State v. Mathews

Decision Date25 May 2022
Docket NumberA22A0460
Citation364 Ga.App. 39,873 S.E.2d 723
Parties The STATE v. MATHEWS.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Elizabeth Dalia Racine, Aimee Fatemeh Sobhani, for Appellant.

Dorian Murry, Union City, Leigh Ann Webster, Atlanta, for Appellee.

McFadden, Presiding Judge.

After stopping Ivan Mathews for a traffic violation, a police officer began a broader criminal investigation based on his belief that he smelled marijuana when he approached Mathews’ vehicle. That broader investigation ultimately led to a warrantless search of the vehicle without Mathews’ consent. The trial court granted Mathews’ motion to suppress evidence seized in the search on the ground that the state had not shown that, at the time of the stop, the officer had been trained to detect the odor of marijuana. But the officer testified that he did have some experience in detecting the odor of marijuana, and that experience could also provide the reasonable articulable suspicion needed for the broader investigation. Because the trial court made no express findings of fact about the officer's experience, we vacate the order suppressing the evidence and remand the case to the trial court.

1. Facts and procedural history.

"When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the trial court's factual findings and judgment. An appellate court also generally must limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court." Caffee v. State , 303 Ga. 557, 814 S.E.2d 386 (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted). "These principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the [s]tate or the defendant." State v. Hinton , 309 Ga. 457, 457-458, 847 S.E.2d 188 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

So viewed, the evidence shows that on August 18, 2020, a police officer stopped a vehicle driven by Mathews for failing to maintain its lane of travel. See OCGA § 40-6-48. The officer approached the vehicle, asked Mathews for his identification and registration, and told him why he had been stopped. Then, prompted by his belief that he had smelled the odor of unburnt marijuana, the officer converted the traffic stop into a drug investigation.

Although the trial court made no express findings on what occurred after that point, it appears to be undisputed that the officer asked another officer with a drug dog to come to the scene, and when the drug dog arrived it alerted to the presence of marijuana. Law enforcement officers then searched Mathews’ vehicle without his consent, finding marijuana and handguns. Mathews was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, OCGA § 16-13-30 (j), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, OCGA § 16-11-106.

Mathews sought to suppress the marijuana and handguns, arguing among other things, that the vehicle search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officer had unlawfully detained him until the drug dog's alert by prolonging the traffic stop. The trial court agreed. The state was not authorized to convert the traffic stop into a drug investigation, the trial court concluded, because it had not satisfied its burden of showing reasonable articulable suspicion. It had not satisfied that burden because the officer's "belief that he smelled the odor of unburnt marijuana [was] not supported by the evidence." That belief was unsupported because there was no convincing evidence that, before the traffic stop on August 18, 2020, the officer had received training on detecting the odor of marijuana.

In her order, the trial court made express factual findings about the officer's lack of training. To the extent the officer testified otherwise on the issue of his training, as the state asserts, the trial court was not required to accept that testimony. See Caffee , 303 Ga. at 559 (1), 814 S.E.2d 386. We must "assume that the trial court rejected the credibility of the officer to the extent that the officer's testimony is inconsistent with the court's decision." State v. Mathis , 338 Ga. App. 86, 91 (1), 789 S.E.2d 336 (2016).

The officer also testified at the hearing on Mathews’ motion about his experience detecting the odor of marijuana. But in her order, the trial court made no express factual findings on that point, stating only that Mathews had "not raised any issue as to [the officer's] experience." Instead, the trial court held that the officer's lack of training was dispositive.

The trial court acknowledged that the officer had testified about other details of the traffic stop that, the state argued, supported a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal drug activity. Without evidence that the officer smelled marijuana, the trial court held, those other factors were not enough to provide the necessary reasonable suspicion.

2. Analysis.

"The [s]tate bears the burden of proving that the search of [Mathews’] car was lawful, and to carry this burden, the [s]tate must show that it was lawful to detain [Mathews] until the time the drug dog indicated the presence of drugs." Dominguez v. State , 310 Ga. App. 370, 372, 714 S.E.2d 25 (2011) (citation omitted). And

[a] dog sniff of a traffic-stopped vehicle is not fairly characterized as part of the officer's traffic mission, because it is a measure aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Consequently, prolonging a traffic stop in order to conduct an open-air dog sniff renders the seizure unlawful, even if that process adds very little time to the stop.

State v. Allen , 298 Ga. 1, 5 (2) (a), 779 S.E.2d 248 (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted). An officer may convert the traffic stop to a broader criminal investigation only if the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity. See McNeil v. State , 362 Ga. App. 85, 90, 866 S.E.2d 249 (2021).

The state argues that the officer did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop because the traffic stop was ongoing when the drug dog arrived at the scene and alerted to Mathews’ vehicle. But the trial court expressly found that the officer began the drug investigation as soon as he approached the vehicle and smelled what he believed to be marijuana. The officer admitted as much at the hearing. When asked by the state whether his "approach to the case" changed "[o]n approach to the vehicle and after detecting the odor of marijuana," the officer responded, "[y]eah, it turned into a drug investigation." Because the trial court found that the purpose of the investigation changed almost immediately, she made no express factual findings about whether the officer completed the tasks associated with the traffic stop in a reasonable period of time. See Reyes v. State , 334 Ga. App. 552, 555 (2), 780 S.E.2d 674 (2015) ("a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures") (citation and punctuation omitted). So we cannot reverse on the basis that the trial court could have construed the evidence to find that the traffic stop was ongoing when the dog alerted to Mathews’ car. See Miller v. State , 288 Ga. 286, 289 (2), 702 S.E.2d 888 (2010) (an appellate court will not reverse a trial court's ruling based on evidence not mentioned in the...

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