State v. Matthes

• Decision Date: 14 April 1930
• Docket Number: 39962
• Citation: 230 N.W. 522,210 Iowa 178
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. NORVAL MATTHES, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

230 N.W. 522

210 Iowa 178

STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. NORVAL MATTHES, Appellant

No. 39962

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 14, 1930

Appeal from Johnson District Court.--R. G. POPHAM, Judge.

Defendant was indicted for willful and unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. He was convicted by a jury, and from a judgment entered thereon he appeals.

Reversed.

E. A Baldwin and Frank F. Messer, for appellant.

John Fletcher, Attorney-general, and F. B. Olsen, County Attorney for appellee.

FAVILLE J. MORLING, C. J., and EVANS, STEVENS, KINDIG, and WAGNER, JJ., concur. DE GRAFF, J., dissents.

OPINION

FAVILLE, J.

The evidence tends to show that the appellant rented a small room over a garage belonging to one Chaddick, and that the means of access to said room was through a door from a haymow in the barn belonging to Chaddick, to which the garage was attached. A door leading from the attic of the garage to the adjacent alley was nailed shut from the inside. The evidence tended to show that the appellant placed a padlock upon the door leading into the attic from the haymow. The officers who were about to search said place caused Chaddick to ask the appellant to come to the place, which he did. The officers took a key from the appellant, which fitted said padlock, and, entering said attic of the garage, found therein more than 30 empty pint bottles, jugs, quart jars, tin cans, and 45 one-gallon tin cans filled with alcohol. A still was also seized by the officers at said time. Chaddick testified that he did not have any key to the padlock.

I. After proper identification, the still referred to was offered in evidence by the State. The appellant's objection thereto was that it was incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant, and not tending to prove any of the allegations of the indictment. The objection was general and indefinite. The still was a part of the paraphernalia seized at the time of the search in question. The court did not err in overruling the objection that was interposed to the offer of this exhibit. State v. Bryant, 208 Iowa 816, 225 N.W. 854; State v. Burzette, 208 Iowa 818, 222 N.W. 394; State v. Campbell, 209 Iowa 519, 228 N.W. 22.

II. The court gave the jury the following instruction on reasonable doubt:

"A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary one, or one that is based upon conjecture or speculation, or one that must be sought after, in order to be found; but it is such a doubt as arises of itself in your minds, without being sought after, either from a consideration of the facts in the evidence before you, or for want of evidence upon a material matter, and causes you involuntarily to hesitate before reaching a conclusion of the defendant's guilt. If, upon a full and fair consideration of all the evidence before you, or from any lack of evidence upon any material fact, you are abidingly satisfied and convinced that the material matters necessary to establish the guilt of the defendant are true, then you have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt."

This instruction is somewhat ambiguous. It cannot be sustained. From the last sentence of said instruction, which we have italicized, the jury may well have understood that if, upon a full and fair consideration of all of the evidence, or from a lack of evidence upon any material fact, they were abidingly satisfied and convinced of the guilt of the appellant, then they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. The correct rule is, of course, that if, from a lack of evidence, the jury entertains a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, they are to acquit him; but this is quite a different thing from convicting a defendant upon a lack of evidence upon any material fact. The jury might readily have construed this instruction to place a burden upon the appellant which the law does not require him to assume.

We have recently had occasion to fully discuss the question of an instruction upon reasonable doubt involving the element of a lack of evidence, in State v. Anderson, 209 Iowa 510, 228 N.W. 353. The instruction in the instant case, however, does not conform to the rule therein announced with regard to a reasonable doubt which may arise from a lack or want of evidence. The instruction in question would seem to authorize a jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt from a lack of evidence upon any material fact. Such cannot be the law, and the instruction as given was not only erroneous, but obviously was prejudicial to the appellant. It was error to give it.

III. Error is predicated upon the giving of Instruction No. 4, which was a copy of Section 1924, Code, 1927, which, in general terms, covers the various forms of the prohibitory liquor law. Complaint is made that the instruction did not limit the offense to the strict subject of unlawful possession, but included a reference to the various forms of violation which are prohibited by the statute. The objection is without merit. No prejudice could have resulted to the appellant from the giving of the instruction. The indictment and the instruction of the court were limited to one subject-matter, to wit, unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. State v. Wareham, 205 Iowa 604, 218 N.W. 145.

IV. Complaint is made because the court gave an instruction defining the term "burden of proof." The court properly instructed the jury that the burden rested upon the State to prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The definition of "burden of proof" might well have been omitted from the instructions, but when the instructions are read in their entirety, there was no prejudice to the appellant by the giving of said instruction.

V. Complaint is made because, in giving Instruction No. 7, the court said: "The law further provides that courts and juries shall construe the laws in regard to intoxicating liquors so as to prevent evasion." Such is the provision of the statute. Code Section 1922. This has been the statutory law in this state for nearly 80 years, since the Code of 1851, Section 929.

In Woolheather v. Risley, 38 Iowa 486 (1874), in an action for damages for injuries from the sale of intoxicating liquor, we said:

"But the statute provides that: 'Courts and juries shall construe this statute so as to prevent evasions' of its provisions, Code Sec. 1554, which changes the common-law rule generally applied to criminal statutes."

In Cox v. Burnham, 120 Iowa 43, 94 N.W. 265 (1903), we said:

"Statutes designed to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors are to be construed and interpreted by the rules having application to statutes generally, save as modified by Section 2431 of the Code, which provides that it shall be the duty of courts and jurors to construe the general chapter relating to the subject of intoxicating liquors so as to prevent evasion. The matter of prime importance in any case is to ascertain what was the intent of the legislature. For this purpose, the act itself is to be relied upon, in the first instance. If it be found that the terms are ambiguous, or the meaning obscure, resort may be had to the defects in the law as previously existing, and the evils sought to be remedied. In cases like the one before us, consideration may be given also to that general policy of the state which it may be presumed the legislature had in mind when framing the enactment. Wheelock v. Madison Co., 75 Iowa 147, 39 N.W. 243; Brown v. Lewis, 76 Iowa 159, 40 N.W. 698; Glass v. Cedar Rapids, 68 Iowa 207, 26 N.W. 75. So, too, statutes in pari materia are oftentimes important aids to correct interpretation. State v. Sherman, 46 Iowa 415."

In Wright v. District Court, 171 Iowa 596, 153 N.W. 157 (1915), a contempt case, we said:

"Courts are, by statute, Code Sec. 2431, required to so administer the law for the suppression of the liquor traffic as to prevent its evasion. This does not require or authorize the court to hold the defendant guilty of contempt without substantial evidence on which to base the finding, but it does emphasize the court's duty to scrutinize the record, and, if an offense is fairly established, to assess the penalty which the statute prescribes."

In State v. Snyder, 185 Iowa 728, 171 N.W. 8 (1919), we said:

"The trial court instructed the jury that, under the statute, courts and jurors should construe the statute prohibiting the liquor traffic so as to prevent evasion. This is complained of, the thought being that the construction of statutes is one of law for the court, and not one of fact for the jury. But the statute itself, Code Section 2431, provides that jurors, as well as courts, shall construe the chapter in regard to alleged violations of the liquor law so as to prevent evasion. The jurors would know nothing about this statute, if they were not informed by the court, and we think it was proper for the court to give the instruction in question."

In State v. Elliott, 198 Iowa 71, 199 N.W. 270 (1924), we said:

"The only remaining question requiring consideration is the contention that the court committed error in Paragraph 7 of its charge to the jury. The court in this instruction told the jury that it was its duty to fully and fairly consider and weigh the testimony, and to so construe the same as to prevent evasions of the law with reference to the sale of intoxicating liquors. Doubtless the court had in mind the appellant's contention that the scene or location of his business was not a 'place,' within the contemplation of the law. The court did not define 'a building, erection, or place,' but submitted the question to the jury as to whether the business was carried on in a place which violated Section 2384. The giving of this instruction does not constitute reversible error."

In State v. Comer, 198 Iowa 740, 200 N.W....