State v. Mathis, 01-671.

• Decision Date: 25 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-671.,01-671.
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James MATHIS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

68 P.3d 756

2003 MT 112

315 Mont. 378

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James MATHIS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 01-671.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs October 17, 2002.

Decided April 25, 2003.

James Mathis (pro se).

Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Kirsten LaCroix, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana, for Respondent.

Justice JIM REGNIER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 After receiving a citation for speeding in a construction zone, Appellant James Mathis challenged the constitutionality of § 61-8-314, MCA, contending that the provision unlawfully delegated legislative authority to an administrative agency and/or private party. The District Court for the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, rejected Mathis's constitutional challenge and the case proceeded to a jury trial. Mathis moved for a directed verdict following the close of the State's case-in-chief. The District Court denied Mathis's motion and the jury subsequently convicted Mathis of the offense. Mathis appeals from the District Court's conclusions regarding the constitutional issues and from its denial of his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.

¶ 2 Mathis raises the following issues on appeal:

¶ 3 1. Does § 61-8-314, MCA, unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to an administrative agency or private party?

¶ 4 2. Did the District Court err when it denied Mathis's motion for a directed verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence?

BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Prior to September 2000, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") contracted with ECM, Inc., to perform construction on Interstate 90 east of Missoula, Montana. ECM subcontracted to Alpine Construction, Inc., its duty to post construction and reduced speed limit signs in the construction zone. Alpine Construction, Inc., posted temporary signs alerting motorists to the construction which lay ahead approximately 8250 feet prior to where ECM commenced work. The speed limit signs gradually reduced the speed of traffic from seventy-five miles per hour to thirty-five miles per hour nearest the work area. At the end of the construction zone, a sign indicated a return to the normal seventy-five mile per hour speed limit.

¶ 6 On September 6, 2000, a Montana Highway Patrol officer encountered Mathis's vehicle traveling fifty-three miles per hour in the thirty-five mile per hour zone on Interstate 90 near Turah, Montana. Therefore, the officer issued Mathis a speeding ticket pursuant to § 61-8-314, MCA. Mathis subsequently pled not guilty in the Missoula County Justice Court and moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that (1) § 61-8-314, MCA, unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the executive branch and/or to private parties and (2) the DOT and/or private contractor did not follow proper procedure to reduce the speed limit in the construction zone. The Justice Court denied Mathis's motion and a jury convicted Mathis of the offense on February 20, 2001. On March 2, 2001, Mathis appealed the conviction to the District Court.

¶ 7 In District Court, Mathis moved to dismiss the charge on the same grounds. On May 17, 2001, the District Court denied Mathis's motion and the case proceeded to trial. Mathis moved for a directed verdict following the State's presentation of its case-in-chief. The District Court denied Mathis's motion and the jury convicted Mathis of the offense on May 31, 2001. On July 30, 2001, Mathis filed a notice of appeal challenging the District Court's conclusions with regard to the constitutionality of § 61-8-314, MCA, and its denial of his motion for a directed verdict.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law. We review a district court's application of the Constitution to determine if it is correct. State v. Stanko, 1998 MT 321, ¶ 14, 292 Mont. 192, ¶ 14, 974 P.2d 1132, ¶ 14. It is the duty of courts, if possible, to construe statutes in a manner that avoids unconstitutional interpretation. Stanko, ¶ 15. We review a district court's decision to deny a criminal defendant's motion for a directed verdict for an abuse of discretion. State v. Billedeaux, 2001 MT 9, ¶ 8, 304 Mont. 89, ¶ 8, 18 P.3d 990, ¶ 8.

DISCUSSION

ISSUE ONE

¶ 9 Does § 61-8-314, MCA, unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to an administrative agency or private party?

¶ 10 Section 61-8-314, MCA, provides, in pertinent part:

(3) The speed limit in a construction zone or in a work zone must be set by the department of transportation or the local authority based on traffic conditions or the condition of the construction, repair, maintenance, or survey project.

(4)(a) If the department of transportation, the local authority, the utility company, or the private contractor determines, based on traffic conditions or the condition of the construction, repair, maintenance, or survey project, that special speed limits in work zones or construction zones are warranted, then the department, the local authority, the utility company, or the private contractor shall post signs that:

(i) conform to the department of transportation's manual on uniform traffic control devices;

(ii) indicate the boundaries of the construction zone and the work zone; and

(iii) display the speed limit in effect within both zones.

....

(5) (a) A person convicted of a traffic violation in a work zone is guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon arrest and conviction, the person shall be punished by a fine of not less than double the penalty provided for the violation in part 7 of this chapter.

(b) A person convicted of a traffic violation in a construction zone is guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon arrest and conviction, the person is subject to the penalty provided for the violation in part 7 of this chapter.

¶ 11 Mathis contends that the Legislature cannot delegate law-making functions, such as the establishment of speed limits, to an administrative agency or private party. Mathis admits that the Legislature can delegate ministerial functions so long as it provides clear standards and guidelines to the implementing entity. Mathis argues that § 61-8-314, MCA, fails to articulate the requisite guidelines, vesting "unbridled discretion" in the DOT. Accordingly, Mathis insists that we must strike § 61-8-314, MCA, down as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

¶ 12 The State argues that § 61-8-314, MCA, articulates "specific standards for the DOT or other entities performing roadwork to follow when reducing speed limits in a construction zone." According to the State, the Legislature expressed such standards by requiring the entity to affix speed limits in accordance with the "traffic conditions or the condition of the construction, repair, maintenance, or survey project." Therefore, the State concludes that § 61-8-314, MCA, sufficiently satisfies the requirements imposed upon the Legislature for delegating ministerial functions.

¶ 13 The District Court concluded that § 61-8-314, MCA, is constitutional in that it sets forth, with reasonable clarity, the limitations on the DOT's discretion in setting speed limits in construction and work zones and does not delegate the establishment of a crime to either the DOT or private contractors.

¶ 14 Article III, Section 1, of the Montana Constitution provides:

Separation of powers. The power of the government of this state is divided into three distinct branches legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons charged with the exercise of power properly belonging to one branch shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.

¶ 15 We have previously held that the authority to establish speed limits is legislative in nature. See Lee v. State (1981), 195 Mont. 1, 8, 635 P.2d 1282, 1286

; Stanko, ¶ 28. The Legislature may constitutionally delegate its legislative functions to an administrative agency, but it must provide, with reasonable clarity, limitations upon the agency's discretion and provide the agency with policy guidance. In re Petition to Transfer Territory, 2000 MT 342, ¶ 13, 303 Mont. 204, ¶ 13, 15 P.3d 447, ¶ 13. In Bacus v. Lake County (1960), 138 Mont. 69, 78, 354 P.2d 1056, 1061, we stated the rule as follows:

The law-making power may not be granted to an administrative body to be exercised under the guise of administrative discretion. Accordingly, in delegating powers to an administrative body with respect to the administration of statutes, the legislature must ordinarily prescribe a policy, standard, or rule for their guidance and must not vest them with an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion with regard thereto, and a statute or ordinance which is deficient in this respect is invalid. In other words, in order to avoid the pure delegation of legislative power by the creation of an administrative agency, the legislature must set limits on such agency's power and enjoin on it a certain course of procedure and rules of decision in the performance of its function; and, if the legislature fails to prescribe with reasonable clarity the limits of power delegated to an administrative agency, or if those limits are too broad, its attempt to delegate is a nullity.

On the other hand, a statute is complete and validly delegates administrative authority when nothing with respect to a determination of what is the law is left to the administrative agency, and its provisions are sufficiently clear, definite, and certain to enable the agency to know its rights and obligation.

¶ 16 In Duck Inn, Inc. v. Montana State Univ. (1997), 285 Mont. 519, 949 P.2d 1179, Montana State University Northern ("Northern") rented its facilities to private persons and organizations for parties, reunions, conventions, and receptions in order to generate supplemental revenue. The Duck Inn, a...