State v. Marley
| Decision Date | 04 May 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 5234,5234 |
| Citation | 509 P.2d 1095,54 Haw. 450 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodney J. MARLEY et al., Defendants-Appellants, and Fred Steven Radford, Defendant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. HRS § 771-1 is not vague, indefinite or overbroad on its face, for its language provides adequate notice of potential criminal liability and also properly recognizes not only rights derived from authoritative control over property in question but the constitutional rights of others as well.
2. HRS § 771-1 is not unconstitutionally applied when invoked against persons present on property contrary to wishes of person in authoritative control of such property, even where such uninvited persons assert First Amendment rights, if (a) there is no showing of discriminatory intent in the invocation of the statute, (b) the property has not been dedicated to public use, and (c) the subject matter of the asserted First Amendment rights is unrelated to the nature of, or business activity conducted on, the premises of the private property.
3. HRS § 771-1 is not unconstitutionally applied when invoked against persons present on private property contrary to wishes of person in authoritative control of such property where such uninvited persons assert First Amendment rights, and where property is private property of a corporation, regardless of whether corporation does business with governmental entities.
4. The contents and interpretation of treaties that are part of American law and that are invoked as applicable law in case are not matters for evidentiary proof.
5. All courts, including state courts, take judicial notice of American treaties.
6. Treaties made under the authority of the United States are the Supreme Law of the Land and take precedence over state statutes.
7. It is the duty of the court to find the law of a treaty and instruct the jury thereon.
8. 'International Law', other than that made by American treaties, does not affect the state in its reasonable regulation of conduct within its territorial limits.
9. Self-executing American treaties affect individual rights and prevail over contrary state law.
10. The prevention or termination of a crime is a justification defense for criminal conduct only when the crime to be prevented or terminated occurs in the 'presence' of defendant, regardless of the type of conduct, or degree of violence therein, that defendant seeks to excuse.
11. The 'presence' requirement in the justification defense of prevention or termination of a crime is not satisfied by information about said crime received through media dissemination.
12. The 'necessity defense' exonerates persons who commit a crime under the pressure of circumstances if the harm that would have resulted from compliance with the law would have significantly exceeded the harm actually resulting from the defendant's breach of the law.
13. Successful use of the 'necessity defense' requires (a) that there is no third and legal alternative available, (b) that the harm to be prevented be imminent, and (c) that a direct, causal relationship be reasonably anticipated to exist between defendant's action and the avoidance of harm.
14. The Nuremberg defenses are not available to those whose personal rights have not been violated, nor to those not subject to prosecution under the principles of the Nuremberg trials.
15. Reasonable mistake of law is often a complete defense to the charge of criminality for an act when the mistake of law negatives a mental state which must be shown to establish a material element of the crime.
16. A prima facie case under HRS § 771-1 is established by a showing of continued unauthorized physical presence of a person on the lands of another after a request to depart is made by the person in control of the property.
17. Exhibits need not be admitted into evidence where irrelevant, immaterial, or excessively lengthy and cumulative.
Richard Turbin, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu (Donald Tsukiyama, Public Defender, Honolulu, with him on the briefs), for defendants-appellants Rodney J. Marley and Gerard A. LePage.
John J. Witeck, Dorothy M. Katz, Bette G. Johnson, Susan M. Atherton, in pro. per. (Noble J. Beck, Jr., and James N. Walkley, with them on the briefs).
Michael A. Weight, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu , for plaintiff-appellee.
Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ.
The defendants-appellants (hereafter referred to as defendants) in this case-Susan M. Atherton, Noble L. Beck, Bette G. Johnson, Dorothy N. Katz, Gerard A. LePage, Rodney J. Marley, James A. Walkley, and John J. Witeck-were convicted of criminal trespass on the premises of the Honolulu office of the Honeywell corporation. The convictions, following a jury trial in Circuit Court on October 5, 6, 7 and 8, 1971, resulted in sentences of fine (in all instances partially suspended) and of jail (in all instances suspended).
The significant facts are as follows: On May 14, 1971, at approximately 2:00 o'clock p. m., the defendants entered on the premises which served as the Honolulu office of the Honeywell Corporation. One of the defendants, Rodney J. Marley, who was then A.W.O.L. from the United States Navy, read to the Honeywell staff a statement concerning the corporation's participation in the Indochina war. The other defendants established a 'sanctuary' in the Honeywell office for the A.W.O.L. sailor and hoped, thereby, to stop the alleged 'war crimes' being committed by Honeywell. Defendants hung pictures on the office walls, and engaged in other activities including singing and talking among themselves. The activities of the defendants were disruptive of the normal business operations of the corporation, but were completely nonviolent. After approximately three hours, at about 5:00 o'clock p. m., Mr. Paulk, Honeywell's local office manager, read a statement to the defendants asking them to leave at closing time or face the charge of trespass. Since the defendants chose to remain and not depart as requested, the police were summoned, and defendants were arrested.
At their trial, the defendants and the state introduced a considerable amount of factual testimony about the Honeywell Corporation and its Honolulu office. Throughout the trial defendants contended that they were justified (under several theories, infra) in being on the premises of the Honolulu office, because, as was stipulated at trial, Honeywell manufactured 'anti-personnel' weapons used in Indochina. Evidence was undisputed that none of these weapons was produced at the Honolulu office, but rather that the Honolulu office dealt chiefly with the computer business of the Honeywell Corporation. However, evidence was conflicting about the extent to which these computers actually played a part in the hostilities in Indochina. It was undisputed that the Honeywell Corporation was a major defense contractor doing an annual business of many millions of dollars with the United States Government.
At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, defendants' motion for acquittal was denied. At that time, defendants offered the testimony of an expert witness, Dr. Fried. The court refused to admit the testimony. During the trial, defendants offered several exhibits for introduction into evidence, but the exhibits were excluded. The trial court also refused to give, verbatim, many of the instructions to the jury proposed by defendants. Throughout the trial defendants were permitted, and encouraged, to give testimony both as to their motivations in their actions on the day of their trespass as well as to their beliefs about the nature of the activity carried on by the Honeywell Corporation and the nature of their beliefs about their rights and duties with respect to that corporation. Verdicts of guilty were returned, judgments were entered accordingly, and sentences were imposed. Defendants have appealed from the judgments and sentences.
Defendants first present the issue of the constitutionality of Hawaii's criminal trespass statute, HRS § 771-1 (now repealed), under which defendants were convicted. 1 Although this matter was not actually raised during defendants' trial, the policy of this court, as stated in State v. Bunn, 50 Haw. 351, 440 P.2d 528 (1968), is to deviate from the rule that appellate courts will not consider questions which were not raised in the trial court, whenever it 'is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights', 50 Haw. at 355, 440 P.2d at 532. Since this case, like State v. Bunn, involves an important constitutional issue that affects defendants' fundamental rights, we will notice the alleged constitutional defect and consider it.
Defendants challenge HRS § 771-1 as vague, indefinite, and overbroad on its face. The portions of the statute that defendants argue to be vague, indefinite, and overbroad are the phrases (a) 'of another' and (b) constitutional privileges to exercise First Amendment rights on public property, quasi-public property, and/or private property. By allegedly failing to provide adequate notice of the extent and occasions for potential criminal liability, the defendants contend that they are denied due process of law by the statute and that the statute is therefore unconstitutional. See, e. g., Connally v. General Constitution Co., 269 U.S 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Grody v. State, 278 N.E.2d 280 (Ind.1972) and the decisions of this court State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 441 P.2d 333 (1968), and State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971).
We do not agree with defendants. This court has recently had occasion to consider the constitutionality of HRS § 771-1, albeit in...
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