State v. Martin
| Decision Date | 09 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-18-0380-PR,CR-18-0380-PR |
| Citation | 446 P.3d 806,247 Ariz. 101 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Philip John MARTIN, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, O.H. Skinner, Solicitor General, Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, Linley Wilson (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona
Aaron M. Demke, Mohave County Legal Advocate Attorney, Jill L. Evans (argued), Deputy Legal Advocate Attorney, Kingman, Attorneys for Philip John Martin
¶1 Philip John Martin was tried for first-degree murder in 2013, but the jury marked the verdict form "[u]nable to agree" on that charge and instead found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. After successfully appealing that conviction, Martin was retried and convicted of first-degree murder. We hold that double jeopardy barred Martin’s retrial for first-degree murder because the State had a full and fair opportunity to try him on that charge in the first trial and the jury, after full deliberation, refused to convict.
¶2 Martin shot and killed his neighbor with a single shotgun blast as the neighbor approached Martin’s house to speak with him. Martin admitted that he shot his neighbor, contending he believed the victim was armed and coming to harm him after the victim ignored his demands to leave. The State charged Martin with premeditated first-degree murder under A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1).
¶3 At Martin’s first trial for first-degree murder, the trial court provided the jury with a standard instruction on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. See State v. LeBlanc , 186 Ariz. 437, 924 P.2d 441 (1996). The court advised:
You may find the defendant guilty of the less serious crime if all of you agree that the state has failed to prove the defendant guilty of the more serious crime beyond a reasonable doubt, or if after reasonable efforts you are unable to agree unanimously on the more serious crime, and you do all agree that the state has proven the defendant guilty of the less serious crime.
The jury returned the verdict form with the box marked "[u]nable to agree" on the first-degree murder charge but found Martin guilty of second-degree murder. He was sentenced to sixteen years in prison.
¶4 Martin appealed on procedural grounds, and the court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. State v. Martin , No. 1 CA-CR 13-0839, 2014 WL 7277831, at *5 ¶ 19 (Ariz. App. Dec. 23, 2014) (mem. decision).
¶5 Before the second trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion to retry Martin for first-degree murder, over Martin’s objection that doing so would violate double jeopardy. The court ruled that no "implied acquittal" occurred in the first trial, that the jury was genuinely deadlocked, and that the State demonstrated a "manifest necessity" for continuing Martin’s jeopardy for first-degree murder. Therefore, jeopardy did not terminate on the first-degree murder charge. The court expressed its misgivings over the ruling, however, observing that the State had the opportunity to convict Martin of first-degree murder and failed, that the State could not have retried Martin for first-degree murder had he not appealed the second-degree murder conviction, and that by doing so Martin essentially forfeited his sixteen-year sentence and was now exposed to a life sentence by having exercised his appellate rights.
¶6 In the subsequent retrial, the jury found Martin guilty of first-degree murder and the court sentenced him to natural life in prison. The court of appeals affirmed Martin’s conviction and sentence. State v. Martin , 245 Ariz. 42, 46 ¶ 18, 424 P.3d 443, 447 (App. 2018).
¶7 We granted review because whether double jeopardy prevents a retrial on the greater offense in these circumstances presents a recurring question of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. Whether double jeopardy bars retrial is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. State v. Moody , 208 Ariz. 424, 437 ¶ 18, 94 P.3d 1119, 1122 (2004).
¶8 "The constitutional prohibition against ‘double jeopardy’ was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense." Green v. United States , 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) ; see U.S. Const. amend. V (). The protection embraces a defendant’s "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal" wherever possible to prevent prolonged or repeated proceedings. Arizona v. Washington , 434 U.S. 497, 503–04, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). The "general rule" is that the prosecution is entitled to only one complete opportunity to prove the case, but retrial on the same charge may be permissible if the "proceeding is terminated without finally resolving the merits of the charges against the accused." Id. at 505, 98 S.Ct. 824.
¶9 Martin primarily relies on Green v. United States to argue that the first trial fully resolved his guilt on the first-degree murder charge such that the State could only retry him for second-degree murder at his subsequent trial. In Green , the United States Supreme Court barred retrial on a first-degree murder charge after the first jury was silent on that charge but returned a guilty verdict on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, and that conviction was overturned on appeal. 355 U.S. at 186, 198, 78 S.Ct. 221. Martin contends that by checking "[u]nable to agree" on the verdict form here, the jury, as in Green , impliedly acquitted him on the first-degree murder charge, thus preventing retrial on that charge.
¶10 By contrast, the State cites Richardson v. United States for the proposition that "a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause." 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). In Richardson , the Court permitted retrial on two narcotics charges when the jury was unable to reach verdicts and the trial court declared a mistrial on those counts because "a trial court’s declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy." Id. at 318–19, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081. When the jury in Martin’s first trial indicated it was unable to agree on the first-degree murder charge, the State argues, it reflected a hung jury, thus entitling the State to retry that offense.
¶11 We agree with Martin that Green guides the analysis here. The Court observed that it is not "essential that a verdict of guilt or innocence be returned for a defendant to have once been placed in jeopardy so as to bar a second trial on the same charge." Green , 355 U.S. at 188, 78 S.Ct. 221. Granted, the jury in Green was silent on the first-degree murder charge; whereas here it specified that it was "[u]nable to agree." But in Green , as here, there were no unforeseeable circumstances, such as mistrial, that made completion of the first trial impossible. Id. Rather, the jury considered both the greater and lesser offense and "refused to find [the defendant] guilty" of the greater charge. Id. at 190, 78 S.Ct. 221.
¶12 The Court in Green observed that in such circumstances, "the great majority of cases in this country have regarded the jury’s verdict as an implicit acquittal on the charge of first degree murder," but the Court concluded that a finding that jeopardy for first-degree murder terminated upon conviction of the lesser-included offense "need not rest alone" on the implied-acquittal assumption. Id. at 190–91, 78 S.Ct. 221. Rather, jeopardy ended when the jury "was given a full opportunity to return a verdict and no extraordinary circumstances appeared which prevented it from doing so." Id. at 191, 78 S.Ct. 221. Thus, the defendant’s jeopardy for first-degree murder "came to an end when the jury was discharged [after entering a verdict] so that he could not be retried for that offense." Id. The rule of Green is that where the state had a full and fair opportunity to try the defendant on a charge and the jury refused to convict, jeopardy terminates when the jury is dismissed following its verdict, and therefore the state may not place the defendant in jeopardy again for that same charge.
¶13 The Court expressly reaffirmed Green ’s holding in Price v. Georgia , 398 U.S. 323, 329, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970). The Court acknowledged the "concept of continuing jeopardy that has application where criminal proceedings against an accused have not run their full course." Id. at 326, 90 S.Ct. 1757. In Price , the defendant was indicted for murder, and while remaining silent as to the charge of murder, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser-included crime of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 324, 90 S.Ct. 1757. As here, the defendant appealed based on procedural grounds and the conviction was overturned. Id. He was retried for murder and again found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Id. While the Court held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial on the lesser offense as the defendant had successfully appealed the conviction, it stated that "the first verdict, limited as it was to the lesser included offense, required that the retrial be limited to that lesser offense." Id. at 327, 90 S.Ct. 1757.
¶14 The Court further clarified the applicable principles in Arizona v. Washington . In that case, the trial judge declared a mistrial because of defense counsel’s improper remarks during opening statements. 434 U.S. at 498, 98 S.Ct. 824. The Court...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Martin v. Attorney Gen.
...for first-degree murder under the circumstances here violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.” State v. Martin, 446 P.3d 806, 811 (Ariz. 2019). court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded to the trial court to consider “whether to reduce Martin's conv......
- State v. Martin