State v. Marino, COA18-1135

• Decision Date: 21 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. COA18-1135,COA18-1135
• Citation: 828 S.E.2d 689,265 N.C.App. 546
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Daniel Yair MARINO
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

265 N.C.App. 546

828 S.E.2d 689

STATE of North Carolina

v.Daniel Yair MARINO

No. COA18-1135

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: May 21, 2019

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kristin J. Uicker, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender James R. Grant, for defendant-appellant.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter involves a Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR) filed by Daniel Yair Marino (Defendant) on 25 October 2017, seeking relief from criminal convictions. The Record based upon the proceedings on the MAR below tends to show the following relevant facts:

On 16 September 2013, a Guilford County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a Class D felony; two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, Class H felonies; one count of Possession with Intent to Sell or Deliver Marijuana, a Class I felony; and one count of Maintaining a Dwelling for the Keeping or Selling of Marijuana and Cocaine, a Class I felony. Pursuant to a plea arrangement, Defendant entered an Alford plea to the charged offenses on 11 June 2015. The terms and conditions of the parties’ plea agreement provided:

1. That the charges shall be consolidated [under the Class D Trafficking in Cocaine charge] for judgment purposes.

2. That prayer for judgment shall be continued until on or after the criminal term beginning pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 90-95(h)(5). That the defendant agrees, if called upon by the State, to provide truthful testimony against any charged co-defendant in these matters.

3. That upon the State's prayer for judgment, the Court shall impose any additional terms deemed appropriate.

Approximately 19 months later, the State prayed for entry of judgment against Defendant. The trial court held Defendant's sentencing hearing on 4 January 2017. At this hearing, the State and defense counsel were given the opportunity to present arguments regarding Defendant's sentence. The State informed the trial court that Defendant had provided the State with "substantial assistance" within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(5),¹ and Defendant's counsel urged the trial court to consider Defendant's efforts when sentencing Defendant.

After finding Defendant provided substantial assistance to the State, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an active term of a minimum of 48 months and a maximum of 70 months, and ordered Defendant to pay a $25,000 fine. This sentence was substantially lower than the sentence Defendant would have received had he not provided substantial assistance to the State, which the trial court acknowledged was a minimum of 175 months and a maximum of 222 months, plus a $250,000 fine. The written Judgment was entered on 6 January 2017; however, there was a clerical error in this Judgment, which was corrected by written Judgment on 27 February 2017.

On 25 October 2017, Defendant filed a MAR requesting the trial court set aside the sentence imposed on Defendant. According to Defendant's MAR, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the sentence because of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331.2, which requires the trial court enter final judgment on certain high-level felonies, including Class D felonies, within 12 months of the trial court entering a prayer for judgment continued (PJC). After hearing arguments from the State and defense counsel, the trial court issued an Order denying Defendant's MAR (MAR Order) on 26 January 2018. In its MAR Order, the trial court concluded Section 15A-1331.2 does not mention jurisdiction and that a violation of this statute does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enter judgment on a PJC after 12 months. Defendant petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to review the MAR Order. We granted Defendant's Petition for the purpose of granting Defendant an appeal. Defendant has prosecuted his appeal, and we now review the merits of his argument.

Issue

The sole issue on appeal is whether Section 15A-1331.2 of our General Statutes divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter Judgment on Defendant's plea to Class D Trafficking in Cocaine.

Standard of Review

"When considering rulings on motions for appropriate relief, we review the trial court's order to determine ‘whether the findings of fact are supported by evidence, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and whether the conclusions of law support the order entered by the trial court.’ " State v. Frogge , 359 N.C. 228, 240, 607 S.E.2d 627, 634 (2005) (quoting State v. Stevens , 305 N.C. 712, 720, 291 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1982) ). "Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review." State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citations omitted). This Court has stated, "If the issues raised by Defendant's challenge to [the trial court's] decision to deny his [MAR] are primarily legal rather than factual in nature, we will essentially use a de novo standard of review in evaluating Defendant's challenges to [the court's] order." State v. Jackson , 220 N.C. App. 1, 8, 727 S.E.2d 322, 329 (2012) (first and third alteration in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, Defendant challenges the trial court's MAR Order on legal rather than factual grounds, asserting that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331.2 divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter Judgment on Defendant's plea to Class D Trafficking in Cocaine. See, e.g. , State v. Hayes , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 788 S.E.2d 651, 652 (2016) ("Issues of statutory construction are questions of law which we review de novo on appeal[.]" (citation omitted)); Powers v. Wagner , 213 N.C. App. 353, 357, 716 S.E.2d 354, 357 (2011) ("This Court's determination of whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed on appeal de novo ." (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, we employ a de novo review.

Analysis

A. Background Law on PJCs

"Once a guilty plea is accepted in a criminal case, a trial court may continue the case to a subsequent date for sentencing." State v. Watkins , 229 N.C. App. 628, 631, 747 S.E.2d 907, 910 (2013) (citing State v. Absher , 335 N.C. 155, 156, 436 S.E.2d 365, 366 (1993) ); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1334(a) (2017) (allowing "continuance of the sentencing hearing"); id. § 15A-1416(b)(1) (2017) (allowing the State to move for imposition of sentence when prayer for judgment has been continued). "This continuance is frequently referred to as a ‘prayer for judgment continued’ ... [and] vests a trial judge presiding at a subsequent session of court with the jurisdiction to sentence a defendant for crimes previously adjudicated."

State v. Degree , 110 N.C. App. 638, 640-41, 430 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1993) (emphasis added); see also Miller v. Aderhold , 288 U.S. 206, 211, 53 S.Ct. 325, 326, 77 L.Ed. 702, 705-06 (1933) ("[W]here verdict has been duly returned, the jurisdiction of the trial court ... is not exhausted until sentence is pronounced, either at the same or a succeeding term." (citations omitted)).

Under our common law, a PJC may be for a definite or indefinite period of time, as long as it is entered "within a reasonable time"; otherwise, the trial court loses jurisdiction. Degree , 110 N.C. App. at 641, 430 S.E.2d at 493 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has clarified that "[a]s long as a prayer for judgment is not continued for an unreasonable period, ... and the defendant was not prejudiced, ... the court does not lose the jurisdiction to impose a sentence." Absher , 335 N.C. at 156, 436 S.E.2d at 366 (citations omitted). "Deciding whether sentence has been entered within a ‘reasonable time’ requires consideration of the reason for the delay, the length of the delay, whether defendant has consented to the delay, and any actual prejudice to defendant which results from the delay." Degree , 110 N.C. App. at 641, 430 S.E.2d at 493 (citation omitted); see also State v. Lea , 156 N.C. App. 178, 180, 576 S.E.2d 131, 133 (2003) (upholding as reasonable a sentence entered over five years after defendant was convicted).

B. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331.2

In 2012, the Legislature enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331.2, titled "Prayer for Judgment Continued for a Period of Time that Exceeds 12 Months Is an Improper Disposition of a Class B1, B2, C, D, or E Felony," which provides:

The court shall not dispose of any criminal action that is a Class B1, B2, C, D, or E felony by ordering a prayer for judgment continued that exceeds 12 months. If the court orders a prayer for judgment continued in any criminal action that is a Class B1, B2, C, D, or E felony, the court shall include as a condition that the State shall pray judgment within a specific period of time not to exceed 12 months. At the time the State prays judgment, or 12 months from the date of the prayer for judgment continued order, whichever is earlier, the court shall enter a final judgment unless the court finds that it is in the interest of justice to continue the order for prayer for judgment continued. If the court continues the order for prayer for judgment continued, the order shall be continued for a specific period of time not to exceed 12 months. The court shall not continue a prayer for judgment continued order for more than one additional 12-month period.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331.2 (2017). Whether, and to what extent, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331.2 imposes stricter jurisdictional requirements on a trial court for these high-level felonies than at common law presents a question of first impression for this Court.²

Here, Defendant's plea to a Class D felony and the trial court's 27 February 2017 Judgment unquestionably failed to comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331.2, which provides that if a trial court orders a PJC for a Class D felony, the trial court must include a condition that the State pray for judgment "within a specific...