State v. Martinson
| Decision Date | 16 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. C1-96-1947,C1-96-1947 |
| Citation | 581 N.W.2d 846 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. Daniel Thomas MARTINSON, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
During a consensual encounter with an arriving passenger, airport narcotics officers developed an objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a brief investigatory Terry stop of the passenger and the passenger's luggage for the purpose of allowing a narcotics dog to smell the luggage.
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Paul R. Kempainen, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for Appellant.
John M. Stuart, Minnesota State Public Defender, Chad M. Oldfather, Timothy C. Rank, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, for Respondent.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
This case arises from the detention and arrest of Daniel Thomas Martinson who was charged with six counts of drug possession and trafficking offenses. Martinson filed a motion to suppress the drugs seized as a result of his detention and arrest. The trial court denied Martinson's pretrial suppression motion, and Martinson waived a jury trial and allowed the trial court to decide the case on the basis of stipulated facts. The trial court found Martinson guilty of a first-degree controlled substance crime and sentenced him to 54 months in prison. 1 The court of appeals reversed Martinson's conviction in an unpublished opinion because it believed the trial court erred in denying the suppression motion. Concluding that the district court did not err in denying Martinson's motion, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate Martinson's conviction.
The following are the facts as stipulated. On June 2, 1995, several narcotics officers were observing passengers arriving at the Minneapolis/St. Paul Airport from Las Vegas, Nevada in the baggage claim area because the officers knew from past experience that passengers coming from this city had often been found in possession of drugs. Before this date, none of the officers knew anything about Martinson, nor did they have any reason to suspect or target him because they had no reason to expect his arrival at the airport.
Officer Staber first noticed Martinson as he was coming down the escalator to the baggage claim area because he was "carrying a duffel bag with a shoulder strap over his shoulder very tightly, almost like a football." Staber then noticed that Martinson did not stop at Carousel 14 where the checked luggage from Martinson's plane was arriving and assumed that Martinson was leaving the airport and only had carry-on luggage. Staber testified that he continued to watch Martinson because one of the things that drug enforcement officers watch for is people who travel with only carry-on luggage. Staber watched as Martinson paused in the area of Carousel 12, went to the restroom, and then returned to the area of Carousel 14 to wait for his luggage. Staber noted that Martinson seemed "agitated" and "upset" and did not "remain in one place" but paced around the carousel unlike the other passengers.
When Martinson's luggage arrived, Staber saw that Martinson retrieved one hard-sided bag that measured approximately 2 1/2 feet X 1 foot X 8 inches and had wheels and a handle. Staber found this "unusual" because the bag was small enough to be carried on the plane. Based on these observations, Staber and Officer Giller approached Martinson. Staber displayed his badge and identification and told Martinson that he was a member of the Airport Narcotics Interdiction Unit and asked Martinson if he could speak with him. Staber told Martinson that he was not under arrest or being detained. Staber asked Martinson where he was coming from, and Martinson first said Arizona, then corrected himself and said Las Vegas. Martinson had actually flown to Minneapolis from Phoenix, via Las Vegas. Staber then asked to see Martinson's airline ticket. Martinson began removing a Northwest Airlines ticket folder from his duffel bag, but then pushed that ticket folder back into the duffel bag and removed an America West ticket folder from a different pocket on the duffel bag. The America West ticket was a one-way ticket paid for in cash from Phoenix to Minneapolis, via Las Vegas. Staber stated that, in his experience, most drug carriers travel using one-way tickets paid for in cash.
Staber asked Martinson for some identification and Martinson produced a certified copy of his birth certificate. Martinson did not have photo identification or any other identification with his address on it, which Staber found "unusual," although photo identification was not required for airline travel at that time. Staber then asked to see the Northwest Airlines ticket folder, and it contained a one-way ticket from Minneapolis to Phoenix dated May 31, 1995--just two days earlier. Both airline tickets and the birth certificate had consistent information with regard to Martinson's identification, except the America West ticket misspelled his name "Martanson". Staber asked Martinson the purpose for his trip to Arizona, and Martinson stated that he had gone for a job interview. Staber found the ticket situation suspicious because he assumed that it would have been more economical to purchase a round-trip ticket and because, in his experience drug couriers often travel and return on different airlines to conceal their travel itineraries.
Staber then asked Martinson if he would consent to a search of his luggage, and Martinson refused, putting the strap of his duffel bag over his shoulder and "look[ing] as if he was about to walk away." At this point, Staber informed Martinson that he was being detained until a narcotics dog could examine his luggage. There was a dog present at the airport, and it normally only takes a few minutes for the dog to arrive once the radio request is made. Staber admitted that at this point he did not have probable cause to arrest Martinson.
Martinson asked if he could have a cigarette while waiting for the dog to arrive, and Staber and Officer Tyndall escorted him outside so that he could smoke, while Officer Giller remained with the luggage. Once outside, Martinson asked why he had been stopped, and Staber told him that they looked for passengers with certain characteristics who denied permission to search luggage. Staber also told Martinson that they were not interested in people carrying small amounts of drugs for personal use. At this point, Martinson pulled up his pants leg and removed a small syringe from his sock and handed it to Staber. Staber asked what the syringe was for, and Martinson replied, "I just got into this shit." Martinson then pulled out a small glass vial from his pants pocket, stating that it was "crystal meth."
Staber then told Martinson that he was under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. Martinson then threw the vial and attempted to run but was subdued and arrested. While these events were taking place outside the airport, the narcotics dog had arrived and Giller indicated the two pieces of luggage to be examined by the dog. The dog noted the presence of controlled substances in the duffel bag, but did not get to inspect the hard-sided bag because of the scuffle outside with Martinson. The officers inside went outside to the area of the scuffle, leaving Martinson's bags unattended for an undetermined amount of time. None of the officers know for sure if the dog ever sniffed the hard-sided bag.
After Martinson's arrest, Staber applied for and obtained a search warrant for both of the bags. The application for the search warrant noted the dog's positive alert to the presence of a controlled substance. Staber found nothing illegal in the duffel bag, but found 1000 grams of cocaine and 297 grams of methamphetamine in the hard-sided bag.
Martinson filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during his detention and arrest on the basis that the evidence was unconstitutionally obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. A Rasmussen hearing was held in which the trial court denied Martinson's motion and determined that the evidence was not unconstitutionally obtained and would be admissible at trial.
After Martinson was found guilty of a first-degree controlled substance crime, Martinson appealed the judgment to the court of appeals, which reversed the conviction, finding that Martinson's detention was unconstitutional because the officers did not have "reasonable suspicion" to justify conducting a brief investigative stop. The state then appealed to this court. We are now required to decide whether the narcotics officers had an objective reasonable suspicion justifying the investigative stop of Martinson and his luggage.
When the facts are undisputed and the trial court's decision is a question of law, this court exercises de novo review. State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.1996); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ().
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution protect a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, providing that a person may be searched if the search is preceded by probable cause and the issuance of a warrant. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an investigatory seizure is constitutional in the absence of probable cause and a warrant if the police officer can point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Similarly, this court has held that "[a] brief investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Stovall
...significance as seen by a trained agent"). State courts that have addressed this issue have held similarly. See, e.g., State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Minn. 1998) (holding that police may rely on characteristics that can be labeled drug courier profile factors in determining whethe......
-
State v. Diede
...articulable suspicion standard, we must examine the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn.1998). Generally, a police officer may “stop and temporarily seize a person to investigate that person for criminal wrongdoing if the o......
-
State v. Flowers
...We consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether reasonable, articulable suspicion exists. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn.1998). And we have noted that, by virtue of the special training they receive, police officers articulating a reasonable suspicion m......
-
State v. Wasson
...facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion." State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn.1998) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 The test articulated in Richards is "reaso......