State v. Martinez-Felix
| Decision Date | 18 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2016-0213,2 CA-CR 2016-0213 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JOSE ISIDRO MARTINEZ-FELIX, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Howard Fell, Judge Pro Tempore
REMANDED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix
By Mariette S. Ambri, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Joel Feinman, Pima County Public Defender
By Abigail Jensen, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Presiding Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Howard1 concurred.
¶1 Following a jury trial, Jose Martinez-Felix was convicted of transportation of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced him to mitigated, concurrent prison terms, the longer of which is three years. On appeal, Martinez-Felix argues the court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a traffic stop of his vehicle because the stop was unlawfully prolonged without reasonable suspicion or consent. For the reasons stated below, we remand this matter for the trial court to determine whether Martinez-Felix's consent was tainted by an unconstitutional prolonged stop.
¶2 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view it in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. State v. Wyman, 197 Ariz. 10, ¶ 2, 3 P.3d 392, 394 (App. 2000). In May 2014, City of Tucson Police Officer Francisco Magos observed a vehicle driven by Martinez-Felix make an "improper left turn." Magos, who was accompanied by Officer Robert Orduno, initiated a traffic stop. As Magos approached the left side of the vehicle and Orduno the right, Martinez-Felix stuck his head out of the driver's window and looked at them with his sunglasses on. When Magos asked for identification, Martinez-Felix, who was "shaking" and "looking all over the place," provided a driver's license from Sinaloa, Mexico. Magos returned to the police car to conduct a records check.
While he did so, Orduno walked around to the driver's side and made "[s]mall talk" with Martinez-Felix. The records check revealed no issues with the license and no warrants.
¶3 Magos returned to the vehicle and asked Martinez-Felix to step out and walk back toward the police car. Once in front of the police car, the two discussed "possible criminal activity" and also engaged in "small talk." At some point, Martinez-Felix consented to a search of his vehicle, and Magos requested that another officer bring his drug-detection dog to the scene to complete an exterior sniff of Martinez-Felix's vehicle. Officer Jason Bentley and his dog arrived "minutes" later, "ten minutes maybe max," according to Orduno. The dog gave a positive alert for the presence of drugs, and the officers eventually found a "golf ball size clear plastic wrap concealing . . . a dark brownish substance," consistent with heroin, under the front-passenger seat. A grand jury indicted Martinez-Felix for transportation of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia.
¶4 Martinez-Felix filed a motion to suppress "all evidence from [his] arrest and seizure," arguing that "it was unreasonable for Officer Magos to infer from his observations, . . . [Martinez-Felix's] left hand turn, and his experience that [Martinez-Felix] was attempting to commit a crime of drug possession." Relying on State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492, 73 P.3d 623 (App. 2003), the state maintained the officers had reasonable suspicion, based on Martinez-Felix's behavior, to conduct a "de minimis post-traffic stop detention" involving a dog sniff. Although the state did not argue in its response that Martinez-Felix had consented to the search, Magos testified at the suppression hearing that he had. Magos admitted, however, that he had failed to include that detail in his written report.
¶5 During oral argument, the trial court observed:
The testimony was that [Martinez-Felix] had given consent to search the vehicle. I don't have anybody here to tell me that's not what happened. [Martinez-Felix is] not here. I've heard no testimony. So I need to rely on the credibility of the witness, which is what Iwill do. But right now there's no evidence before me that he didn't consent . . . .
The court subsequently denied the motion to suppress, explaining that the "officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle" and that "officers do not need an individualized reasonable suspicion of drug related activity before subjecting a vehicle lawfully detained to . . . a dog sniff."
¶6 A few days before trial, Martinez-Felix filed a motion for reconsideration based on the recently decided Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that "a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. The Court reiterated that "[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, 'become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission' of issuing a ticket for the violation." Id., quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) ().
¶7 The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, reasoning that this case was distinguishable from Rodriguez. The court explained:
Based upon his interaction with . . . Martinez-Felix, . . . Officer Magos had reasonable suspicion that Martinez-Felix was concealing criminal behavior. In fact, Officer Magos asked Martinez-Felix if there was anything illegal in his vehicle, to which Martinez-Felix replied, "No, there shouldn't be." It was at that time that the [drug-detection dog] summoned by Officer Magos arrived on scene.
The jury found Martinez-Felix guilty as charged,2 and the court sentenced him as described above. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶8 Martinez-Felix argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He reasons, "Because [the] officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe [he] was engaged in criminal activity, their expansion of the scope of the traffic stop from the investigation of a traffic violation to an investigation of possible drug crimes," including "a dog sniff of his vehicle," violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He also maintains the state failed to show he voluntarily consented to the search. We review a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion if it involves a discretionary issue, but we review purely legal issues de novo. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 62, 94 P.3d 1119, 1140 (2004).
¶9 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 787, 791 (App. 2007). "An investigatory stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment" and, therefore, requires reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed an offense. State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, ¶ 5, 179 P.3d 954, 956 (App. 2008). An officer who has observed a traffic violation has reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop. State v. Kjolsrud, 239 Ariz. 319, ¶ 9, 371 P.3d 647, 650 (App. 2016).
¶10 An investigatory stop, however, is "temporary" and may "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, ¶ 17, 227 P.3d 868, 873 (App. 2010), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). For a traffic stop, "the tolerable duration of police inquiries . . . is determined by the seizure's 'mission'—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and to attend to related safety concerns." Rodriguez, ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S.Ct. at 1614, quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic stop are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Id.
¶11 On-scene investigation, including dog sniffs, into other criminal activity constitutes a "detour" from the mission of the traffic violation. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615-16. "[T]he Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that d[o] not lengthen the roadside detention," but a traffic stop "'become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission' of issuing a [citation or] warning ticket." Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15, quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 (). Upon completion of the mission, an officer "must allow a driver to continue on his way unless (1) the encounter between the driver and the officer becomes consensual, or (2) during the encounter, the officer develops a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, ¶ 17, 227 P.3d at 873.
¶12 Martinez-Felix concedes that the officers "had reasonable suspicion to stop [him] for an illegal left turn." Accordingly, it was reasonable for the officers to make contact with Martinez-Felix, request his identification, and perform a records check. See Rodriguez, ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615; see also Kjolsrud, 239 Ariz. 319, ¶ 11, 371 P.3d at 651.
¶13 The parties, however, dispute what occurred after the records check. Martinez-Felix maintains that Magos unlawfully prolonged the stop by "convert[ing] the purpose . . . into a drug investigation" without any new reasonable...
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