State v. Mason
| Decision Date | 17 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0202,2 CA-CR 2018-0202 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JAMES LEROY MASON JR., Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Scott Rash, Judge
AFFIRMED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel
By Mariette S. Ambri, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Joel Feinman, Pima County Public Defender
By Sarah L. Mayhew, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Chief Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
¶1 After a jury trial, James Mason was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment. On appeal, Mason argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury "on the law and defense theories," by precluding a defense witness from testifying about the victim's "prior acts of domestic violence," and by denying his motion to preclude the state from using "prejudicial titles." For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to affirming Mason's conviction. See State v. Allen, 235 Ariz. 72, ¶ 2 (App. 2014). Mason lived with and cared for his mother, J.N., and seventy-two-year-old stepfather, A.N. Because he had "a hard time getting around," A.N., who weighed 137 pounds and stood over six feet tall, spent most of his time in a recliner in the living room, eating and sleeping there, and even urinating in a container nearby. When A.N. did get up, he used a walker for support.
¶3 On Thanksgiving Day 2015, before leaving for work, Mason prepared dinner for J.N., A.N., and J.N.'s minor grandson, K.M., who was visiting. Early the next morning, when Mason returned home, he played video games with K.M. After A.N. woke up, he urinated from his recliner into the container, which started an argument between A.N. and Mason. The two continued arguing, and A.N. threatened to kick Mason out of the house.
¶4 Later, Mason told K.M., "I can't take it anymore." At Mason's direction, K.M. took J.N. to her bedroom so they did not have to hear the two men arguing. While in his grandmother's room, K.M. heard "stuff falling," and he also heard Mason say, Mason then called out to K.M., commenting, "Come look at what [A.N.] made me do to him." K.M. walked into the living room and saw A.N. slouched over in hisrecliner with a knife in his stomach. Mason, who appeared angry, threw A.N.'s walker and directed K.M. to call the police. A.N. was dead when officers arrived. An examination of A.N.'s body revealed "four sharp-force injuries" to the chest, two of which punctured his heart. Mason was charged with first-degree murder.
¶5 At trial, Mason testified that A.N. "kept guns near him all the time," including by his recliner, and that he had previously threatened to shoot Mason, even pointing a gun at Mason's head. Mason also explained that when A.N. drank alcohol, he became "aggressive" and "violent," hitting people with his cane and using vulgar language. According to Mason, A.N.'s behavior extended to other family members, including J.N. and K.M. A.N. had been drinking leading up to the incident, and Mason testified that, during their argument, A.N. threatened to shoot him and started to reach for something from his recliner. Because Mason thought A.N. was reaching for a gun and "was going to kill [him]," Mason explained that he grabbed a nearby Bowie knife and stabbed A.N.
¶6 The jury found Mason not guilty of first-degree murder but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as described above, and this appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶7 Mason argues the trial court erred by failing to give the following jury instructions: (1) under a justification defense, when there have been prior acts of domestic violence against the defendant by the victim, the defendant's state of mind should be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of such domestic violence; (2) defense of others; and (3) the weight and credibility to be given to a defendant's trial testimony. He also contends that these errors cumulatively denied him his constitutional due process right to a fair trial.
¶8 In reviewing jury instructions, we consider them "as a whole to determine whether the jury received the information necessary to arrive at a legally correct decision." State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, ¶ 51 (2009). We review for an abuse of discretion the giving or refusing of requested instructions. State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, ¶ 15 (2006). However, we review de novo whether the jury instructions accurately stated the law. State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, ¶ 47 (2008).
¶9 An objection to the trial court's "failing to give any instruction . . . must be made before the jury retires to consider its verdict." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 21.3(b); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 21.3(a) (). If a defendant fails to properly object to the instructions below, the issue is forfeited for all but fundamental, prejudicial error. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, ¶ 51; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 21.3(b) (). "A defendant establishes fundamental error by showing that (1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error took from the defendant a right essential to his defense, or (3) the error was so egregious that he could not possibly have received a fair trial." State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, ¶ 21 (2018). The first two prongs of the fundamental-error analysis also require a separate showing of prejudice. Id.
¶10 Approximately fourteen months before trial, relying on A.R.S. § 13-415, Mason filed a motion requesting the following jury instruction: "If there have been past acts of domestic violence against the defendant by the victim, the state of mind of a reasonable person shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of those past acts of domestic violence." He also requested instructions, pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(A) and 13-1203(A)(2), providing that "'[d]omestic violence' includes an assault against a stepchild" and "'[a]ssault' includes intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury." At trial, Mason testified that A.N. was "violent," physically and verbally, toward him and that he had acted in self-defense when he stabbed A.N. However, when the trial court and counsel were settling jury instructions, Mason did not mention his prior request for the state-of-mind and domestic-violence instructions, and the court did not give them.
¶11 On appeal, Mason argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider the reasonableness of his state of mind—in connection with his justification defense—from the perspective of a domestic-violence victim because he had "introduced evidence of ongoing acts of domestic violence by [A.N.]." He contends we must review this issue for harmless error because he requested the instructions before trial. The state counters that fundamental-error review applies because Mason "did not request the instructions during the settling of the instructions, despite the court's repeated invitations to add to or amend the juryinstructions, nor did he object to the absence of the instructions in the final jury instructions."
¶12 The purpose of requiring an objection to the failure to give a requested instruction below is to provide the trial court with an opportunity to address the issue and correct any error. State v. Bean, 119 Ariz. 412, 414 (App. 1978); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 21.3(b). Although trial courts have the responsibility of ruling on pending motions, "if an accused wants to rely on the [matters] raised in those motions he or she has the responsibility of bringing them to the court's attention and seeing that a record of the rulings makes its way to the reviewing court." State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 326, 328 (1983). Here, although Mason requested the state-of-mind and domestic-violence instructions in a pretrial filing, he did not re-urge the issue at trial during the settling of the jury instructions, instead indicating that he had nothing else to add to the final packet of instructions. Consequently, the trial court did not address Mason's request from over a year earlier. The argument is therefore forfeited for all but fundamental, prejudicial error.1 See Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, ¶ 21.
¶13 Pursuant to § 13-415, "If there have been past acts of domestic violence as defined in § 13-3601, subsection A against the defendant by the victim, the state of mind of a reasonable person" purportedly acting in self-defense under A.R.S. §§ 13-404 and 13-405 "shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person who has been a victim of those past acts of domestic violence." As this court has explained, § 13-415 "is a limited statutory codification of Arizona case law holding that prior acts of violence by the [victim] are generally admissible as evidence of [the] defendant's state of mind if the defendant either personally observed the acts or was aware of the acts before the homicide." State v. Vogel, 207 Ariz. 280, n.4 (App. 2004). Before § 13-415 was added, "the Recommended Arizona Jury Instruction for...
To continue reading
Request your trial