State v. Mason

• Decision Date: 31 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 24736.,24736.
• Citation: 95 S.W.3d 206
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William H. MASON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

95 S.W.3d 206

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William H. MASON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 24736.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

January 31, 2003.

David A. Yarger, Versailles, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Breck K. Burgess, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for respondent.

KENNETH W. SHRUM, Judge.

William Mason ("Defendant") appeals his conviction for second-degree statutory rape in violation of § 566.034, RSMo (2000).¹ Defendant urges reversal based upon the following: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in that the victim's testimony was uncorroborated; (2) the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings; (3) the "senior judge" who tried the case "was without jurisdiction" because the case was never assigned to him; and (4) the jury was "coerced" into a guilty verdict because it was required to deliberate the same day it spent twelve hours hearing evidence. Finding no merit in these claims, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.

FACTS

Defendant was the stepfather of C.L.K. ("Victim"), a female born July 3, 1985. Originally, Victim's mother ("Mother") cohabited with Defendant, but then married him in 1993. Beginning with the cohabitation period and until March 20, 2001, Victim and her younger brother lived with Mother and Defendant. According to Victim, Defendant started abusing her sometime before 1993.

In the fall of 2000, Victim began dating seventeen-year-old D.C. ("Boyfriend"). Soon, Victim and Boyfriend began skipping school so they could go to the mall or to Boyfriend's house where "sometimes [they] ... would have sex." To explain her absences from school, Victim forged Mother's signature on over twenty "excuse" notes and gave them to school officials. When Victim began her relationship with Boyfriend, Defendant repeatedly objected and "broke [them] up approximately three or four times." He also accused Victim of having sex with Boyfriend.

On March 20, 2001, Defendant awakened Mother and showed her a letter he had found in Victim's clothing. The letter, written by Boyfriend, contained sexually explicit details about their conduct. Defendant's questions to Victim about the letter led to an argument between them. During this confrontation, Defendant again accused Victim of having sex with Boyfriend and demanded that she stop seeing him. Victim responded by becoming "very emotional," repeatedly denied misconduct with Boyfriend, and accused Defendant of a long-term sexual relationship with her. When Mother turned to Defendant to ask about the accusation, she described him as having "a look of being caught." Moreover, Defendant's only response to Mother's inquiry was: "That's bullshit."

Defendant said nothing further to Mother or Victim, but began writing out a will leaving his possessions to his biological daughter, B.M. Then, Defendant retrieved a gun from a closet and threatened suicide. Thereon, Mother left with the children, and she and Victim reported the crime to the police. Defendant was arrested later that day at the home.

At trial, Victim testified Defendant began fondling her breasts when she was approximately seven years of age. He began having sexual intercourse with her (at least once per week) when she was ten years old. Dr. Brayfield, a physician who examined Victim, testified that her physical and mental condition was consistent with sexual assault. His findings included a "defect" in Victim's hymen. When asked if he could tell whether the defect was caused by intercourse with an eighteen-year-old or a fifty-year-old man, Dr. Brayfield answered, "no." He also admitted he did not know when the defect occurred.

The offense for which Defendant was convicted was the last time he had intercourse with Victim, specifically on March 20, 2001. Victim testified she had been up late trying to get a younger sibling to sleep. She finally went to her bedroom between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., whereon she found Defendant asleep in her bed. Victim wanted Defendant out of her bed; so, she woke him and told him she had school the next day. Defendant told her to lie down, and she complied. He then undressed Victim, undressed himself, got on top of Victim, and put his penis in her vagina. After about ten minutes, Defendant removed his penis from inside Victim and ejaculated on her stomach. He then wiped off her stomach with a paper towel, got up, dressed, and went to the living room couch.

After Defendant was charged, his case was moved to Laclede County on a change of venue and tried before Judge Carl Gum, a senior judge. After a two-day trial (November 1-2, 2001), the jury retired at 8:00 p.m. on the second day and returned a guilty verdict of second-degree statutory rape approximately three hours later. This appeal followed.

Point I: Submissibility of the Case

Defendant's first point maintains there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. He claims the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal because evidence of the crime consisted solely of Victim's testimony that "was so contradictory, incomplete, and so indefinite after having been impeached ... that such evidence required corroboration." In essence, Defendant claims that Victim's out-of-court statements and deposition testimony, where she admittedly lied repeatedly about her relationship with Boyfriend and other collateral matters, rendered her at-trial testimony inherently unreliable unless corroborated.

Regarding her deposition testimony, Defendant maintains that Victim lied therein when she (1) denied any sexual intercourse with Boyfriend; (2) denied the validity of what Boyfriend put in his letter about their sexual conduct; (3) denied Boyfriend had furnished her with a home pregnancy kit; (4) denied sex acts with Boyfriend when they skipped school; and (5) did not mention she had initially assured Mother of the truthfulness of her claims of no sex with Boyfriend. As to her out-of-court statements, Defendant points to evidence that (1) Victim lied to police, Family Services, Mother, Defendant, and Dr. Brayfield regarding her sexual relationship with Boyfriend; (2) Victim forged documents given to the school when she skipped classes; (3) Victim lied to Mother and Defendant about going to the movies; and (4) Victim's pre-trial statements were that Defendant had sex with her twice monthly, but at trial, claimed this occurred each week. Because of these inconsistencies and contradictions, Defendant claims her testimony must be corroborated. We disagree.

In deciding if the State made a submissible case, we review the facts and inferences reasonably drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the State; all contrary facts and inferences must be disregarded. State v. Young, 42 S.W.3d 729, 732-33[2] (Mo.App.2001). "The determination of a witness' credibility and the effects of conflicting or inconsistent testimony are for the trier of fact." State v. Barnes, 980 S.W.2d 314, 320[15] (Mo.App.1998).

Generally, in sexual offense cases, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349, 353[5] (Mo.banc 1981); State v. Wood, 355 Mo. 1008, 199 S.W.2d 396, 398 (1947). There are instances, however, when courts have overturned verdicts by applying the so-called "corroboration rule." See, e.g., State v. Wade, 306 Mo. 457, 268 S.W. 52 (1924) and cases cited therein. The rule applies when the testimony of the victim "is so inherently contradictory or unbelievable as to cloud the mind of the court with doubt." State v. Salkil, 659 S.W.2d 330, 333[3] (Mo.App.1983). Even so, such instances are rare as Missouri courts look with disfavor on the "corroboration rule" and apply it restrictively only in cases where there are "`gross inconsistencies and contradictions which bear on proof essential to a case.'" State v. Kelley, 83 S.W.3d 36, 43[12] (Mo.App.2002) (quoting State v. Nelson, 818 S.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Mo.App. 1991)). If the contradictions or inconsistencies relate to something other than elements of the crime, the rule is inapplicable. State v. Lee, 404 S.W.2d 740, 747-48 (Mo. 1966); Salkil, 659 S.W.2d at 333[3].

Here, Defendant first argues that Victim's testimony had to be corroborated because of her false statements to Dr. Brayfield, i.e., her denials of sexual intercourse with Boyfriend. Defendant insists the corroboration rule controls the case at bar because "[t]he essential element [in this case] is, does her physical condition, as testified to by Dr. Brayfield, result from acts of [Defendant] or from the sexual relationship between her and [Boyfriend?]" Defendant is mistaken in such argument.

Establishing the cause of the defect in Victim's hymen was not an element of the crime charged. A person commits the crime of statutory rape in the second degree if, being over twenty-one years of age, "he has sexual intercourse with another person who is less than seventeen years of age." § 566.034.1. The jury could have interpreted Dr. Brayfield's finding as corroborative of Victim's claim that Defendant had sexual intercourse with her, but it was in no way essential to prove the crime of second-degree statutory rape.

Defendant's argument also fails because it ignores the fact that Victim's at-trial account of what Defendant did to her was consistent with what she first told her mother and then told others who investigated her complaints. In graphic detail, Victim unequivocally testified Defendant had sexual intercourse with her at a time when she was age fifteen and he was older than twenty-one. Dr. Brayfield testified that when he interviewed Victim, she gave him the same details about Defendant's conduct as related by her at trial. Victim also gave an investigator the same "clear, concise history of sexual assault[]" as recounted by her at trial. Moreover, Victim's deposition testimony about the elements of the crime was...