City of Farmington v. Piñon–Garcia

• Decision Date: 19 September 2013
• Docket Number: 33,676.,Nos. 33,650,s. 33,650
• Citation: 311 P.3d 446
• Parties: CITY OF FARMINGTON, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Juan A. PIÑON–GARCIA, Defendant–Petitioner. and City of Farmington, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. Juan A. PiÑon–Garcia, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

311 P.3d 446

CITY OF FARMINGTON, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Juan A. PIÑON–GARCIA, Defendant–Petitioner.andCity of Farmington, Plaintiff–Petitioner,

v.Juan A. PiÑon–Garcia, Defendant–Respondent.

Nos. 33,650, 33,676.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept. 19, 2013.

Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender, Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner and Respondent.

Jennifer Nicole Breakell, City of Farmington, Farmington, NM, for Respondent and Petitioner.

OPINION

CHÁVEZ, Justice.

{1} In this case, we discuss the appropriate review by a district court of a municipal court's pretrial dismissal of a criminal complaint because the government's key witness failed to appear for the scheduled trial. Because the right of appeal from courts not of record is the right to a trial or hearing de novo in district court, N.M. Const. Art. VI, § 27; State v. Hicks, 1986–NMCA–129, ¶ 6, 105 N.M. 286, 731 P.2d 982, we conclude that the district court must make an independent determination of the merits of the pretrial motion, id.;State v. Foster, 2003–NMCA–099, ¶ 19, 134 N.M. 224, 75 P.3d 824.

{2} If district courts are not permitted to review a lower court's grant or denial of potentially dispositive pretrial motions on appeal, the power of lower courts to grant relief when constitutional safeguards and proceduralrules, such as speedy trial, double jeopardy, or discovery rules, are violated would be meaningless. In addition, parties in courts of limited jurisdiction who believe they are entitled to a dispositive order as a remedy for a constitutional or procedural violation would effectively be deprived of the safeguards of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions and our procedural rules if a district court's de novo review of the lower court's ruling are bypassed in favor of a trial de novo on the underlying complaint.

{3} In this case, the district court rejected Juan Piñon–Garcia's (Piñon–Garcia) request for it to review a municipal court dismissal for an abuse of discretion. The district court also declined to independently consider Piñon–Garcia's motion to dismiss because the court believed it was compelled to proceed directly to a trial de novo. The Court of Appeals reversed on this issue. We affirm the Court of Appeals on the second issue and reverse the district court, remanding for its independent consideration of the motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

{4} In January 2009, Piñon–Garcia was arrested and charged in Farmington Municipal Court with three traffic offenses in violation of Farmington municipal ordinances. Piñon–Garcia pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the pretrial conference held on March 19, 2009, the municipal court entered an order scheduling a trial for May 5, 2009. On the notice of trial setting and order to appear, the municipal court ordered the arresting officer, Virgil Todacheeney (Officer Todacheeney), to appear at the trial, stating that if he did not appear, a warrant would be issued for his arrest.

{5} On the scheduled trial date, the municipal court granted Piñon–Garcia's pretrial motion to dismiss all three charges, including a DWI charge, because Officer Todacheeney, who was the only witness to observe Piñon–Garcia driving and who administered Piñon–Garcia's breath alcohol test, did not appear. The City of Farmington (the City) appealed only the dismissal of the DWI charge to the district court for a trial de novo. During a pretrial hearing before the district court, Piñon–Garcia moved to dismiss the appeal, or alternatively to affirm the municipal court's dismissal of the charges. He argued that under State v. Candelaria, 2008–NMCA–120, ¶¶ 12, 15, 144 N.M. 797, 192 P.3d 792, the district court must review the dismissal for an abuse of discretion. The district court denied Piñon–Garcia's motion, stating in its order:

It is undisputed that the officer who arrested the Defendant for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs did not appear for trial below in the Farmington Municipal Court on May 5, 2009. Upon Defendant's oral motion to dismiss at that time, the municipal court judge dismissed the charges against the Defendant with prejudice. The parties agree that for constitutional purposes, jeopardy had not attached.

The district court concluded that New Mexico Constitution Article VI, Section 27 precluded it from reviewing the municipal court order for an abuse of discretion, but rather required the district court to hold a trial de novo.

{6} A trial de novo was held in district court, and this time Officer Todacheeney appeared and testified. Piñon–Garcia was convicted of a first offense, non-aggravated DWI. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the district court should have reviewed the municipal court's order of dismissal for an abuse of discretion. City of Farmington v. Pinon–Garcia, 2012–NMCA–079, ¶¶ 4, 6, 284 P.3d 1086.

{7} The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the district court for a de novo review of the propriety of the municipal court's dismissal before proceeding to a trial de novo. Id. ¶¶ 1, 7. Both parties filed petitions for certiorari, which we granted. On appeal to this Court, Piñon–Garcia continues to assert that rulings by a municipal court pursuant to its inherent authority should be reviewed on appeal by the district court for abuse of discretion. The City argues that we should reverse the Court of Appeals because the district court conducted a proper de novo review of the municipal court's order of dismissal. The City also asks this Court to set forth specific guidelinesfor a district court's de novo review of pretrial motions.

AUTHORITY OF MUNICIPAL COURTS

{8} “Each municipal court has jurisdiction over all offenses and complaints under ordinances of the municipality and may issue subpoenas and warrants and punish for contempt.” NMSA 1978, § 35–14–2(A) (1988). In addition, we have promulgated the Rules of Procedure for the Municipal Courts that govern the practice in those courts. SeeRules 8–101 to 8–802 NMRA. As part of these rules, we have (1) empowered municipal court judges to sanction parties for the violation of discovery orders, which includes the authority to dismiss a case, Rule 8–504(F)(5) (such other order as it deems appropriate); (2) explained their contempt power, Rule 8–110; and (3) authorized municipal judges to dismiss with prejudice a complaint or a citation filed against an individual if that person is not brought to trial within the time limits of our rules, Rule 8–506(E). Municipal court judges also must uphold the Constitutions of the United States and the State of New Mexico. N.M. Const. art. XX, § 1.

APPEALS FROM MUNICIPAL COURTS TO DISTRICT COURTS CALL FOR HEARINGS OR TRIALS DE NOVO

{9} The final judgments and decisions of a municipal court may be appealed to the district court for a trial de novo. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 27 (“Appeals shall be allowed in all cases from the final judgments and decisions of ... inferior courts to the district courts, and in all such appeals, trial shall be had de novo unless otherwise provided by law.”). In a de novo appeal, the general rule is that a district court conducts a new trial as if the trial in the lower court had not occurred. NMSA 1978, § 39–3–1 (1955) (“All appeals from inferior tribunals to the district courts shall be tried anew in said courts on their merits, as if no trial had been had below, except as otherwise provided by law.” (emphasis added)); State v. Trujillo, 1999–NMCA–003, ¶ 4, 126 N.M. 603, 973 P.2d 855. However, when raised by a party, district courts also consider pretrial motions in de novo appeals. Foster, 2003–NMCA–099, ¶ 11, 134 N.M. 224, 75 P.3d 824 (quoting Rule 5–601(B) NMRA (“Any defense [, objection or request] which is capable of determination without a trial on the merits may be raised before trial by motion.”)). The duty of the district court, when a party raises a pretrial motion in a de novo appeal, is to make an independent determination of the merits of the motion. Foster, 2003–NMCA–099, ¶ 19, 134 N.M. 224, 75 P.3d 824;Hicks, 1986–NMCA–129, ¶ 6, 105 N.M. 286, 731 P.2d 982.

{10} For example, in Foster, the defendant was tried in magistrate court, a court not of record, on a charge of aggravated DWI. 2003–NMCA–099, ¶¶ 1, 3, 75 P.3d 824. During the trial, defense counsel posed a question to a witness that resulted in the magistrate court judge granting a mistrial to the state. Id. ¶ 3. The following day, the state asked the judge to enter an order finding manifest necessity for the mistrial so that the defendant could be retried. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7. Over the defendant's objection, the magistrate court judge granted the state's motion. Id. ¶ 3. The defendant was subsequently tried and convicted. Id. ¶ 4. He appealed to the district court for a trial de novo and filed a pretrial motion with the district court to dismiss the complaint on double jeopardy grounds because there was not manifest necessity for granting the mistrial. Id. ¶¶ 3, 4;see State v. Martinez, 1995–NMSC–064, ¶ 8, 120 N.M. 677, 905 P.2d 715 (stating that when a mistrial is granted over the defendant's objection, retrial is not barred if the court finds manifest necessity). The district court denied the defendant's motion because it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review events that transpired in magistrate court. Foster, 2003–NMCA–099, ¶ 5, 134 N.M. 224, 75 P.3d 824.

{11} On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court to independently review, de novo, the merits of the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. The Foster court cited several cases as examples of a district court's jurisdiction to review the merits of motions filed in lower courts. Id. ¶ 11 (citing “[ State v.] Wilson, 1998–NMCA–084, ¶ 20, 125 N.M. 390, 962 P.2d 636 (remanding to district court for hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation in magistrate court); State v....