State v. Young

Decision Date06 February 2001
Citation42 S.W.3d 729
Parties(Mo.App. W.D. 2001) . State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Larry L. Young, Appellant WD58171 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Handdown Date: 0
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Miller County, Hon. Mary A. Dickerson

Counsel for Appellant: Dennis Owens

Counsel for Respondent: Susan K. Glass

Opinion Summary: Larry L. Young appeals his convictions of acceding to corruption and failure to execute an arrest warrant.

AFFIRMED.

Division One holds:

(1) From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably found that Young accepted sexual intercourse from Tammy Belk in return for not arresting her, even though it rejected the State's argument that the intercourse was non-consensual.

(2) There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Young did not execute the warrant for Belk's arrest for the purpose of allowing Belk to escape. Even if the jury did believe that the sheriff had the warrant pulled for the purpose of allowing Belk to continue her work as a confidential informant, the jury was free to believe that Young's purpose in not executing the warrant was different, i.e., so that Belk could avoid arrest and remain free and they could continue their sexual relationship.

Opinion Author: Victor C. Howard, Judge

Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. Breckenridge, P.J., and Ulrich, J., concur.

Opinion:

Larry L. Young appeals from his convictions of acceding to corruption, section 576.020,1 and failure to execute an arrest warrant, section 575.180. Young raises two points on appeal. First, he claims the trial court erred in refusing to direct the verdict on the acceding to corruption count because the State failed as a matter of law to prove the elements of acceding to corruption in that there was no evidence that he received the benefit described in the information, sexual intercourse, as established by the jury's rejection of the sexual assault count and the State's failure to present any evidence of sexual intercourse other than its failed theory of rape. Second, Young claims the trial court erred in refusing to direct the verdict on the count of failure to execute an arrest warrant because the State failed as a matter of law to prove the elements of failure to execute an arrest warrant in that the State failed to offer any evidence that he had the purpose of allowing Tammy Belk to escape.

We affirm.

Facts

Larry L. Young was charged by information filed on April 19, 1999, with the class C felony of sexual assault, section 566.040, the class D felony of acceding to corruption, section 576.020, and the class D felony of failure to execute an arrest warrant, section 575.180. Young was charged by first amended information, filed on May 4, 1999, as follows:

Count 1

The special prosecuting attorney of Miller County, State of Missouri, charges that the above named defendant, in violation of Section 566.040, RSMo, committed the class C felony of sexual assault, punishable upon conviction under Sections 558.011 and 560.011, RSMo, in that between September and December 1998, in the County of Miller, State of Missouri, he had sexual intercourse with Tammy Belk-Moore after exerting duress upon her to do so, knowing that he did so without the consent of Tammy Belk-Moore.

Count 2

The special prosecuting attorney of Miller County, State of Missouri, charges that the above named defendant, in violation of Section 576.020, RSMo, committed the class D felony of acceding to corruption, punishable upon conviction under Sections 558.011.1(4) and 560.011, RSMo, in that between September 11 and December 31, 1998, in the County of Miller, State of Missouri, Larry L. Young, being a deputy for the Miller County Sheriffs Department, knowingly accepted a benefit, namely, sexual intercourse from Tammy Belk-Moore, in return for his violation of his known legal duty, namely, not arresting her on a Miller County warrant for felony bad checks.

Count 3

The special prosecuting attorney of Miller County, State of Missouri, charges that the above named defendant, in violation of in violation of [sic] Section 575.180, RSMo, committed the class D felony of failure to execute an arrest warrant, punishable upon conviction under Sections 558.011.1(4) and 560.011, RSMo, in that between September 11 and December 31, 1998 in the County of Miller, State of Missouri, the defendant was a law enforcement officer authorized and required by law to execute a felony arrest warrant for bad checks which had been issued for the arrest of Tammy Belk-Moore, and for the purpose of allowing Tammy Belk-Moore to escape, failed to execute, or attempt to execute, said warrant.

The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is as follows. In September 1998, Tammy Belk contacted Larry Young, a deputy with the Miller County Sheriff's Department, about becoming a confidential informant. As a result of this conversation, Belk agreed to participate in a drug buy on September 11, 1998. On that same day, Belk first learned that a warrant had been issued for her arrest in Miller County for bad check charges. The warrant had been received by the Miller County Sheriff's Department and entered into the computer system on September 10, 1998, but had been cleared from the computer on September 20, 1998. At some point after the September 11, 1998 drug buy, Belk received a page from Young. When Belk called Young back, he asked her to meet him at the C&C gas station later that evening. When she arrived at the gas station, she again called Young and he went there to meet her. Because Young did not want to be seen with Belk, he asked her to meet him near F Highway. Before they left the gas station, however, Young told Belk that a warrant had been issued for her arrest, but that it had been taken out of the computer and placed in a desk drawer.

When they arrived at F Highway, Young told Belk that he had feelings for her and that he was not going to be able to participate in future drug buys with her. He again told her about the arrest warrant and told her that if she had sex with him, she would not go to jail. Young then got out of his patrol car and walked with Belk to the passenger side of the car. Belk then laid down in the front seat of the car and engaged in sexual intercourse with Young.

Over the next few months, Belk and Young engaged in sexual intercourse five more times. Although Belk could not remember the specific dates on which these incidents occurred, she testified that they engaged in sexual intercourse on three occasions at Young's house and two occasions at her house. On each occasion, Young reminded Belk of the arrest warrant and let her know what he expected in return for pulling the warrant out of the computer.

On January 15, 1999, the warrant for Belk's arrest was reentered into the computer. Belk was ultimately arrested on this warrant on January 30, 1999, in Wentzville.

Young testified at trial. He admitted to meeting with Belk at the C&C gas station and telling her that he had feelings for her. However, he denied that he had ever engaged in sexual intercourse with Belk. He further testified that he did not arrest Belk despite being aware of the warrant against her because he had been informed that the warrant was taken care of because she was serving as a confidential informant to the sheriff's department.

Following a jury trial, Young was acquitted of Count I, sexual assault, and convicted of Count II, acceding to corruption, and Count III, failure to execute an arrest warrant. Young was sentenced to pay the maximum fine of $5,000 on both Counts II and III, for a total of $10,000. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our review of the denial of a motion for acquittal is limited to whether the evidence is sufficient to make a submissible case, and whether there is sufficient evidence from which reasonable persons could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Moon, 602 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Mo.App. W.D. 1980); see also State v. Foster, 930 S.W.2d 62, 63-64 (Mo.App. E.D. 1996). In testing the sufficiency of the evidence, facts and favorable inferences reasonably drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and all contrary inferences and evidence must be disregarded. Id.

Point I

Young's first point on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to direct the verdict on Count II, acceding to corruption, because the State failed as a matter of law to prove the elements of acceding to corruption in that there was no evidence that he received the benefit described in the information, sexual intercourse, as established by the jury's rejection of Count I for sexual assault and the State's failure to present any evidence of sexual intercourse other than its failed theory of rape.

Section 566.040.1 provides that "[a] person commits the crime of sexual assault if he has sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he does so without that person's consent." Section 576.020.1 provides that "[a] public servant commits the crime of acceding to corruption if he...

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