State v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 20 March 2019
• Docket Number: NO. PD-0878-17,PD-0878-17
• Citation: 570 S.W.3d 278
• Parties: The STATE of Texas v. Juan MARTINEZ, Jr., Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

570 S.W.3d 278

The STATE of Texas

v.Juan MARTINEZ, Jr., Appellee

NO. PD-0878-17

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Delivered: March 20, 2019

Patrick Overman, Julie Balovich, Bee County Regional Public Defender, Beeville, TX, for Juan Martinez, Jr.

Edward F. Shaughnessy III, Attorney at Law, San Antonio, TX, Stacey Soule, State’s Attorney, Austin, TX, for State of Texas.

OPINION

Walker, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Keasler, Hervey, Richardson, Keel, and Slaughter, JJ., joined.

After Appellee, Juan Martinez, Jr., was indicted for intoxication manslaughter, he filed a motion to suppress challenging the State's seizure and search of vials of his blood which were previously drawn at a hospital for medical purposes. The trial court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. Because, under the facts of this case, Appellee has a privacy interest in the private facts contained in his blood and because the State's acquisition and subsequent testing of the blood went beyond the scope of the hospital's blood draw, Appellee's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, and the trial court correctly granted his motion to suppress. The judgment of the court of appeals, upholding the grant, is affirmed.

I — The Motion to Suppress

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard of review. Lerma v. State , 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ; Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Under this bifurcated standard:

The trial court is given almost complete deference in its determination of historical facts, especially if those are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor. The same deference is afforded the trial court with respect to its rulings on application of the law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. However, for mixed questions of law and fact that do not fall within that category, a reviewing court may conduct a de novo review.

Crain v. State , 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Additionally, we review de novo questions of law, such as whether particular historical facts give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

In this case, Appellee was involved in a traffic accident. He was taken to a hospital where his blood was drawn for medical purposes. The State later acquired and tested the blood, both without a warrant. Appellee filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the blood was obtained in violation of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and through an improper use of the grand jury subpoena process. Appellee also argued that the acquisition and testing of the blood violated a laundry list of constitutional and statutory rights, including the protections against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. A hearing was held, and the trial court granted Appellee's motion to suppress. The trial court made the following findings of historical fact, to which we defer:

1. On February 5, 2014, Juan Martinez was transported, by ambulance, from the scene of a traffic accident to Christus Spohn Hospital in Beeville, Texas. The Defendant was not under arrest.

2. Nurse Gary Calloway testified that, upon arrival to the hospital, "trauma procedures" were begun on the Defendant which included the taking of blood from the Defendant by the nurse for medical purposes. The Defendant was conscious during the blood draw, though not entirely coherent. There was testimony that Defendant's blood, as contained in the hospital vials, ceased to metabolize or change and that the passage of time would not change the results of a test on the drawn blood.

3. Nurse Calloway testified that, during the course of the "trauma procedures" Defendant became aware of his blood being drawn and was informed of the need for a urine sample. Defendant told the nurse he could not afford any tests and needed to leave the hospital as his daughter was out in the parking lot. Defendant removed all monitors and IV's, got dressed and ran out of the hospital.

4. Trooper Quiroga testified that he arrived at the hospital shortly before the defendant left; however, the Trooper was unaware the defendant was running away from the hospital and did not have the opportunity to speak with the defendant before he fled. At no time was the defendant placed under arrest.

5. Hospital staff told Trooper Quiroga that they had Defendant's blood. Trooper Quiroga testified that he told the hospital not to destroy the blood and proceeded to obtain a Grand Jury Subpoena from the Bee County District Attorneys' Office to gain possession of Defendants' blood.

6. Upon presentation of the Grand Jury Subpoena, the Hospital released Defendant's blood (four vials of blood) to an agent of The Department of Public Safety, Trooper Keese. The Hospital's representative testified as to their lab procedures and stated that the Hospital had no policy in place to show a chain of custody on the vials of blood. There was no documentation as to the chain of custody for the vials of blood while in the Hospital's care and control. It was testified to that the blood was not tested by the Hospital and there were no medical records indicating a test of the drawn blood.

7. Upon receipt of the vials of Defendant's blood, Trooper Keese immediately placed it in a DPS box (standard DPS blood kit) and mailed it, using the U.S. Postal Service, to the DPS lab in Austin, Texas for testing.

Order on Def.'s Mot. to Suppress, Clerk's R. 8, 8–9. The trial court's written conclusions of law stated:

1. The Court finds the seizure of the Defendant's blood from the Hospital and subsequent search of that blood by the DPS lab constitute a search and seizure within the scope of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution.

2. The initial seizure of Juan Martinez's blood from the Hospital by the State using a Grand Jury Subpoena was a valid seizure. However,

3. The search of the blood was performed without the necessary search warrant. The blood had been drawn and was no longer subject to mutation or metabolization. Further, the blood was in the possession of the DPS and not subject to destruction. There were no exigent circumstances to justify a search of the blood without a warrant.

4. The search of the blood, and the subsequent blood test results, are found to be inadmissible at this time.

Id. at 10 (emphasis in original). The State appealed the ruling, arguing that the trial court's decision was contrary to our opinion in State v. Huse and that the State's acquisition and testing of the blood did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. State v. Martinez , 534 S.W.3d 97, 100 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburgh 2017). The court of appeals disagreed with the State and upheld the trial court's ruling, holding that the warrantless search of Appellee's blood sample violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 102. We granted the State's petition for discretionary review, which claimed that:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court properly granted the defendant/appellee's motion to suppress evidence that revealed the results of testing of the blood of the defendant/appellee.

II — The Fourth Amendment

Under the Fourth Amendment, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment is about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person's private effects. Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 345, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) ; State v. Rodriguez , 521 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A claim that the Fourth Amendment was violated may be based on a trespass theory of search, where one's own personal effects have been trespassed, or a privacy theory of search, where one's own expectation of privacy was breached. Rodriguez , 521 S.W.3d at 9 ; Ford v. State , 477 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Under the privacy theory, a person has standing to contend that a search or seizure was unreasonable if (1) he has a subjective expectation of privacy in the place or object searched, and (2) society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable or legitimate. Ford , 477 S.W.3d at 328 ; State v. Granville , 423 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

III — Comeaux , Hardy , and Huse

Before the court of appeals, the State argued that our decisions in State v. Hardy and State v. Huse dictated that Appellee could have no expectation of privacy subject to Fourth Amendment protection in the vials containing samples of blood. Martinez , 534 S.W.3d at 100 (quoting and construing State's argument based on State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), and State v. Huse , 491 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ). The court of appeals, however, found those cases distinguishable and instead relied upon an earlier plurality opinion, State v. Comeaux . Id. at 101 (discussing State v. Comeaux , 818 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ). Finding Comeaux persuasive, the court of appeals held that the State's testing of Appellee's blood constituted a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, and a warrant was required before the State could test it. Id. at 102.

Before this Court, the State argues that both the trial court and the court of appeals failed to adequately take into account Hardy and Huse . The State also contends that the court of appeals improperly relied upon Comeaux , which the State claims is inapplicable because it...