leave her trailer but returned after convincing her of his innocence. Ginger Manning contended at trial that Todd Manning admitted to the incident on the night of his death. She attempted to call the police, but he threatened to kill both her and her daughter if she did.
Ginger Manning maintained further that she lay in bed for a while with Jennifer. She then got up, opened a beer, and watched television with Todd until he fell asleep. At this point, she retrieved her gun from the bedroom, went into the kitchen to load it, and returned to the living room. She began to recall the many instances of abuse, she alleged, and grew fearful for her and Jennifer's safety. Ginger Manning then pointed her gun at Todd's right temple and fired a single bullet through his head. He survived for approximately thirty-six hours before expiring from the severe wound.
Ginger Manning promptly called the police and reported the incident. During the investigation, she claimed she had banished Todd Manning from the trailer but he had broken in while she was asleep. Mistaking him for a common intruder lying on her sofa, she shot him.
Numerous discrepancies in Manning's initial account quickly surfaced. Consequently, she was indicted for aggravated murder, R.C. 2903.01(A), with a gun specification, on March 13, 1990. After a five-day trial, the jury returned a conviction for the lesser offense of murder, R.C. 2903.02. This appeal raising eleven assignments of error followed.
Early in pretrial proceedings, it became apparent that Manning was going to abandon her defense of mistake and contend instead that she was a victim of battered woman syndrome. Manning's counsel expressed an intention to have an expert examine her and testify on this issue. A hearing followed on June 4, 1990, during which the prosecutor requested that any such testimony be excluded since prepared reports had not been submitted by the defense in compliance with a prior discovery order. In the ensuing discussion, Manning's counsel declared that an independent examination by a state psychiatrist would be acceptable if the date for filing the overdue report could be continued. This request was granted by the court.
In a brief to the court dated June 15, 1990, Manning's counsel switched positions and maintained that such an examination would violate her constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. This argument was rejected on the grounds that any such rights were waived. On June 21, 1990, Manning was transported to Cleveland for an interview with Phillip J. Resnick, M.D. Prior to this psychiatrist's testimony at trial, the objection was again raised and overruled by the court. Manning now complains that these rulings were erroneous.
In State v. Koss (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970, paragraph three of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome could assist the trier of fact in resolving a claim of self-defense. Such assessments are important in determining whether the defendant possessed the appropriate mental state to justify an acquittal. Id. at 215-218, 551 N.E.2d at 972-975. The Ohio General Assembly recently endowed this ruling with statutory force. R.C. 2901.06.
During the defense case, Lynne B. Rosewater, Ph.D., testified that she believed that Manning was in fear of imminent bodily harm to either herself or Jennifer at the time she shot Todd Manning. The prosecutor then presented Dr. Resnick's contrary evaluation in rebuttal. When a defendant introduces psychiatric evidence and places her state of mind directly at issue, as here, she can be compelled to submit to a independent examination by a state psychiatrist. See Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987), 483 U.S. 402, 422-424, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 2917-2919, 97 L.Ed.2d 336, 355; Isley v. Dugger (C.A. 11, 1989), 877 F.2d 47, 49; Silagy v. Peters (C.A. 7, 1990), 905 F.2d 986, 1005. One court has reasoned that:
Schneider v. Lynaugh (C.A. 5, 1988), 835 F.2d 570, 576.
While these opinions do not involve the specific issue of battered woman syndrome, the general principles announced are no less applicable. Consequently Manning's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were waived and the admission of Dr. Resnick's testimony was proper. This assignment of error is overruled.
Manning's counsel does not suggest, and we are unable to confirm, that an objection was ever raised as Dr. Resnick testified as an expert witness. Therefore, this court need not review the matter for the first time on appeal. State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Self (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 73, 81, 564 N.E.2d 446, 454.
Regardless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Resnick to render an expert opinion. See Ohio Turnpike Comm. v. Ellis (1955), 164 Ohio St. 377, 58 O.O. 179, 131 N.E.2d 397, paragraph eight of the syllabus. His qualifications as a criminal psychiatrist were extensive. The jury was fully apprised of the differences between his and Dr. Rosewater's backgrounds and could determine on its own how much weight to afford each. This assignment of error is not well taken.
Objections were raised when a caseworker from Lorain County Children's Services, Holly Croyle, and a Coshocton County Detective, Al Lingo, were permitted to testify that Todd Manning had undergone a lie detector test which indicated that he had not molested Jennifer. The decisions cited by Ginger Manning to this court in support of her argument all concern the admissibility of lie detector tests taken either by the accused, State v. Souel (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 123, 7 O.O.3d 207, 372 N.E.2d 1318, or a party, Brown v. Best Products Co. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 32, 35-36, 18 OBR 69, 72-73, 479 N.E.2d 852, 855-856.
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently distinguished that line of opinions by noting that in those cases polygraph evidence was offered to corroborate or impeach trial testimony. Criss v. Springfield Twp. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 82, 86, 564 N.E.2d 440, 444. In Criss, the court held that police officers defending against a civil claim of malicious prosecution should have been allowed to present polygraph results on their behalf. The test subjects were state witnesses in rape proceedings against the plaintiffs. The evidence was admissible not to challenge or support the veracity of the witnesses' testimony but to demonstrate the officer's state of mind during the plaintiffs' arrest. Id. at 86-87, 564 N.E.2d at 444-445.
A similar conclusion is warranted in the case at bar. The results of Todd Manning's polygraph test were offered to demonstrate that Ginger Manning had reason to believe he had not, in fact, molested her daughter. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by concluding that such testimony was relevant to rebut her claim of self-defense. Evid.R. 401, 402; see, generally, State v. Hymore (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128, 38 O.O.2d 298, 302, 224 N.E.2d 126, 130, certiorari denied (1968), 390 U.S. 1024, 88 S.Ct. 1409, 20 L.Ed.2d 281. Accordingly, we also overrule the third assignment of error.
The prosecution maintained at trial that Ginger Manning's motive for shooting Todd Manning was based, in part, upon his possession of these unflattering photographs and her fear that he would use them against her. Several witnesses testified in support of this theory. These exhibits were therefore relevant in accordance with Evid.R. 401 and 402. Moreover, we cannot agree that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that their probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect as urged by counsel. Evid.R. 403; see State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 264-266, 15 OBR 379, 400-403, 473 N.E.2d 768, 790-793. This assignment of error is without merit.
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