State v. Marlow, 199PA83

• Decision Date: 03 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 199PA83,199PA83
• Citation: 310 N.C. 507,313 S.E.2d 532
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. William Paul MARLOW.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 532

313 S.E.2d 532

310 N.C. 507

STATE of North Carolina v. William Paul MARLOW.

No. 199PA83.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 3, 1984.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Atty. Gen. Richard L. Kucharski, Raleigh, for the State.

Samuel C. Evans, Sparta, for defendant.

COPELAND, Justice.

The State brings forward two assignments of error addressing the two issues ruled upon by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. That court held that the defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated and that he also had been improperly joined for trial with co-defendant Tena Marion. For the reasons discussed below, we find error with regard to the Court of Appeals' determination of the speedy trial issue, but not with their improper joinder holding.

The defendant, in his brief to this Court, not only replied to the State's two assignments of error, but also brought forth issues presented to the Court of Appeals, which that court deemed unnecessary to reach or determine in light of their ruling. In the interest of justice, we shall address these remaining issues, none of which, however, constitute prejudicial error.

The record discloses that on 8 February 1982, prior to trial, defendant presented several motions to the trial court, including the motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. At the hearing on this motion to dismiss the State offered evidence tending to show that at the trial term immediately preceding the 8 February 1982 term, co-defendant Tena Marion was in the late stages of pregnancy and, as such, was not physically able to withstand the rigors of a lengthy murder trial. The State also tendered evidence that Wilkes County was a county with a limited number of court sessions.

After hearing all the evidence, the trial court made several findings of fact, including a delineation of the specific terms of court in Wilkes County and the types of cases calendared. The court also found that co-defendant Tena Marion was pregnant at the December term and expected to give birth to a child sometime in January 1982 and did deliver the child on 1 January 1982; that the District Attorney did not place the case on the trial calendar for the week of 14 December 1981 because he felt that the pregnant defendant was unable to stand trial at that time; and that the next session following the December term of court was 8 February 1982.

The trial court concluded:

(T)hat the defendant has failed to show wherein he has been prejudiced in the delay of his trial or the delay in his indictment and has failed to show that the State deliberately failed to prosecute and that the Court concludes that the defendant has not shown any constitutional right or any constitutional denial of the right to a speedy trial. The Court further concludes that since the date of the indictment, September the 14th, 1981, that inasmuch as the codefendant, Tena Marion, was expecting to deliver childbirth, that the time from December 14th, 1981 to February the 8th, should be excluded for the reason that the codefendant was not physically able to appear in court; and the Court further concludes by excluding this time from the date of indictment the defendant has not been denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.

First, the State contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated. Under North Carolina's Speedy Trial Act, N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-701(a1), "[t]he trial of the defendant charged with a criminal offense shall begin ... (1) [w]ithin 120 days from the date the defendant is arrested, served with criminal process, waives an indictment, or is indicted, whichever occurs last." If the defendant is not tried within the time prescribed, then the charge shall be dismissed, pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-703(a).

According to the record, defendant's trial commenced on 8 February 1982, 147 days after the issuance of the indictment. The 120 day period expired on 12 January 1982. However, the State argues that the exclusions provided in N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 15A-701(b)(1), (4), (6) and (8) apply to the case sub judice and serve to bring this trial within the required 120 day period.

Under the provisions of N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-701(b)(1) the trial court may exclude "[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant ..." from the 120 day period in which a criminal defendant must be tried. Although this provision enumerates certain specific proceedings which may be excluded from the statutory period, this section explicitly provides that this list is not inclusive, to wit, the statutory exclusion is not limited to these listed proceedings. Thus, the legislature has deemed it appropriate, in this particular instance, to allow judicial discretion when the ends of justice would be served.

The State urges this Court to interpret N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-701(b)(1) as excluding discovery time from the 120 day period. With particular regard to the case at bar, the State argues that the excludable period should run from the time of the indictment, 14 September 1981, until at least the time the district attorney received the final laboratory report on 23 October 1981. Such an interpretation, of course, would bring this defendant's trial well within the 120 day period. Never before has our Court determined the effect a defendant's request for discovery would have upon the Speedy Trial Act.

The basic purpose of the Speedy Trial Act is to provide for the efficient administration of justice, which, according to our legislature, is best effectuated through a prompt determination of a criminal defendant's guilt or innocence. The Act's delineation of specific time limits and exclusions serves as a guideline for processing cases, and thus provides a technical defense for criminal defendants. This statute is quite distinguishable from a defendant's Sixth Amendment fundamental right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution, and in no way should it be interpreted as a bar to this constitutional right. See N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-704. We shall discuss this distinction in more detail later in this opinion.

While the Speedy Trial Act explicitly defines the specific procedural limitations and exclusions, it also provides, by way of Section 701(b)(1), a means with which the courts could augment the types of proceeding which should merit exclusion.

After careful consideration, we have determined that the Speedy Trial Act's rule of exclusion, specifically subsection (b) of section 701, should include the period of delay resulting from a defendant's request for discovery. This excludable discovery period shall commence upon the service of defendant's motion for request for discovery upon counsel for the State, and shall encompass only such time which occurred after the speedy trial period has been triggered. In this case, the excludable time began upon the issuance of an indictment on 14 September 1981. Thereupon, the statutory time, within which the trial of a criminal case must begin, would cease to run until the occurrence of the earlier of the following events: (1) the completion of the requested discovery; (2) the filing by the defendant of a confirmation of voluntary compliance with the discovery request; or (3) the date upon which the court, pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-909, has determined that discovery would be completed. This holding is consistent with our purpose to ensure a fair and judicious determination of the issues. Without possession of all the vital information to which he is entitled, the defendant could possibly be deprived of the benefit of necessary evidence. Presumably, a defendant would not be ready for trial until the needed material was received. Furthermore, there are various circumstances in which the investigative process is hindered by the secretion, disposition or attempted elimination of evidence by not only interested parties, but also by innocent persons unaware of the significance of such information.

Our decision to exclude discovery time does not force the defendant to anxiously await, at the mercy of the State, the completion of discovery within a reasonable time. The State remains bound not only by requirements of good faith to proceed in a timely manner, but also by the defendant's ability to compel earlier discovery, pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-909. Under this statute, a defendant may petition the court to declare a specific time, place and manner for completing discovery. If the defendant pursues this available course of action, then, of course, the statutory time begins to run again upon the court ordered date of compliance.

The record before us reveals that the defendant, after his arrest in March, but prior to his indictment in September, filed a comprehensive request for discovery on 10 June 1981. Included in this request were the results of various laboratory examinations conducted by the State Bureau of Investigation. The district attorney, upon receiving these relevant and material laboratory reports on 23 October 1981, complied with defendant's discovery request at the 10 November 1981 meeting with the defense attorneys. We find the delay in providing discovery was reasonable, especially considering the unusual circumstances involved in this case. The State's efforts to positively identify the corpus delicti and the evidence incriminating the defendant were severely and intentionally complicated by the defendant's surreptitious attempt to conceal his criminal acts. The defendant and his co-defendants disposed of the victim's body by throwing it into a creek. Approximately five months later, an unsuspecting fisherman discovered the badly decomposed body. Items of evidence linking the defendants to the killing were burned by the defendants. These conscious acts of concealment serve to support our conclusion that the...