State v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 09 January 2019
• Docket Number: NO. PD-0324-17,PD-0324-17
• Citation: 569 S.W.3d 621
• Parties: The STATE of Texas v. Roger Anthony MARTINEZ, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

569 S.W.3d 621

The STATE of Texas

v.Roger Anthony MARTINEZ, Appellee

NO. PD-0324-17

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Delivered: January 9, 2019

OPINION

Walker, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Appellee, Roger Anthony Martinez, filed a motion to suppress challenging the legality of his arrest for public intoxication. The motion was granted by the trial court, and the court of appeals affirmed. Because there was probable cause to arrest Appellee for public intoxication, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.

I — The Motion to Suppress

After Appellee was arrested for public intoxication without a warrant, he filed a motion to suppress. As we stated over thirty years ago in Russell v. State :

When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence on the basis of a Fourth Amendment violation, this Court has placed the burden of proof initially upon the defendant. As the movant in a motion to suppress evidence, a defendant must produce evidence that defeats the presumption of proper police conduct and therefore shifts the burden of proof to the State. A defendant meets his initial burden of proof by establishing that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant.

Once a defendant has established 1) that a search or seizure occurred and 2) that no warrant was obtained, the burden of proof shifts to the State. If the State produces evidence of a warrant, the burden of proof is shifted back to the defendant to show the invalidity of the warrant. If the State is unable to produce evidence of a warrant, then it must prove the reasonableness of the search or seizure.

Russell v. State , 717 S.W.2d 7, 9–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (citations omitted), disavowed on other grounds by Handy v. State , 189 S.W.3d 296, 299 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

In the case before us, it was undisputed that Appellee was arrested without a warrant. Indeed, at the beginning of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State readily acknowledged that it had the burden.¹ Thus, the burden shifted to the State to prove that the arrest fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ; Russell , 717 S.W.2d at 9.

To satisfy its burden, the State tried to show that Appellee was committing the offense of public intoxication, apparently relying upon the exception for offenses committed in the presence of the police. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) ("A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view."). The State presented the testimony of Officers Guerrero and Ramirez that they saw facts constituting the offense of public intoxication: that Appellee was in a public place, that Appellee was intoxicated, and that Appellee posed a danger to himself or others.

Toward the end of the State's closing argument, the trial court interrupted, disagreeing with the State's reference to the "arresting officers."² Next, during Appellee's closing argument, counsel continued on that front and began by focusing on the fact that Officer Quinn, who physically arrested Appellee, did not testify. Defense counsel argued that Appellee's right to confront his accusers was being violated. Defense counsel also contended that the State failed to show that Appellee was a danger to himself or others.

As the State was about to begin its rebuttal argument, the trial court asked whether Officer Quinn would testify at trial. The trial court also asked the State to again confirm that only Officer Quinn arrested Appellee.

After closing arguments, the trial court quoted from article 14.01(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ; informed the parties that it looked at cases discussing article 14.01(b) ;³ and concluded that article 14.01(b) appeared to be limited to the officer who made the arrest, Officer Quinn. Because the trial court believed there was no evidence showing whether Officer Quinn had knowledge of sufficient facts to constitute probable cause, the trial court granted Appellee's motion to suppress.

On appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling due to a lack of direct evidence about Officer Quinn's observations of Appellee's intoxication or what, if anything, the testifying officers, Guerrero and Ramirez, told Quinn about their own observations of Appellee's intoxication. State v. Martinez , No. 13-15-00069-CR, 2015 WL 5797604 at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 1, 2015) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( Martinez I ), vacated , No. PD-1337-15, 2016 WL 7234085 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2016) (plurality op.) (not designated for publication) ( Martinez II ). We vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded to that court because probable cause can be shown by circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and a finding of probable cause did not necessarily depend on direct evidence about Officer Quinn's observations or what the testifying officers told him about their observations of Appellee's intoxication. Martinez II , 2016 WL 7234085 at *6, *8. We instructed the court of appeals to abate the appeal for supplemental findings from the trial court. Id. at *8.

The trial court, accordingly, made those supplemental findings, and it concluded, again, that Officer Quinn did not have probable cause to arrest Appellee for public intoxication. The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Martinez , No. 13-15-00069-CR, 2017 WL 2200298 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 16, 2017, pet. granted) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( Martinez III ). The State filed another petition for discretionary review, and we granted review on both grounds:

1. The Court of Appeals erroneously decided an important question of state law in a way that conflicts with the applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals, by finding that the knowledge of supporting officers cannot be used to establish probable cause.

2. The Court of Appeals failed to conduct the required de novo review of whether the evidence known to Officer Quinn was sufficient to establish probable cause and that failure constitutes a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that calls for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals' power of supervision.

We conclude that consideration of the first ground resolves the probable cause question. Under the facts of this case, Officer Quinn's knowledge is not determinative. Whatever his knowledge of the facts may have been, that information, in combination with the knowledge of Officers Guerrero and Ramirez, showed probable cause to arrest Appellee for public intoxication.

II — Probable Cause Can Be Established Without Officer Quinn

In support of the first ground for review, the State argues that the "collective knowledge" doctrine applies in this case, and the knowledge of both Officers Guerrero and Ramirez should be added to the knowledge of Officer Quinn (which is unknown). The State contends that the sum total of the knowledge of all three officers would add up to probable cause, and the arrest should be upheld. Appellee's initial response is that the applicability of the collective knowledge doctrine is not before the Court, because it was not explicitly part of our prior opinion remanding this matter to the court of appeals. Appellee points out that our opinion on first submission faulted the lower courts for failing to consider whether circumstantial evidence of Officer Quinn's knowledge could amount to probable cause, and we remanded "for supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this opinion." Martinez II , 2016 WL 7234085 at *8. While it is true that our opinion, remanding this case to the court of appeals, did not direct that court to address the collective knowledge issue, the State nevertheless raised it as an issue on remand, and the court of appeals considered and rejected the State's argument. See Martinez III , 2017 WL 2200298 at *5 (rejecting the State's collective knowledge argument, which at that time relied upon Willis and Astran ).⁴ Additionally, in its current petition for discretionary review, the State's argument in favor of review on the first ground asserted that the court of appeals erred by failing to take into account the collective knowledge doctrine. State's Pet. for Discretionary Review at 21–23. That first ground was granted review by this Court, and, even though it was not part of our prior opinion remanding this case, the issue has been addressed by the court of appeals, is before us now, and should be addressed.

In Woodward v. State , we held "that when there has been some cooperation between law enforcement agencies or between members of the same agency, the sum of the information known to the cooperating agencies or officers at the time of an arrest or search by any of the officers involved is to be considered in determining whether there was sufficient probable cause therefor." Woodward v. State , 668 S.W.2d 337, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on reh'g). In other words, under this "collective knowledge" doctrine, when several officers are cooperating, their cumulative information may be considered in assessing reasonable suspicion or probable cause. State v. Duran , 396 S.W.3d 563, 569 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ; see also Illinois v. Andreas , 463 U.S. 765, 771–72 n.5, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983) ("where law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation, ... the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all"). The State argues that the collective knowledge doctrine applies in this case because the arresting officer, Officer Quinn, is clearly cooperating with Officers Guerrero and Ramirez.

Appellee argues that communication is key to the collective knowledge doctrine, and, because there is no evidence that either Officer Guerrero or Officer Ramirez communicated with Officer Quinn before the arrest, the...