State v. Martin
| Decision Date | 13 December 1904 |
| Citation | 125 Iowa 715,101 N.W. 637 |
| Parties | STATE v. MARTIN. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Winneshiek County; A. N. Hobson, Judge.
Indictment for indecent exposure. Verdict and judgment of guilty, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.E. W. Cutting and F. S. Burling, for appellant.
C. W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., and L. De Graff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The indictment charges that defendant did “unlawfully, willfully, and designedly make an open, indecent exposure of his person in a public place, to wit, a public highway in Winneshiek county, in the state of Iowa, in the presence of one Agnes Haugen, a female then and there being, the said defendant Richard Martin and Agnes Haugen not being married to each other, and each of them being unmarried.” By exception to the instructions given to the jury, and by motion in arrest of judgment, the appellant attacked the sufficiency of the indictment, and the question thus raised is the principal one upon which a reversal is demanded.
It is said that the indictment does not charge that any one saw the indecent exhibition, or that it was made with the intent that any one should see it, or that the exposure was made under circumstances when it was possible that any one should see it, or that it was in public, or without the consent of the woman named. It is also said that the allegations may be literally true, and yet the appellant and the woman may have been miles apart, and may have been ignorant of one another's presence upon the public road; that defendant may have been entirely alone, or the alleged exhibition may have been in the darkness of night and without evil intent. It is to be conceded that, if this indictment is to be construed with all the technical strictness which mark the earlier authorities, some of the criticisms made upon it might be held well founded. But the technical exactness of the common law, which had its origin at a time when the accused could not be heard by counsel or testify as a witness in his own behalf, has been to a great extent removed by statutory provisions, and by the general tendency of the courts to disregard objections which go to matters of mere form and not of substantial right. Our statute, so far as it is here applicable, provides that the indictment shall be held sufficient if the act charged is “stated in ordinary and concise language with such certainty and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment according to law upon conviction.” Code, § 5289. It also provides that no indictment shall be held insufficient because of any matter “which was formerly deemed a defect or imperfection but which does not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.” Code, § 5290. See, also, State v. Shunka, 116 Iowa, 206, 89 N. W. 977;State v. Fisher, 106 Iowa, 658, 77 N. W. 456;State v. Thompson, 19 Iowa, 299; State v. Johnson, 26 Iowa, 407, 96 Am. Dec. 158. Acting upon this principle, we have uniformly held that an indictment which charges an offense in the language of the statute is sufficient in all cases where the statutory definition states the material facts constituting the unlawful act (State v. Shaw, 35 Iowa, 575; State v. Smith, 46 Iowa, 672; State v. Curran, 51 Iowa, 113, 49 N. W. 1006;State v. Brewer, 53 Iowa, 735, 6 N. W. 62;State v. Whalen, 98 Iowa, 662, 68 N. W. 554;State v. Porter, 105 Iowa, 677, 75 N. W. 519), and the indictment before us follows this rule. That a charge of indecent exposure falls within this class of cases was expressly held by us in State v. Bauguess, 106 Iowa, 107, 76 N. W. 508. The indictment there approved charged that the defendant “did willfully, unlawfully, and designedly make an open, indecent, and obscene exposure of his person in a public place, to wit, at or near Pine street, on the north side of Sixth street, in the city of Fort Madison.” This description is certainly not less general or uncertain than is contained in the indictment before us. No intelligent person reading this charge can have any doubt as to the meaning of the words here employed, and common decency and propriety forbid the setting...
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Ricketts v. State
...a time and place that, as a reasonable man, he knows or should know his act will be open to the observation of others. State v. Martin (Iowa) (125 Iowa 715), 101 N.W. 637; Peyton v. District of Columbia, 100 A.2d 36, By thus labeling indecent exposure a general intent crime, the types of of......
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State v. Peery, 34360.
...The intent, however, may be inferred from the manner of the exposure or from recklessness." This rule is expressed in State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 718, 101 N.W. 637, 638, as follows: "* * * It does not follow * * * that one who uncovers his person in the privacy of his own apartment, or o......
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State v. Jorgensen
...place where, as a reasonable person, he knows, or ought to know, his act is open to the observation of others."4 State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 718, 101 N.W. 637, 638 (1904). This definition presupposes a public exposure as opposed to a private Nothing, however, in the plain language of the......
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Case v. Commonwealth
...Jur. 19. We are of the opinion that the indictment properly charges the offense of indecent exposure at common law. In State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 101 N.W. 637, 638, it is said: "The words `indecent exposure' clearly imply that the act is either in the actual presence and sight of others......