State v. Wasson
| Decision Date | 03 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. C7-99-199.,C7-99-199. |
| Citation | 615 N.W.2d 316 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Warren Calvin WASSON, petitioner, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Mike Hatch, Atty. Gen., Natalie E. Hudson, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Earl E. Maus, Cass County Atty., Walker, for respondent.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Theodora Gaitas, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
Appellant was arrested and charged with a controlled substance offense after police executed a nighttime, no-knock search warrant at a residence where appellant was staying. Appellant moved to suppress the fruits of the search warrant on the basis that no circumstances existed to justify a no-knock search. The district court denied the motion, and appellant submitted the case to the court on stipulated facts, resulting in conviction. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. We granted appellant's petition for review solely on the issue of whether there was a sufficient basis for the unannounced search and now affirm.
Appellant was staying for an indefinite period of time at the home of James Meixner in rural Cass County. This particular house had been the object of a search pursuant to warrant in June 1997, three months previous to the October 1997 search at issue herein. In the June search numerous weapons and drugs were found on the premises.
A confidential reliable informant (CRI) visited Meixner on September 25, 1997. The CRI had previously purchased marijuana and methamphetamines from Meixner, and on this visit observed drug paraphernalia present. The informant told police that Meixner said someone named "Smiley" might have methamphetamines and possibly would stop by on September 27, 1997.
On September 26, 1997, a sheriff's deputy applied for a search warrant for Meixner's property, cars and Meixner himself. The application was based on the information from the CRI. The deputy also stated in the affidavit that he had personal knowledge that Meixner had two previous convictions for possession of controlled substances, including a conviction earlier that year. The deputy specifically requested a no-knock, nighttime entry.1 The affidavit stated that the nighttime search was sought because:
Your Affiant believes that entering onto the described property could be [sic] affected by law enforcement officers, if done under the cover of darkness, and therefor allowing for the security of property without endangering law enforcement officers or subjects who may be located within the residence or outbuildings. A[p]rior [s]earch [w]arrant was executed on the 27th of June 1997 and numerous weapons were removed [from] the residence.
The affidavit disclosed the unannounced entry was sought because:
Your Affiant knows that, through experience and training that often persons involved in narcotics trafficking and transactions carry firearms and/or other weapons to protect themselves and to protect their controlled substances. Your Affiant further knows through experience that those involved with controlled substance[s] often attempt to destroy those substances if they should [fear] substances are in [jeopardy] of being confiscated by law enforcement officers.
The deputy testified at the omnibus hearing that most of this language was taken from other search warrant affidavits, and was commonly used in drug-related search warrant applications.
A district court judge signed the warrant application September 26 and it was executed at 9:30 p.m. on October 3, 1997. When executing the warrant the officers parked about a quarter of a mile from Meixner's house. Before entering, they observed Meixner and appellant, whom they did not recognize, sitting across from each other at a coffee table, playing what appeared to be a word game. One of the officers tried the front door, and found it unlocked. The officers, in camouflage, helmets and masks, entered with guns drawn, shouting, "police."
Meixner did not move other than raising his arms above his head. Appellant was startled by the entry, and tossed the dictionary he was holding into the air. He attempted to run out of the room, and did not obey officers' commands to keep his hands where they could be seen and to stand still. Appellant held his fist clenched, and then appeared to shove the contents of his fist down the front of his pants. Officers testified they thought appellant might be hiding a weapon. The officers eventually subdued him. Officers removed a buck knife from appellant's belt and two items containing methamphetamines-an inhaler and a plastic baggie.
Appellant was arrested and charged with fifth-degree controlled substance crime. See Minn.Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (1998). He moved to suppress all the evidence obtained during the execution of the warrant, claiming there was no basis for the unannounced search. At the omnibus hearing it was first revealed that the weapons taken in the June search were ordinary hunting rifles, and had been returned to a relative of Meixner.
The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding the possible presence of guns warranted the unannounced entry. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and submitted the case on stipulated facts. He was found guilty and the court stayed imposition of his sentence on condition that he serve 90 days in the county jail and five years on probation. The court of appeals affirmed, finding in particular that the possible possession of weapons warranted the unannounced entry.
Important purposes are served by the knock and announce requirement, including preventing the unnecessary destruction of property and mistaken entry into the wrong premises, protecting against unnecessary shock and embarrassment, and decreasing the potential for a violent response. See State v. Prudhomme, 287 N.W.2d 386, 389 (Minn.1979)
. As the United States Supreme Court recently recognized, these values are protected by including in the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment an inquiry into the necessity of an unannounced entry. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995).
Given the constitutional dimension to the method of entry into a residence, evidence should be suppressed when the circumstances do not warrant an unannounced entry. See City of Minneapolis v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. 1993)
(). Where, as here, the material facts are not in dispute, we independently determine whether evidence should have been suppressed as a matter of law. See State v. Hardy, 577 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn.1998).
We laid out the principles governing an unannounced entry of a dwelling place in State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 838-39 (Minn.1978). Relevant to the particular claims appellant makes, we require the police to inform the issuing magistrate of the circumstances that they believe justify the unannounced entry and to obtain specific advance authorization for an unannounced entry. See id. at 838.2
To substantiate the need for a no-knock warrant an officer must establish more than that drugs are involved. See id. The United States Supreme Court recently held that a blanket exception for the announce requirement in all felony drug cases violates the Fourth Amendment. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 396, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997)
. In that case the Court reviewed a decision from the Wisconsin Supreme Court holding that exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock entry are always present in felony drug cases because each case involves a risk of injury to the police and the potential for the disposal of drugs by the occupants prior to entry. See id. at 390, 117 S.Ct. 1416. In Richards, the Court rejected a blanket rule for all drug cases and required more particularized findings. The Court held that "police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Id. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416.
The Court in Richards specifically distinguished the standard for issuance of the warrant itself, probable cause, from the standard for an unannounced entry, which is reasonable suspicion. In describing the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court noted, "[t]his showing is not high, but the police should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no knock entry is challenged." Id. at 394-95, 117 S.Ct. 1416. In other contexts this court has defined reasonable suspicion as something more than an unarticulated hunch, that the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue. See State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Minn.1989)
.
We turn to the affidavit in this case. Appellant is correct that Richards makes clear that the admittedly boilerplate language in the search warrant affidavit does not satisfy the requirement for a showing, particular to the search at issue, that announcing would be dangerous or allow the destruction of evidence. However, the search warrant affidavit in this case also pointed to a specific, objective piece of information: that weapons were likely present in the house given that numerous weapons were seized from the exact location just three months previously. This information, in combination with the knowledge that since execution of the June warrant Meixner had been willing to facilitate the sale of drugs at his residence to at least the CRI and perhaps others, is more than an unarticulated hunch and objectively supports a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing police presence would be dangerous. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 394,
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Bracy
...Ct. App. 2015) (rejecting nonparticularized boilerplate as supporting probable cause in drunk driving case); State v. Wasson , 615 N.W.2d 316, 320–21 (Minn. 2000) (en banc) (rejecting boilerplate in context of application for no-knock warrant). See generally Shayna Bartow, Suspects Use Cell......
-
Commonwealth v. Jimenez
...116, 130-131 (1999); State v. Miskell, 748 So. 2d 409, 413 (La. 1999); Davis v. State, 144 Md. App. 144, 152 (2002); State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 320-322 (Minn. 2000); White v. State, 746 So. 2d 953, 957 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Hamilton, 8 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Pe......
-
State v. Lindquist, A12–0599.
...cases, we determined that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred and therefore the exception was inapplicable. See State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn.2000) ; State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999) ; State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857, 864 n. 4 (Minn.1991) ; State v.......
-
State v. Davis, A05-857.
...hunch, [and] that the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue." State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn.2000). We consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, and seemingly innocent fa......