State v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 25 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-36069,A-1-CA-36069 |
| Citation | 450 P.3d 405 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Liborio MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Marko D. Hananel, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
Law Offices of Adrianne R. Turner, Adrianne R. Turner, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant
{1} Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Defendant Liborio Martinez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence discovered after he was stopped for speeding. On appeal, Defendant argues that police engaged in an illegal search of his vehicle when Officer Anthony Perez: (1) opened the door of Defendant’s vehicle; and (2) broke "the plane of the car" and entered the vehicle, transforming the traffic stop into a search that required a warrant. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court erred in concluding that Officer Perez’s actions of opening Defendant’s door was not a search that required a warrant. We therefore reverse.
{2} Defendant’s conviction stems from a traffic stop initiated by Officer Perez. After observing Defendant driving ten miles per hour over the speed limit, Officer Perez made a U-turn, pulled behind Defendant’s vehicle, and activated his emergency lights. Defendant failed to pull over for a "couple miles" over the course of approximately two minutes, prompting Officer Perez to call for assistance. During this time, Defendant did not noticeably increase his speed or take any action to indicate he sought to flee from Officer Perez. Instead, Defendant appeared to maintain his speed and only increased or decreased his speed according to the flow of traffic in front of his car.
{3} After Defendant pulled over, Officer Perez exited his vehicle and walked toward the rear passenger’s side of Defendant’s car. Officer Perez testified that as he approached Defendant’s vehicle, he was unable to see whether anyone was in the back because although it was daylight, the rear window was "dark." Officer Perez approached the front passenger’s side window and was able to see through that window. The window was not rolled all the way down and he testified that he had a "narrow" point of view. Through that window, however, he could see Defendant holding a cell phone in one hand and trying to light a cigar or a cigarette with the other.
{4} As he approached Defendant’s passenger’s side window, Officer Perez lowered his head to look inside Defendant’s vehicle and initiated the following exchange:
Approximately four seconds elapsed from the time Officer Perez lowered his head to look inside the vehicle and the verbal exchange described above was completed. Three seconds into the exchange, as Defendant said "Hey," but before he asked "how’s it going," Officer Perez opened the front passenger’s side door of Defendant’s vehicle. Officer Perez testified that he opened Defendant’s door so as to speak with Defendant and prevent him from possibly fleeing. Officer Perez testified that he was unsure why Defendant failed to stop and was initially concerned that Defendant might drive away while Officer Perez was outside of his patrol vehicle.
{5} After about twenty seconds of standing outside Defendant’s car with the front passenger’s side door open, Officer Perez asked Defendant if he had been drinking. Defendant responded that he had not, to which Officer Perez responded that he could smell alcohol. Officer Perez testified that he first noticed an odor of alcohol after he opened the car door. Defendant stated, "Perhaps it’s the beer in here," to which Officer Perez asked, "Where is it?" Officer Perez observed an unopened bottle of beer in the back seat, instructed Defendant to exit the vehicle, initiated a DWI investigation, and arrested him. Defendant was charged with speeding, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-301 (2015), and aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(D)(1) (2010, amended 2016).
{6} Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the magistrate court denied. Defendant was found guilty of aggravated DWI and appealed to the district court. Defendant filed a motion to suppress in the district court, arguing that Officer Perez’s conduct in opening Defendant’s door as well as his conduct of entering the vehicle amounted to searches, both of which required a warrant. The district court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appealed to this Court pursuant to a conditional guilty plea to the DWI charge, which reserved his right to appeal "any suppression motions[.]"
{7} "[A]ppeals from magistrate courts are de novo." State v. Foster , 2003-NMCA-099, ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 224, 75 P.3d 824 ; see NMSA 1978, § 35-13-2(A) (1996) (). "In a de novo appeal, ... a district court conducts a new trial as if the trial in the lower court had not occurred." Foster , 2003-NMCA-099, ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 224, 75 P.3d 824. When a party raises a pretrial motion in a de novo appeal, the district court "is to make an independent determination of the merits of the motion." City of Farmington v. Piñon-Garcia , 2013-NMSC-046, ¶ 9, 311 P.3d 446.
{8} Our "review of a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of fact and law." State v. Rowell , 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "We review the contested facts in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party and defer to the factual findings of the district court if substantial evidence exists to support those findings." Id. "[W]e then review de novo the [district] court’s application of law to the facts to determine whether the search or seizure were reasonable." State v. Leyva , 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861.
{9} The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, "searches and seizures must be reasonable." State v. Bond , 2011-NMCA-036, ¶ 11, 150 N.M. 451, 261 P.3d 599. "Warrantless searches [and seizures] are presumed to be unreasonable" and "[t]he [s]tate bears the burden of proving ... reasonable[ness]." Id. ¶ 11. We note that Defendant does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop. See Leyva , 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 31, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861 (). Rather, Defendant argues Officer Perez’s conduct in opening Defendant’s car door was a search requiring either a warrant or justification under an exception to the warrant requirement.
{10} The State argues that opening Defendant’s car door did not transform a lawful detention into a search that required a warrant, relying on State v. Simpson , 2016-NMCA-070, 388 P.3d 277. In Simpson , an officer received a report that a male who smelled of alcohol entered a restaurant, passed out in the restroom, left the restaurant, got into a dark blue car, moved the car from one parking space to another, and in so doing, almost struck several other vehicles in the parking lot. Id. ¶ 3.
{11} The officer arrived at the parking lot and approached a dark blue vehicle with "very dark tinted windows[,]" which he confirmed was the "correct vehicle." Id. ¶ 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the dark tint prevented the officer from seeing inside the car or determining whether it was occupied, he walked to the driver’s side window, which was cracked a couple of inches, knocked on the car window, waited for a response to no avail, and saw a female in the passenger seat and a man in the back seat. Id. ¶¶ 4, 24. "There was nobody in the driver’s seat, so there was no one to open the driver’s side window, and because of the dark tinted windows, [the officer] could not see inside the vehicle to determine what the occupants were doing." Id. ¶ 4. The officer believed "the safest way to make contact with the occupants was to open the driver’s side door." Id.
{12} A divided panel of this Court held that the officer’s "conduct in opening the [defendant’s car] door did not transform his lawful investigative detention into a search that required a warrant[.]" Id. ¶ 20. Relying on State v. Lovato , 1991-NMCA-083, 112 N.M. 517, 817 P.2d 251, the majority concluded that "[u]nder all the circumstances confronting [the officer], this safety precaution was reasonable and permissible under the governing law." Simpson , 2016-NMCA-070, ¶ 22, 388 P.3d 277. Also, citing State v. Cobbs , 1985-NMCA-105, 103 N.M. 623, 711 P.2d 900, the majority explained that "even when an officer is merely investigating a traffic offense, he faces an inordinate risk when he approaches a subject seated in an automobile[,]" and the officer may therefore "take reasonable safety precautions while conducting investigatory detentions[.]" Simpson , 2016-NMCA-070, ¶ 23, 388 P.3d 277 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{13} Our review of Simpson and the cases it cites reveals that the common concern raised in each of those cases was officer safety. In Lovato , this Court concluded it was not unreasonable for officers to open a car door after they received a report of a drive-by shooting, they pulled over a car they believed to be the car described in the report, their visibility was limited because of the late hour, they believed that either the occupants were armed or that there was a firearm in the vehicle, three people exited the vehicle from the front and two people exited from the back, and the officers were unsure whether another occupant was lying on...
To continue reading
Request your trial