State v. Martin
| Decision Date | 30 June 1832 |
| Citation | 14 N.C. 329 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | THE STATE v. MARTIN. |
In an indictment under the Act of 1823 (Tay. Rev., ch. 1229), "declaring the punishment of persons of color in certain cases," it is necessary to charge that the assault was made with an intent to commit a rape. An allegation that the defendant feloniously attempted to ravish is insufficient.
THE prisoner was tried on the last circuit, at HYDE, before his Honor, Martin, J., upon the following indictment:
"The jurors for the State, upon their oath present, that Martin, a slave, etc., not having, etc., but being moved, etc., on, etc., with force arms at, etc., in and upon one S. H., a white female, in the peace, etc., violently and feloniously did make an assault, and her the said S. H. forcibly and against the will of her the said S. H. then and there did feloniously attempt to ravish and carnally know; against the form, etc."
After a verdict for the prosecution, his Honor arrested the judgment, and Mr. Solicitor Miller, on behalf of the State, appealed.
The Attorney-General admits in the argument that the guilty will with which the assault was made is a necessary allegation in the indictment. But it is contended that it is sufficiently expressed by "then and there feloniously did attempt to ravish," following the charge of the assault. The statute makes it a capital felony for any person of color to make an assault with intent to commit a rape upon the body of a white female. Though in some minor offenses the guilty will (which in all cases is necessary to constitute a crime) is implied from the wrongful overt act, and therefore need not be stated in the indictment; and in other cases the allegation of such criminal purpose, though required in the frame of the indictment, is formal so far as respects the finding of that purpose as a fact by the jury, because the law would prima facie infer it from the act of which it prompted the perpetration; yet generally, even at common law, the intent constituting an act a capital crime must be precisely and specifically alleged. Thisrule is exemplified by the words of art, felonice, burglariter, and the like. Much more is that the case when the indictment is founded on a statute. The terms used by the statute are then necessary in the indictment, not only to denote the disposition of the accused, but also to describe and identify the crime as that for which the particular punishment is prescribed. This may be a good reason why...
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State v. Powers
...and "try," in their broadest signification, mean a physical effort to do a particular thing. An attempt is an overt act itself. State v. Martin, 14 N.C. 329, 330; Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380, 388. See also Logan v. State, Me., 263 A.2d 266 Furthermore, even if the trial Justice had given th......
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Moody v. Lovell
...unaware, however, that the North Carolina court in State v. Hewett, 158 N.C. 627, 74 S.E. 356, overruled the Goldston case and State v. Martin, 14 N.C. 329, the case cited as authority therefor. In State v. Hewett [158 N.C. 627, 74 S.E. 357] the North Carolina court 'We are unable to see ho......
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Wooldridge v. United States
...it, and proceeded a certain way in the doing. The intent in the mind covers the thing in full; the act covers it only in part.' In State v. Martin, 14 N.C. 329, the court 'Attempt is expressive rather of a moving towards doing the thing, than of the purpose itself. An attempt is an overt ac......
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State v. Hewett
...know forcibly and against her will, " etc. There are two decisions of this court which sustain the contention of the defendant—State v. Martin, 14 N. C. 329, and State v. Goldston, 103 N. C. 323, 9 S. E. 580 —but with perfect deference we must say we are not impressed with the reasoning upo......